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1.1 Introduction  
One in four people in the world—more than 1.5 billion people—lived in fragile and 
conflict-affected states (FCSs) in 2011 (World Bank, 2011a).1 This number has likely 
grown due to recent crises in countries such as Syria and Iraq. Most of these 
conflict-affected states are among the poorest in the world. People who reside in 
conflict-affected states are more likely to live in extreme poverty and receive less 
education and healthcare than people who reside in countries that are not affected 
by conflict. Many FCSs experience recurrent cycles of conflict and lag behind in 
their development. Despite these challenges, official development aid (ODA) to 
conflict-affected states has steadily decreased over the past few years (OECD, 
2014). In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) remains low, especially in low-
income, conflict-affected states, and is, like ODA, a volatile capital flow. For 
example, since the start of the economic crisis, FDI to conflict-affected states has 
dropped considerably.  
In light of these challenges, hope lies in other forms of resource 
mobilization for the development of conflict-affected states. One of these forms of 
resource mobilization involves tapping into the positive effects of migration. 
Conflict-affected countries often have large diasporas that are scattered across the 
globe. In 2013, more than 51 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide, 
which was the highest spike since WWII (UNHCR, 2014a). Although most 
diaspora members are refugees, diasporas from conflict-affected states are highly 
heterogeneous, consisting of people who have migrated at different times and for 
different reasons and who have different intentions to stay in their host country. 
Diaspora members can contribute to their home countries by sending remittances, 
setting up community projects or sharing the skills that they have learned abroad 
through, for example, (temporary) return programs (Amassari & Black, 2001). This 
interest in migration as a contributor to development in conflict-affected states has 
been inspired by a general trend concerning the positive effects of migration on 
development (see, e.g., Skeldon, 2008, for an overview). 
  The view that migration could contribute positively to development in 
migrant-sending countries has spurred a significant increase in academic studies 
                                                 
1 Fragile and conflict-affected states are defined by the World Bank (2011a) as countries with ‘(1) 
homicide rates greater than 10 per 100,000 population per year; (2) major civil conflict (battle deaths 
greater than 1,000 per year (as defined in the from 2006 to 2009), (3) UN or regionally mandated peace- 
building or peacekeeping missions; and (4) low-income countries with institutional levels in 2006–09, 
correlated with high risks of violence and conflict’. 
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that investigate migration’s potential contributions to development. In the 
academic literature, remittances and return migration have surfaced as being 
among the most important migration-related phenomena that may contribute to 
development in migrant-sending countries (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear, & 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Remittances, the money or goods that migrants send to 
family members or friends living abroad, have increased significantly over the past 
few decades. Developing countries received more than 404 billion US dollars in 
remittances in 2013, which was almost 70 per cent of global remittances and three 
times greater than the value of Official Development Aid (ODA) (World Bank, 
2014). Given these statistics, it is not surprising that remittances are seen as 
important contributors to development in receiving countries.  
More recently, return migration has been acknowledged as an interesting 
policy ‘tool’ to stimulate development in home countries. Return migrants, who 
learned new skills and generated funds abroad, would contribute to the 
development of their home countries by transferring these skills, bringing money 
home upon return or starting up businesses in their country of origin. The 
expectation that return migration would contribute to development inspired host 
country governments to invest in policies that would stimulate or facilitate return, 
often as part of their development policies (see, e.g., ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013). 
Migrant-sending countries have also increasingly recognized the potential of their 
citizens residing abroad and have, depending on their institutional capacity, 
implemented policies to engage them in the development of their home countries 
(see, e.g., Newland & Patrick, 2004).  
In the emerging academic and policy literature on migration and 
development in conflict-affected states, migration is also generally regarded as a 
positive force for development. Migration may contribute positively to economic 
development and thereby reconstruction and peace building in conflict-affected 
states. The Task Force on Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States (2013) stated, for 
example, that remittances ‘are of central importance for restoring stability and 
enhancing human security in post-conflict countries’ (p. 1). Remittances to fragile 
states grew from approximately 25 billion in 2000 to almost 80 billion US dollars in 
2011, which accounted for 56 per cent of all financial inflows to fragile states 
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(OECD, 2014).2 This remittance total was nearly double the share of ODA and 
almost four times the share of FDI. In middle-income fragile sates, remittances 
have now overtaken ODA and FDI as the largest capital inflow (ibid.). Lower-
income fragile states are still more dependent on aid; remittances in these states 
accounted for 42 per cent of the financial inflow in 2011, while ODA accounted for 
45 per cent.  
However, remittances in lower-income fragile states may be larger than 
formal statistics indicate. An estimated 35 to 75 per cent of remittances worldwide 
are sent through informal channels (Freund & Spatafore, 2005), which are not 
represented in official statistics. Information on remittances in fragile states is 
limited, but it is likely that a large share passes through informal channels (Task 
Force on Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States, 2013). Remittance senders are 
incentivized to use informal channels to transfer funds because formal financial 
infrastructures are often damaged during conflict (Freund & Spatafore, 2005; Weiss 
Fagen & Bump, 2006). In addition, remittances in lower-income fragile states may 
be more stable resources than ODA or FDI, which are more volatile (OECD, 2014).  
Similarly, return migration has been described as a potential important 
source for development in origin countries, as returning refugees and other former 
migrants may bring with them the skills, assets and money, and social capital that 
they have acquired abroad (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Return migration flows 
generally present one of the largest migration flows in conflict-affected countries. 
During periods of relative stability, conflict-affected countries frequently 
experience large population inflows when former refugees return home. For 
example, more than 5.7 million Afghans, a quarter of Afghanistan’s population, 
have returned to Afghanistan since 2002 (UNHCR, 2014b). Likewise, Bosnia 
welcomed 1 million returnees after the 1992-1995 war, and more than 700,000 
former refugees returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. The return of former 
refugees to conflict-affected contexts is often associated with a positive change 
towards ‘normality, peace and stability’ (Chimni, 2002, p. 163). Return migration 
represents a transition from a conflict state to a post-conflict state, after which the 
reconstruction and development phase begins. The successful return of 
populations residing abroad also legitimizes post-conflict states and enhances 
                                                 
2 OECD defines fragile states as ‘Those failing to provide basic services to poor people because they are 
unwilling or unable to do so’ (OECD, 2006, p. 147). This definition is wider than the definition of fragile 
and conflict-affected states that the World Bank employs. 
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donor confidence (Black & Gent, 2006; Black & Koser, 1999). It is generally 
acknowledged that return can have a positive effect on development under certain 
conditions (Black & Gent, 2006; Crisp, 2000). 
However, research on the effects of migration on development in recent 
years has mainly focused on the effects of labour migration. This focus is mainly 
related to data availability; although the availability of data from developing 
countries has increased considerably over the past few decades, data from conflict-
affected countries are still scarce and more likely to be of poor quality. Migration 
research has therefore yielded limited insights into the effects of remittances and 
return migration on development in conflict-affected states.  
Conflict-affected states differ significantly from other developing country 
contexts that have not been affected by conflict, which can make us question the 
extent to which remittances and return migration have the potential to contribute 
to development in these contexts. First, the causes and characteristics of migration 
flows are significantly different in conflict-affected contexts. People who migrate 
due to conflict mainly do so because they seek security. Although studies have 
shown that refugees frequently support family or friends living back home 
(Ahmed, 2000; Carling, Erdal, & Horst, 2012; Horst, 2004, 2008; Lindley, 2009), their 
motivations for migration violate the assumptions of rational choice that underlie 
most migration theories and are likely to affect the possibilities for remittance 
sending (Lindley, 2008). In addition, many refugees reside in neighbouring 
countries where they often reside in camps or temporary shelters (Nyberg-
Sørensen et al., 2002). Refugees’ living conditions during exile affect the resources 
that they can send home and the skills that they can acquire while abroad (Van 
Hear, 2004). Refugees who reside in neighbouring countries often have few 
employment opportunities and consequently few possibilities to send remittances 
or to obtain skills that can be brought back upon return. 
Second, civil conflict has both direct and indirect effects on the lives of the 
people affected, which creates a situation of insecurity and instability that often 
persists long after the conflict has ended (Justino, 2009). These direct and indirect 
effects most likely affect the extent to which migration can contribute to 
development. The direct effects of conflict include the death or injury of household 
members, the recruitment of household members into armed groups, the 
demolition or looting of assets (e.g., livestock, housing and other valuables), and 
the forced displacement of household members. Indirect effects include reduced 
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access to employment, insurance, legal aid, health or schooling. Moreover, civil 
conflicts often affect social ties (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). An erosion of social ties 
decreases the support that households can rely on in times of need and creates 
higher vulnerability for those who are excluded from social ties. Households 
residing in conflict-affected states are thus more likely than households residing in 
countries that have not been affected by conflict to live in extreme poverty, often 
face more insecurity and have fewer opportunities to invest or find employment.  
The recent decades of migration and development research have shown 
that migration’s impact on development varies significantly across contexts. The 
extent to which remittances have a positive effect on development depends on 
characteristics in both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. The 
context in migrant-receiving countries affects opportunities for remittance sending, 
whereas the economic, social and political climate in migrant-sending countries 
affects the development potential of remittances. In underdeveloped areas where 
economic opportunities are limited, remittances are unlikely to have large positive 
development potential (De Haas, 2005). Likewise, the impact of return migration 
on development highly depends on, for example, the size of the return flow, the 
period in which return takes place, the characteristics of returnees, their living 
conditions during exile, and the situation they find upon return to their country of 
origin (Amassari & Black, 2001). Refugees often return in large numbers to areas 
that are damaged by the conflict and may encounter limited opportunities to re-
establish their livelihoods (Chimni, 2002; Macrae, 1999). In these instances, return 
may be seen as a security threat instead of as a boost to development (Crisp, 2000).  
Given the specific challenges that conflict-affected countries face, it is 
unclear whether the expectations that migration will play a role in the 
development of conflict-affected states, particularly lower-income states, are 
realistic. The extent to which migration may contribute to development in conflict-
affected states has not been researched in detail and therefore warrants further 
research attention. 
 
1.2 Research aims and research questions 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on migration and development 
in three ways. First, this dissertation aims to provide insights into the lives of 
households and communities that are recovering from civil conflict and the role 
that migration plays in their lives. As described above, data from conflict-affected 
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contexts are scarce, and there is little knowledge on migration as a livelihood or the 
coping strategies of households in these contexts. The data that are used in this 
dissertation, which are described in detail in Chapter 4, were collected around five 
years after the official end of conflict in the country studied and therefore offer a 
unique insight into the role of migration in households residing in a conflict-
affected context. 
Second, the aim of this dissertation is to apply specific tenets of theoretical 
approaches that have often been used to study labour migration to a conflict-
affected setting. The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) (Stark, 1980; 
Stark & Bloom, 1985) approach, for example, has been specifically designed to 
study labour migration and the remittances that originate from it. However, people 
who are forced to migrate due to conflict primarily do so to seek safety and 
security, not to diversify their income, which violates the economic incentive 
assumption of the NELM (Lindley, 2008, 2010). The question remains as to what 
extent the conflict-affected context leads to different remittance usage when 
compared with the context in which migration is primarily a means of income 
diversification, as posited by the NELM literature. 
Third, this dissertation aims to study how migration affects both economic 
and social aspects of a conflict-affected society. In this dissertation, development is 
therefore treated as a multidimensional concept that incorporates not only 
economic factors but also social aspects of society. This multidimensionality is 
especially relevant in a conflict-affected context, in which economic structures have 
to be rebuilt and social relations are often damaged (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). 
Because of the importance of social relations for development (see, e.g., Woolcock 
& Narayan, 2000, for an overview), this dissertation draws from economic 
approaches to the study of migration, such as NELM (Stark, 1980; Stark & Bloom, 
1985), and combines these with concepts, such as social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2002) and social cohesion (see, e.g., Jenson, 2010, for a 
historical overview of the concept of social cohesion). The concepts of social 
capital, social cohesion and civil conflict are closely related (Colletta & Cullen, 
2000). Strong social capital is seen as a prerequisite for a cohesive society, together 
with the absence of latent conflict ‘whether in the form of income/wealth 
inequality; racial/ethnic tensions; disparities in political participation; or other 
forms of polarization’ (Berkman & Kawachi, 2000, p. 175). In turn, cohesive 
societies are less likely to be affected by conflict because a high level of social 
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cohesion can serve as a buffer to violence (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). In this 
dissertation, social capital is operationalized as a household-level resource, 
following Bourdieu (1986), whereas social cohesion is measured at the community 
level by focusing on the presence of thefts, disputes and security. Using this 
multidimensional view on development, this dissertation aims to provide a more 
holistic view on the concept of development and how it is affected by migration.  
The central research question of this dissertation is: What are the economic 
and social effects of remittances and return migration on households and communities in a 
conflict-affected context? This research question is split into the following sub-
questions that are addressed in the four empirical papers that form the body of this 
dissertation (see Section 1.4, Structure of this dissertation, for more details). The 
first two sub-questions focus on remittances, and sub-questions 3 and 4 address the 
effects of return migration.  
 
1. What are the economic effects of international monetary remittances on 
remittance-receiving households? 
2. How do international monetary remittances affect the social capital of 
remittance-receiving households? 
3. What is the economic impact of return migration on households and  
communities in a conflict-affected context?  
4.    What is the impact of return migration on security in return communities? 
1.3 The case study of Burundi 
The country case study for this dissertation is Burundi, a small, conflict-affected 
country in the African Great Lakes region. Burundi has experienced various 
episodes of civil conflict since it gained independence in 1962. These conflicts 
generated massive migration flows and left their marks on both economic and 
social aspects of Burundi society. Nearly all households were affected, either 
directly or indirectly, by the war, which, combined with increasing poverty levels, 
deeply divided community members.  
 Migration has played a large role in Burundi’s transition from war to 
peace, which started in the early 2000s. The wider Burundi diaspora, located 
mainly in North America and Europe, which played an oppositional political role 
during the conflict period, became increasingly invested in development activities 
(Turner & Bronden, 2011). Remittances, which are mainly sent by the wider 
diaspora, grew substantially after the war. Hundreds of thousands of internally 
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displaced people (IDPs) and refugees also returned home, some on their own, and 
others with the help of international organizations, NGOs and the governments of 
Burundi and/or their host countries. Whereas remittances are considered beneficial 
for Burundi’s development, return migration has been a topic of concern for 
Burundi’s policymakers. Due to the size of the return flow, the time that former 
refugees spent in exile, and the unstable economic and political conditions in 
Burundi, return is feared to increase competition for the country’s scarce resources, 
thereby re-instigating social tensions.  
 This situation is not unique to Burundi. As described above, many conflict-
affected countries experience large return migrations during periods of relative 
stability and receive vast amounts of remittances that are considered beneficial to 
reconstruction and economic development. In that sense, Burundi provides an 
interesting case study to draw lessons from for other low-income, conflict-affected 
states that have experienced large refugee flows and are attempting to draw from 
their diaspora to stimulate development. At the same time, Burundi is a unique 
case because it is one of the poorest countries in the world and struggles with 
increasing population density and the scarcity of agricultural land.  
Burundi is also one of the least urbanized countries in the world—more than 90 
per cent of its population relies on agriculture. The country offers very limited 
economic opportunities and struggles with low institutional capacity. This 
dissertation explores how remittances and return migration have affected 
Burundian households and communities that are recovering from decades of civil 
conflict in a context that is characterized by poverty, large inequalities, and, yet 
again, growing insecurity in the lead up to the 2015 elections.  
The empirical chapters in this dissertation rely on nationally representative 
household and community survey data that were collected in Burundi for the IS 
Academy Migration and Development: A World in Motion project. The Migration 
and Development project, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under 
the heading of the IS Academy, was a five-year research project that studied the 
consequences of migration for four migrant-sending countries (Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco) and one migrant-receiving country (the 
Netherlands). The objective of the project was to provide empirical evidence on the 
linkages between migration and development to guide policymaking in the area of 
development cooperation. Burundi was chosen as a country of interest because of 
its position on the list of countries that receive development aid from the 
23 
 
Netherlands and because little research had been conducted on migration and/or 
development in Burundi. Data were collected in Burundi in 2011, a little over five 
years after the official end of conflict there, and therefore offer a unique 
perspective into the livelihoods of Burundian households and communities and 
the impacts that migration has on these livelihoods. The research for this 
dissertation was conducted independently from the views or interests of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views in this dissertation therefore represent the 
author’s views only. 
 
1.4 Structure of this dissertation 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the 
research that has been conducted on the linkages between migration and 
development, and the theoretical views that underlie the research in this area. The 
chapter then addresses the relationship between migration and development in 
conflict-affected states and discusses the extent to which current theoretical views 
apply to conflict-affected states. This chapter also discusses the extent to which 
migration’s effects on development may differ in conflict-affected countries.   
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are background chapters that introduce the 
country case study of Burundi and the data that were used for this dissertation, 
respectively. Chapter 3 briefly discusses Burundi’s history of conflict, the 
consequences of conflict for development, and the forced migrations that resulted 
from conflict. This chapter then focuses on the two migration-related phenomena 
that are central to this dissertation: remittances and return migration. Chapter 3 
will show how remittances are seen as potential contributors to development in 
Burundi, while return migration is mostly seen as a threat to its fragile peace in the 
literature. Chapter 4 introduces the data that are used in this dissertation, as well 
as their limitations. It also shortly describes the methods that were used to analyse 
the data in the following chapters. 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 comprise four (published or submitted) academic 
articles that investigate the linkages between migration and development in 
Burundi. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 examine the effects of remittances on urban 
households, while Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 focus on the relationship between 
refugee return and development in rural areas. One of the remittance-related 
findings was that remittances are largely absent in Burundi’s rural areas. The 
analyses in Chapter 5 and 6 are therefore based on urban survey data, while the 
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analyses in Chapter 7 and 8 are based on national survey data. The differences 
between these two datasets will be described in detail in Chapter 4.  
Each of the empirical chapters can be read independently. The status of 
each article (published, submitted, or revised and re-submitted) will be clearly 
indicated at the beginning of each chapter. Because Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 are 
stand-alone papers, there is some overlap between the chapters, especially in the 
sections that describe the country case study of Burundi (Section 5.3, Section 6.3, 
Section 7.2, and Section 8.3). Readers that have read Chapter 3 (Burundi: Conflict, 
migration and development) can skip these sections. The references that were used 
for the empirical chapters are presented at the end of the dissertation to ease the 
reading process.   
 Chapter 5, ‘Remittances and household wealth after conflict’, is a study of 
the effects of international monetary remittances on the wealth of receiving 
households in Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. This chapter analyses the extent to 
which relatively poorer and wealthier households rely on international remittances 
and the way that households allocate these funds. A distinction is made between 
investments in productive versus non-productive assets to investigate whether 
remittances are used for long-term investments or short-term income smoothing. 
This multidimensional view on the effects of remittances on household wealth 
offers a broad perspective into the role of remittances for conflict-affected 
households. This chapter also applies NELM theory to a conflict-affected context. 
Three NELM-derived hypotheses were tested to explore how remittances are used 
in a conflict-affected setting and to determine whether the results differ from those 
in other development contexts. The findings in Chapter 5 show that remittances 
mostly reach wealthier and higher-educated households in Bujumbura. These 
findings reject one of the NELM-derived hypotheses, which anticipates that rural 
households, being the most deprived, will be more likely to migrate and therefore 
receive remittances. Households primarily used remittances to enhance living 
conditions and establish food security, which verifies the expectation that 
remittances are mostly used to sustain households, especially poorer households, 
after conflict. The finding that remittances reach relatively better-off households 
matches findings from development contexts, but the finding that remittances are 
not invested in assets and education contradicts studies from development 
contexts that were not affected by conflict, where remittances were often found to 
be invested in schooling and assets, such as housing and agricultural land. 
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Chapter 6, entitled ‘Remittances, bonds and bridges’, examines the social 
capital investments of remittance-receiving households. This paper hypothesizes 
that remittance-receiving households invest remittances in their social capital for 
insurance purposes. In unstable settings, such as those affected by conflict, other 
investment opportunities may be limited due to economic and political instability. 
By investing in social capital, remittance-receiving households create a financial 
safety net for difficult times. To test this hypothesis, the social capital investments 
of remittance-receiving and non-remittance-receiving households are compared to 
explore how remittances affect the structural, both bonding and bridging, social 
capital (networks) of remittance-receiving households. This paper extends the 
NELM investment assumption beyond investments that concern economic or 
human capital and focuses on the social capital investments of remittance-
receiving households. The expectation that remittances are invested in networks 
for insurance purposes could only partly be confirmed. The results demonstrate 
that remittance-receiving households invest more in bridging social capital by 
participating in organizations (donating time), but these households make fewer 
monetary contributions compared with non-receiving households. Remittances 
have mixed effects on bonding social capital: compared with non-receiving 
households, receiving households give significantly fewer gifts to family members 
and friends, but they are more likely to send internal remittances. Overall, these 
findings seem to suggest that remittance-related financial investments have mainly 
strengthened the bonding social capital of remittance-receiving households, 
particularly family networks.  
Chapter 7, ‘The socio-economic sustainability of refugee return’, explores 
the sustainability of return in Burundi using a wider view that compares return 
households to non-return households and focuses on the effects of return on entire 
communities. Socio-economic sustainability is operationalized as a 
multidimensional concept, including indicators such as land ownership, living 
conditions and subjective wealth. By exploring the relationship between refugee 
return and the socio-economic conditions of both households and communities, 
this study aims to provide a nationwide, in-depth understanding of the 
sustainability of refugee return in Burundi. This paper also makes a distinction 
between first- and second-generation returnees—the children of former refugees 
who were born abroad—to explore whether there are key differences in the 
sustainability of return in relation to both groups. This chapter shows that from a 
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household perspective and from a community perspective, the sustainability of 
return in Burundi is questionable. Although most returnees have been successfully 
repatriated in their home country, many live in poor socio-economic conditions 
and are worse off than households that did not experience forced international 
migration. Non-return households were also affected by return migration to their 
communities. Food insecurity was higher in communities with more first-
generation returnees, and in communities with more second-generation returnees, 
all households (return and non-return) reported lower living conditions, lower 
subjective wealth and experienced more negative changes in wealth in recent 
years. These findings provide support for studying sustainability from a wider 
view that incorporates both household and community perspectives, together with 
a multidimensional approach that includes multiple indicators.  
Chapter 8 builds on Chapter 7 and investigates how return migration and 
the accompanying challenges have affected the number of thefts and disputes and 
security levels in rural communities. This research is based on the presumption 
that refugee return in large numbers may lower social cohesion and pose a threat 
to peace in conflict-affected societies. As described in Section 1.2, the presence of 
disputes and insecurity is considered an indication of weak social cohesion 
(Berkman & Kawachi, 2000), which, in turn, is a conflict hazard (Colletta & Cullen, 
2000). To study the relationship between return migration, thefts, disputes, and 
security, this chapter draws from neo-Malthusian views that a rapid population 
increase will lead to a scarcity of renewable natural resources, such as agricultural 
land and natural water sources, which, in turn, may instigate violence (Homer-
Dixon, 2010). Various studies have been conducted on the linkages between 
population pressure, land scarcity and conflict, but few have addressed population 
increases as a result of large-scale migration. This chapter tests the neo-Malthusian 
hypothesis in the context of refugee return in Burundi and studies the effects of 
return migration across communities that have received different numbers of 
returnees. This study focuses on land disputes, thefts and overall security levels in 
areas of return, as these variables have been identified as underlying factors in 
Burundi’s past conflicts and are therefore considered risk factors for future conflict. 
The findings show that communities with more returnees did not experience more 
violence or less security than did communities with fewer returnees. Likewise, 
households in communities with more returnees did not experience more thefts or 
destruction of agricultural tools and livestock. Instead, structural factors, such as 
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the availability of employment and the presence of infrastructure, were found to be 
significantly related to violence and security. These findings suggest that the direct 
effects of return migration on land scarcity and insecurity in Burundi are 
overestimated and that structural problems play a more important role in 
determining sustainable peace in Burundi. 
The dissertation ends with the conclusions in Chapter 9. This chapter 
summarizes the research findings and links these back to the theory and research 
questions that were described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. This chapter also 
discusses this dissertation’s limitations and provides suggestions for future 
research in the area of migration and development. 
  
   
  
 
 
Chapter 2: Remittances, return migration and 
development in conflict-affected states 
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2.1 Introduction 
As described in the introduction of this dissertation (Chapter 1), the majority of 
studies that have addressed the linkages between migration and development 
have focused on labour migration. The theoretical approaches that have been 
formulated to investigate migration and its consequences for development have 
also focused on labour migration. However, migration is considered to be an 
important contributor to development in conflict-affected states. This dissertation 
suggests that the impact of migration on development may differ in conflict-
affected states, because a) the causes and characteristics of forced migration flows 
that originate from conflict-affected contexts differ from the causes and 
characteristics of forced migration flows in contexts that were not affected by 
conflict and b) the direct and indirect effects of conflict on development create a 
situation of instability and insecurity that may alter the effect of migration on 
development. The following questions are addressed: Are the theories discussed in 
the migration and development literature applicable to conflict-affected contexts? 
And, to what extent are the expectations that migration contributes to 
development transferrable to a conflict-affected context and how do the specific 
characteristics of conflict-affected contexts affect the impact of migration on 
development?  
This chapter provides an overview of the linkages between migration and 
development and the theoretical perspectives that have guided research in this 
area for decades. As described in the introduction of this dissertation (Chapter 1), 
two thematic areas comprise the focus of this chapter: remittances and return 
migration. These thematic areas were selected due to their prominence in the 
migration and development literature as important channels via which migration 
may affect development in the regions of origin (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002) and 
their relevance to the country case study of Burundi (see Chapter 3). 
 State of the art knowledge regarding the linkages between remittances 
and development will be discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.2.1 discusses the 
relationship between remittances and development in conflict-affected contexts. 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of the literature on return migration and 
development, and Section 2.3.1 focuses on the relationship between return 
migration and development in conflict-affected states. Section 2.4 describes the 
theoretical contributions of this dissertation, based on previous studies.  
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2.2 Remittances and development 
Remittances served a minor role in the early migration theories, such as the push 
and pull models, neo-classical migration theories and historical-structural 
approaches to the study of migration (see, e.g., Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013, for 
an overview). These theories primarily focused on the causes and drivers of 
migration (Taylor, 1999). The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
approach (Stark, 1980; Stark & Bloom, 1985) that was developed in the 1980s 
placed particular emphasis on remittances. NELM considers migration as a 
household-level strategy to minimize risks by generating income via remittances. 
The expectation of receiving remittances is an integral aspect and driver of 
migration: households attempt to diversify their income and thereby reduce risks 
or improve their economic position via migration. With the introduction of the 
NELM approach, the focus also shifted from the individual migrant to households 
as principal actors in decision-making regarding migration. 
According to the NELM approach, households can use migration to insure 
themselves against financial risks, such as food insecurity, failing crops, or 
unemployment. Remittances can smooth consumption for receiving households 
(Lucas & Stark, 1985). Remittances can reduce also household liquidity constraints, 
enable households to invest in income-generating activities, such as businesses or 
agriculture, and stimulate economic development in remittance-receiving areas 
(Taylor, 1999). The majority of micro-level studies on remittances were based on 
the NELM approach. 
The assumptions of the NELM approach yield three hypotheses regarding 
migration motivations: (1) the relative deprivation hypothesis, (2) the investment 
hypothesis, and (3) the insurance hypothesis. The relative deprivation hypothesis 
posits that households attempt to improve their economic position in their 
community or country via migration. Households that are relatively deprived are 
more likely to use migration as a household strategy (Stark & Taylor, 1989). The 
investment hypothesis posits that remittances are invested in income-generating 
activities, such as businesses and agriculture. Remittances can stimulate 
development in poor countries by relaxing the liquidity constraints of households 
in failing markets (Taylor, 1999). The insurance or smoothing hypothesis states that 
households use migration to insure themselves against financial risks, such as food 
insecurity, failing crops, or unemployment. Remittances can smooth consumption 
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by providing a form of insurance during difficult times (see, e.g., Lucas & Stark, 
1985). 
Previous studies on remittances have demonstrated varying levels of 
support for these hypotheses. With regard to the relative deprivation hypothesis, 
research has shown that remittances are generally not received by people who 
‘need’ them the most or people who are most deprived in the context of 
developing countries (Ratha et al., 2011). This result is due to the ‘selection effect’ 
of migration; because costs are associated with migration, wealthier households 
generally have more means to send someone abroad and are consequently more 
likely to receive remittances (Adams Jr, 2011). In Ghana, for example, international 
remittances were received by the richest two per cent of households (Mazzucato, 
Van Den Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008). However, another study indicated that 
poorer households received a greater benefit from international remittances than 
richer households (Adams Jr, Cuecuecha, & Page, 2008). In Pakistan, households 
with more income were also more likely to receive remittances (Adams Jr, 1998). 
Whether the higher income of remittance-receiving households was due to 
remittances was not clear. 
Although the literature has shown that remittances are frequently used for 
daily needs, the investment hypothesis has been supported by meta-analyses that 
showed that remittances spur development and reduce poverty in developing 
countries (Adams Jr, 2011; Page & Plaza, 2006; Ratha et al., 2011). Remittances are 
frequently invested in human capital and physical capital, such as large assets 
(land or housing), businesses, or agricultural investments. Other studies have 
highlighted the insurance or consumption smoothing function of remittances by 
showing that remittances are sent for, or invested in, daily needs (Kabki, 
Mazzucato, & Appiah, 2004; Mazzucato, 2009). 
The investment and insurance hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. 
Remittances can be sent, or employed, for both investment and insurance. The 
literature review reveals that remittances are employed for both investment and 
insurance in most contexts. The development effect of remittances also seems to 
vary across time and place. The economic, social and political climate in migrant-
sending countries affects the development potential of remittances. In 
underdeveloped areas with limited economic opportunities, remittances are 
unlikely to have a large positive development potential (De Haas, 2005).  
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2.2.1 Remittances in conflict-affected states 
The extent to which theoretical perspectives on remittances are applicable to 
conflict-affected contexts remains ambiguous. As its name implies, the NELM 
approach was designed to explain labour migration and the remittances that 
originate from migration. It assumes that migration is a household strategy to 
generate income through remittances. However, people forced to migrate due to 
conflict primarily do so to seek safety and security; they do not migrate to diversify 
income, which violates the economic incentive assumption of the NELM approach 
(Lindley, 2008, 2010). Numerous studies have shown that refugees frequently 
support family or friends living back home (Ahmed, 2000; Carling, Erdal, & Horst, 
2012; Horst, 2004, 2008; Lindley, 2009). Some authors have argued that motivations 
to remit do not substantially differ between refugees and economic migrants (see, 
e.g., Horst, 2004). However, to what extent does the conflict-affected context cause 
different remittance usage compared with the case in which migration is primarily 
a means of income diversification, as posited by the NELM literature? What is the 
effect of remittances on development in a conflict-affected context where economic 
opportunities are limited? 
As previously described, the majority of refugees move within the borders 
of their own country or to neighbouring countries where they have few resources 
to remit (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Only some people have the means to travel 
a considerable distance to generate income that is sufficient to engage in remittance 
sending (Van Hear, 2004). This situation is also valid for labour migrants from 
conflict-affected contexts (Ahmed, 2000). Thus, remittances are most likely only 
received by a few households in conflict-affected settings. These households are 
most likely not the most disadvantaged households as the most disadvantaged 
households generally have fewer resources to send an individual abroad. The 
relative deprivation hypothesis of NELM is therefore not likely to be valid for a 
conflict-affected setting.  
With respect to remittance usage, the limited available evidence suggests 
that remittances are more likely to ‘sustain’ livelihoods after conflict through 
income smoothing rather than ‘transform’ them through investments (Van Hear, 
2002). Conflict-affected settings frequently offer limited investment possibilities 
due to political and economic instability, which may affect remittance allocation 
and the development effect of remittances. Qualitative studies have shown that 
refugees frequently remit to support daily needs instead of business investments 
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(Van Hear, 2002; Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). For example, Ahmed (2000) 
discovered that 15 per cent of households in Somaliland used remittances for 
business or asset investments. Especially in rural areas, remittances were used to 
smooth consumption and cope with shocks. Similarly, Horst and Van Hear (Horst 
& Van Hear, 2002) describe how Somali refugees in Kenyan refugee camps smooth 
consumption by relying on remittances during difficult times. This evidence 
provides support for the insurance hypothesis instead of the investment 
hypothesis of the NELM approach in conflict-affected settings.  
Van Hear has argued that households may also allocate (part of) their 
remittances to their social capital instead of to more tangible investments, such as 
education or business investments, in unstable settings where investment 
opportunities are limited (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). Social capital is commonly 
defined as ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 1995, p. 
67). Social capital is a concept that was introduced by Bourdieu (1986) and 
subsequently elaborated by Coleman (1988) and Putnam (Putnam, 1995, 2000, 
2002). From an economic point of view, social capital is an asset that can be 
addressed in times of financial difficulties (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In the 
absence of formal insurance mechanisms, such as provided by the state, 
households frequently rely on informal networks and social relations for support. 
These networks are used to share risks and function as reciprocal insurance 
mechanisms during times of hardship (see, e.g., Fafchamps, 2006; Fafchamps & 
Lund, 2003).  
Social capital enhances the well-being of households by information-
sharing among group members, cost reduction for shared initiatives, the possibility 
and efficiency of collective action, and by reducing deviant behaviours that are not 
in the interest of the group (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002). Research has shown 
that households with more social capital have better socio-economic states than 
households with less social capital (see, e.g., Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert, Oh, & 
Swamy, 2002; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Based on a study in Indonesia, Grootaert 
(1999) noted that social capital in the form of organization membership positively 
affected the expenditures, savings, and assets ownership of households and their 
access to credit. Similarly, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) discovered that social 
capital at the village level positively affected household incomes of the village 
members in rural Tanzania. Especially for poorer households in unstable 
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environments, which offer minimal institutional protection, social capital 
investments are an insurance strategy that reduces vulnerability to shocks 
(Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
Some studies addressed the social capital investments of remittance-
receiving households by examining the church donations (James, 1997; Kabki et al., 
2004), funeral participation (Kabki et al., 2004; Mazzucato, Kabki, & Smith, 2006), 
or gift-giving practices (Gerber & Torosyan, 2010) of remittance-receiving 
households in non-conflict affected contexts. These studies provided insights on 
the effect of remittances on social relations in remittance-receiving areas by 
showing that remittances were invested in social capital or social capital-enhancing 
activities. The majority of studies, however, were small-scale studies that 
employed single indicators of social capital. 
A study conducted in Rwanda, however, has examined the previously 
observed and positive relationship between remittances and social capital. Caarls, 
Fransen and Ruben (2013) adopted a multidimensional perspective on social 
capital and explored the effect of migratory contacts and remittances on behaviour 
(memberships of civil society organizations) and attitudes (feelings of 
reconciliation) in Southern Rwanda. The authors revealed that migratory contacts 
enhanced cooperative behaviour and reconciliation, whereas remittance receivers 
participated less in community organizations and reported lower levels of 
reconciliation than non-receivers. The authors argued that remittances enabled 
individuals to become more financially independent and ‘crowded out’ their 
incentives to participate in social activities, especially those social activities that 
crossed social divides. This, in turn, led to reduced feelings of reconciliation. These 
findings suggested that remittance-receiving households tend to invest less in 
bridging social capital.  
The distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital was 
presented by (Putnam, 2000, 2002). Bonding social capital refers to connections 
between homogeneous groups or individuals, whereas bridging social capital 
unites individuals or groups that are dissimilar in terms of background 
characteristics or beliefs and bridges social divides. Putnam argued that bridging 
social capital benefits not only the members of these networks but also society as a 
whole, whereas bonding social capital creates subsets of networks that are isolated 
and behave according to their own interests, which potentially decreases social 
cohesion of society as a whole.  
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If remittances are invested in social capital in remittance-receiving areas, 
these investments may have an important effect on social ties in remittance-
receiving areas by reinforcing networks and restoring social ties (Van Hear, 2002, 
2004). However, if remittance-receiving households withdraw from their social 
relations and exclusively invest remittances exclusively in in-group social capital, 
as Caarls et al. (2013) suggested, remittances may intensify social divides instead of 
contribute to social development. The extent to which remittance-receiving 
households invest in different facets of their social capital has yet to be examined in 
depth, leaving room for further exploration of the complex relationship between 
remittances and social capital. 
 
2.3 Return migration and development 
Neoclassical migration theories and the NELM approach shed light on the 
motivations for return. Neoclassical migration theory attributes migration to wage 
or income differences among regions. Migrants move as they expect to earn more 
in other places. In neoclassical migration theory, return migration is considered to 
be a failed attempt to increase income abroad (Cassarino, 2004). Migrants return 
when their expectations are not satisfied or they fail to maximize their income 
abroad. Conversely, the NELM approach considers return migration to be a 
positive move—after a successful migration episode, during which a migrant 
earned income that was remitted to the household back home, he or she returns to 
the origin country (ibid.). Following NELM, the decision to return is thus a natural 
outcome of the migration episode. Neoclassical migration theories and the NELM 
approach only provided insight into the motivations for return migration and did 
not address the potential impact of return migration on home societies.  
The structural approach to return migration posits that the extent to which 
return migration affects development in home countries is dependent on the time 
that a migrant spent abroad and where a migrant resided while abroad (Cassarino, 
2004). If a migrant spent a very long time abroad, readjustment in the country of 
origin and the ability to make a positive contribution will be challenging. Similarly, 
if the period spent abroad was very short, it is unlikely that a migrant gained any 
skills or resources that will positively affect the home country (King, 1986). The 
place that the migrant returns to determines whether the migrant is able to transfer 
the skills or resources that may be beneficial upon return. Whereas neoclassical 
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migration theories and NELM focused on the skills that were obtained abroad, 
structural theorists thus emphasized the context to which former migrants return. 
Cassarino (2004) identified two additional factors that affect the potential 
of return migrants to contribute to development in their origin countries. First, the 
extent to which returnees are able to mobilize financial, social and human capital 
before and during migration has a large effect on the development impact of 
return. Second, the level of preparedness of a returnee, which is determined by 
access to information about return, conditions in the origin country and the access 
to resources upon return, impact the way in which a return can contribute to 
development. These two factors—resource mobilization and the level of 
preparedness—differ for different types of migrants (e.g., low-skilled versus high-
skilled and refugees versus labour migrants) and are affected by the context in the 
host country and the home country.  
  The literature on return migration and development revealed mixed 
findings regarding the linkages between return and development and confirmed 
that the extent to which return migration can contribute to development is 
dependent on a range of factors (Amassari & Black, 2001). The most important 
factors include the number of migrants returning, the type of migration flow 
(forced versus labour) and the timing of a return. These factors affect the 
development impact of return migration on the origin country. In addition, the 
context of the origin country serves an important role in the relationship between 
return migration and development (Amassari & Black, 2001; Ghosh, 2000). In areas 
with limited resources, return migration is not likely to have a large positive effect 
on development. This argument was illustrated by Thomas (2008) who noted that 
returning migrants to Uganda were more likely to economically re-integrate in 
areas with higher employment rates. Another factor that affects the impact of a 
return on development are the skills and level of preparation of the returnee 
(Ghosh, 2000). Low-skilled returnees who are not well prepared are more likely to 
experience difficulties upon returning. The majority of studies focused on the 
return of labour migrants (see, e.g., Black, King, & Tiemoko, 2003; King, 1978; King, 
1986).  
 
2.3.1 Return migration in conflict-affected states 
The extent to which return migration in a forced migration context fits current 
theoretical approaches to the study of migration is debatable as well. The main 
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assumption underlying the NELM approach and neoclassical migration theories is 
that migrants make rational decisions on their migration trajectories – decisions 
that are mainly based on economic considerations. This assumption implies that 
migrants, including return migrants, have the freedom to make their own, rational 
decisions about whether or not migrate. This may be the case for returning 
refugees. Voluntary repatriation has, as opposed to local integration or 
resettlement, been the preferred durable solution of UNHCR since the early 1990s. 
The return of refugees is an important part of the peace process that signifies 
change and restores confidence of donors (Black & Gent, 2006; Crisp, 2000). 
Repatriation is a voluntary process that ought to occur in safety and dignity. 
However, in many forced migration contexts the return of former refugees has not 
been voluntary but forced (see, e.g., Chimni, 1999). In these cases, the economic 
incentive assumption of the NELM approach and neoclassical migration theories 
does not hold. Moreover, motivations for return after conflict are often related to 
emotional attachments to the homeland instead of to rational (economic) 
considerations. To what extent do these motivations for, and drivers of, return 
migration in a conflict-affected context affect the impact that return migration has 
on development? 
 As previously described, the extent to which return migration has the 
potential to contribute to development is dependent on a range of factors, 
including the situation in the home and host countries, the resources that migrants 
are able to mobilize, the time spent abroad, and the level of preparedness for a 
return. In conflict-affected contexts, the pre-requisites for return migration to 
contribute to development are minimal.  
  First, most returnees have resided in the region of their origin country and 
have frequently resided in camps or temporary shelters (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 
2002). These living conditions of refugees during exile affected the resources and 
skills that they acquired while abroad (Van Hear, 2004). Refugees who reside in 
neighbouring countries often have few employment opportunities and possibilities 
to obtain skills that can be brought back and applied upon their return. Second, in 
cases where return was forced, the resources that can be brought back upon return 
may be even more limited. Third, returnees frequently lack (access to) important 
assets, such as land and housing, upon their return, which are a necessity for (re-) 
building a sustainable livelihood. Different studies have highlighted the difficulties 
of property restitution for returning refugees (see, e.g., Ozerdem & Sofizada, 2006; 
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Pantuliano, 2009; Unruh, 1998, 2009). 
  Fourth, conflict-affected return areas frequently offer few opportunities for 
returnees to re-establish their livelihoods (Chimni, 2002). Areas affected by conflict 
are frequently poor with limited infrastructure. Returnees frequently return in 
large numbers as part of repatriation exercises. A rapid population increase due to 
an influx of returnees may create increased competition over resources, such as 
land (see, e.g., Huggins, 2007; Musahara & Huggins, 2005; Özerdem & Sofizada, 
2006), and decrease living conditions for all households (Hammond, 1999). In areas 
where households are struggling to maintain their livelihoods, scarce resources, 
such as land, have to be shared with a large number of people, which causes 
poverty. The relationship between a large number of returnees and land scarcity 
has been observed in various contexts, such as Rwanda (Musahara & Huggins, 
2005), Sudan (Unruh, 1998)) and Mozambique (Unruh, 1998). In these instances, 
return migration is feared to unsettle community relations, which may contribute 
to a vicious cycle of conflict and forced migration (Crisp, 2000). 
When return migration leads to a deterioration of living conditions or 
renewed conflict in return areas, return migration is considered ‘unsustainable’ for 
the countries that migrants return to. The concept of sustainability in conflict-
affected states appeared high on the policy agenda in the 1990s when large return 
movements, especially within and to the African continent, demanded the 
attention of local governments and international organizations (Black & Gent, 2006; 
UNHCR, 2008b). The question regarding the extent that refugee repatriation or 
general returns were successful or ‘sustainable’ for the countries of origin was 
posed. It was increasingly acknowledged that return not only affects individual 
returnees, but also the communities and countries of return (Black & Gent, 2006). 
Moreover, return can pose security challenges if returnees do not sufficiently 
reintegrate. Refugee reintegration, therefore, became one of the focus areas in 
preventing future conflict and ensuring the sustainability of return.  
The concept of sustainable return is now extensively incorporated in policy 
circles to refer to the successful reintegration of returnees in conflict-affected 
societies. Sustainable return is frequently considered to be the outcome of 
reintegration. When reintegration is successful, a return is considered to be 
sustainable and does not pose a security threat. Macrae (1999) argues that 
reintegration ‘is equated with the achievement of a sustainable return’ (p. 3). 
Similarly, a UNHCR report from 1997 indicated that sustainable return is the 
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equivalent of ‘effective reintegration’ (UNHCR, 1997, p. 2). When returnees are 
similar to the local population in terms of socio-economic conditions and security, 
return is sustainable. However, return migration may affect not only returning 
individuals or households but also other households in return areas. Accordingly, 
scholars have argued for a comprehensive definition of sustainability that includes 
reintegration outcomes for individual returnees and the effect of return at the 
community or country level (Black & Gent, 2006). This more extensive viewpoint 
of sustainability remains an underexplored topic, primarily due to a lack of reliable 
and large-scale data from conflict-affected settings.  
The viewpoint that return migration can create social tensions by 
increasing resource scarcity align with neo-Malthusian ideas that a rapid 
population increase will cause a scarcity of renewable natural resources, such as 
agricultural land and natural water sources, and instigate violence (Homer-Dixon, 
2010). Large-scale return migration may generate demand-induced scarcity of 
natural resources, which originates from a rapid population increase while 
resources remain fairly constant. In this case, resources have to be shared with a 
greater number of people, competition over resources will increase, and social 
tensions may form. Large-scale return may also cause structural natural resource 
scarcity. This case is evident when returnees have less access to resources than 
other households. As previously described, research has shown that returnees 
frequently lack (access to) important assets, such as land and housing. This is 
especially the case when former refugees spent long periods abroad and lost 
property rights.  
Both demand-induced and structural scarcity may instigate tensions and 
violence. Neo-Malthusians predicted that this situation is more likely to occur in 
countries that are more dependent on natural resources and have a lower capacity 
to address natural resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 2010). Conflict-affected states 
that experience a rapid population increase are more likely to be affected by 
conflict. Various studies on the linkages among population pressure, resource 
scarcity and conflict have been conducted (Andre & Platteau, 1998; Urdal, 2005; 
Verpoorten, 2012) but few studies have addressed population increases due to 
migration (an exception is: Urdal, 2005). Yet, disputes over assets, such as land, 
between former displaced and non-displaced populations have been argued to lie 
at the heart of renewed social tensions in many conflict-affected societies (Unruh, 
2003). Population movements that are large, relative to local populations, are 
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concentrated in certain areas, and that rapidly occur are more likely to enhance 
resource scarcity and creating conflict (Urdal, 2005).   
 The effect of return migration on households and communities remains 
understudied due to a lack of reliable data from conflict-affected settings. In 
addition to the challenges that accompany data collection in conflict-affected 
settings, such as continuing insecurity, problems related to infrastructure, and 
vulnerability of local populations (Fransen, Kuschminder, & Siegel, 2012), other 
factors that are specific to returnees complicate the collection of data on refugee 
return in conflict-affected contexts. Returnees may be a difficult group to research 
as they are frequently scattered across the country instead of residing in one 
specific location, which hinders an accurate assessment of their locations (Allen & 
Morsink, 1994). Some returnees return unregistered and others do not wish to be 
recognized due to fears of stigmatization (Rogge, 1994). The extent to which and 
the conditions under which return is a hazard to renewed conflict remains 
underexplored. 
   
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the available evidence regarding the linkages among 
remittances, return migration and development and described the theoretical 
approaches that are generally employed to evaluate the linkages between 
migration and development.  
The prevailing viewpoint in the literature on remittances in conflict-
affected contexts is that remittances are a crucial source of income for survival, 
especially due to the volatile nature of development aid (see, e.g., Weiss Fagen & 
Bump, 2006). These studies argue that remittances provide a safety net for poorer 
households, insure them against shocks, and reduce poverty during unstable 
times. The majority of the studies that were conducted on remittances in conflict-
affected countries were conducted on a small scale, which yielded limited 
knowledge about the role of remittances for development in conflict-affected 
contexts. The following questions remain: Are remittances a common resource for 
households that are recovering from conflict? Who are the main beneficiaries of 
remittances after conflict? And, how are remittances allocated by receiving 
households? 
This dissertation aims to make two theoretical contributions to the 
literature on remittances and development. First, this dissertation applies the 
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NELM theory and the hypotheses that can be derived from it to the conflict-
affected context of Burundi. Three hypotheses (relative deprivation, investment 
and insurance) are tested to examine whether the effect of remittances in a conflict-
affected context differ from the effect in other development contexts. Are 
remittances used to sustain households in a conflict-affected context or are they 
also used to invest in education, health care, or businesses? By testing the NELM 
hypotheses in the conflict-affected context of Burundi, this dissertation offers 
insight into the role of remittances for receiving households and examines the 
characteristics of receiving households, the extent to which they rely on 
remittances, and how they allocate the financial resources they receive from family 
members or friends who reside abroad.  
Second, this dissertation will extend the NELM investment assumption 
beyond the most commonly studied investments that concern economic or human 
capital by exploring the effect of remittances on the social capital of remittance-
receiving households. To what extent are remittances invested in social capital or 
social capital-enhancing activities in conflict-affected Burundi? Based on social 
capital theories, a distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social 
capital is made (Putnam, 2000, 2002) to determine the extent to which remittance-
receiving households invest in social capital that benefits their in-group compared 
with social capital that crosses social divides. Social capital is treated as a 
multifaceted concept to investigate the link between remittances and social capital.  
The prevailing viewpoint in the literature on return migration and 
development is that return migration may serve a positive role in the development 
of migrant-sending countries. However, when return flows are large, returnees 
have few resources and the context to which they return offers few opportunities, 
the results may be less positive. In conflict-affected states that receive large return 
movements, return is therefore frequently considered to be a security threat 
instead of a boost to development. 
 Two main gaps emerge from the literature on large-scale refugee return 
and its consequences for development. First, the definition of sustainability of 
return and its measurement remains ambiguous. A lack of consensus on the term 
sustainable return has created a diffused conceptual landscape that hampers the 
formation of a strong theoretical base underlying research on sustainable return. 
This ‘poverty of epistemology’ (Chimni, 2002, p. 164) obstructs the design of policy 
measures to enhance the sustainability of refugee return. Second, whether 
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migration generates scarcity and conflict and represents a conflict hazard has not 
been sufficiently explored and warrants additional scrutiny.  
This dissertation aims to make two theoretical contributions to the 
literature on return migration and development in conflict-affected states. First, the 
socio-sustainability of return migration in Burundi is evaluated using a wider 
viewpoint that not only compares return households to non-return households but 
also focuses on the effect of return on entire communities. Socio-economic 
sustainability is operationalized as a multidimensional concept that includes 
multiple indicators to provide a detailed understanding of sustainability in the 
Burundi context. This dissertation highlights the various challenges experienced by 
return and non-return households using different levels of analysis and different 
socio-economic indicators. The distinction between different groups of returnees, 
particularly first- and second-generation returnees, is made. Second-generation 
returnees include the children of former refugees that were born in exile. Few 
studies have addressed the return of second-generation returnees (exceptions are: 
Christou, 2006; King & Christou, 2010; Wessendorf, 2007). Second-generation 
returnees are however a relevant group in the Burundi context as they represent a 
significant percentage of the return population in Burundi. As described in 
Chapter 3, second-generation returnees experience specific challenges, especially 
regarding property restitution (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012); however, minimal 
information about this group is available. This dissertation aims to contribute to 
the literature on second-generation return and investigate whether differences 
exist in the sustainability of return regarding both groups in Burundi. 
Second, the potential destabilizing effect of return migration is examined 
by estimating the effect of return migration on theft and/or the destruction of 
crops, livestock and agricultural tools, land disputes, and security levels in 
communities of returnees. This dissertation employs neo-Malthusian viewpoints 
regarding the linkages among rapid population increase, scarcity of renewable 
natural resources, and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 2010) and applies these viewpoints 
to a case of large-scale return migration. Did large- scale return migration in 
Burundi cause demand-induced or structural scarcity of agricultural land? Did 
large-scale return migration cause thefts and disputes and diminish security in 
communities of returnees? These questions will be addressed  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Burundi: conflict, migration and 
development 
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Section 3.2.1 (Forced migration) and Section 3.3.2 (Return migration) in this chapter 
draw heavily from the following working paper: Fransen, S. and Kuschminder, K. 
(2012). Reintegration after repatriation: The long-term challenges of return migration in 
Burundi. New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 242. Geneva: 
UNHCR. 
 
Our Burundi, gentle country, 
Take your place in the concert of nations, 
Acceding to independence with honourable intentions. 
Wounded and bruised, you have remained master of yourself 
[…] 
Our Burundi, worthy of our tenderest love, 
We vow to your noble service our hands and hearts and lives. 
May God, who gave you to us, keep you for us to venerate, 
Under the shield of unity, 
In peace, joy and prosperity. 
(Burundi national anthem, 1962) 
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3.1 Introduction 
When Burundi gained independence in 1962, after 46 years of Belgian colonial rule 
preceded by 17 years of German suzerainty, the Burundi people had high hopes 
for a peaceful and prosperous future. This milestone in Burundi’s history, 
however, marked the onset of unprecedented, recurrent waves of violence that 
lasted almost 40 years. Between 1962 and 2000, nearly 600,000 people lost their 
lives; more than a million people were uprooted from their homes; and nearly all 
Burundians experienced losses in terms of housing, land, livestock, other 
valuables, education and health, and the deaths of family members and friends 
(Uvin, 1999, 2009). The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements were signed 
in August 2000, and a new constitution was established in 2005, followed by 
democratic elections in that same year. These events paved the way towards 
stability and development, and Burundi was officially declared a post-conflict 
society.  
 During Burundi’s transition from war to peace, migration played a large 
role in economic and social life. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
people (IDPs) and refugees returned home, some on their own and others with the 
help of international organizations, NGOs and the Burundi and/or host country 
governments. The Burundi wider diaspora, located primarily in North America 
and Europa, had played an oppositional political role during the conflict period 
and became increasingly invested in development activities (Turner & Bronden, 
2011). Remittances, which are typically sent by the wider diaspora, grew 
substantially after the war (see Chapter 5 of this dissertation, or Fransen & 
Mazzucato, 2014) and are regarded as important potential contributors to 
development. Migration has therefore been intrinsically linked to development in 
Burundi’s post-conflict period.  
 Throughout this dissertation, Burundi is referred to as a conflict-affected 
society, although it is officially classified as a post-conflict state. The term ‘post-
conflict’ highlights the wish of the country to move forward in the pursuit of 
stability and economic development. The use of this term is ambiguous, however, 
because conflict-affected countries often experience unstable political transitions 
that are accompanied by incidents of violence, and such countries have a high 
probability of relapsing back into conflict (World Bank, 2011a). Burundi is no 
exception in this regard: several human right abuses have been reported since 
2005, and tensions are rising again in the run-up to the early 2015 elections. The 
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term ‘conflict-affected’ is therefore adopted here to highlight the continuity of 
insecurity and instability that accompanies the transition from war to peace in 
Burundi.  
The rest of this chapter describes Burundi’s transition from war to peace, 
beginning with a brief account of Burundi’s history of conflict (Section 3.2), 
followed by a description of the forced migration flows that originated from this 
conflict in Section 3.2.1 and migration to the wider diaspora in Section 3.2.2. Then, 
Burundi’s transition period is described in Section 3.3, including the role of 
migration in this transition period, with a focus on remittances (Section 3.3.1) and 
return migration (3.3.2). A map of Burundi is provided in the Appendix of this 
dissertation (Map A.1).  
 
3.2 Conflict and forced migration 
Burundi has experienced waves of civil conflict since it gained independence from 
Belgium in 1962 (see, e.g., Lemarchand, 1996, for an overview). The major conflict 
episodes occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 
2000, 2005). These conflict episodes did not generate much media attention or 
scholarly debate, especially compared with Burundi’s neighbouring country 
Rwanda, but they nevertheless had disastrous effects on economic and social life in 
Burundi. To quote Lemarchand (1996): ‘Nowhere else in Africa has so much 
violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small space as in 
Burundi during the years following independence’ (p. xxv). Table 3.1 provides a 
summary of the major conflict episodes that occurred in Burundi after 
independence and their consequences.  
The conflict episodes in 1972 and 1993 were the most prominent. In 1972, 
the Tutsi-dominated army repressed a violent insurgency of Hutu groups in 
southern Burundi (see, Lemarchand, 2008, for a detailed account). The army killed 
approximately 200,000 Burundians, primarily of Hutu origin (Watt, 2008). In 1993, 
the most recent war erupted in Burundi when extremist groups in the Tutsi army 
assassinated Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected Hutu president. 
This event led to retaliations from Hutu society members against the Tutsi 
population, followed by a violent response from the Tutsi army against Hutus. The 
1993 war lasted for more than a decade, led to approximately 300,000 casualties 
and essentially affected the entire country.  
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Table 3.1. Burundi’s conflict episodes 
 1965 1972 1988 1991 1993 
      
Duration (months) 2 4 2 1 108 
Casualties (thousands) 5 200 15 1-3 300 
Refugees (thousands) 0 300 50 38 687 
Casualties and refugees 
over the total population 
0.2 14.0 1.3 0.7 17.1 
      
Provinces affected Muramvya Whole 
country 
Ngozi, 
Kirundo 
Cibitoke, 
Bubanza, 
Bujumbura 
Whole 
country 
      
Source: Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005. 
 
Four decades of civil war left its marks on both economic and social 
aspects of Burundi society. Per capita income had decreased by nearly 40 per cent 
in the 1993-2007 period (World Bank, 2009), and this decrease, in combination with 
a substantial decrease in international aid (Bundervoet & Verwimp, 2005), drove 
the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line of 1 dollar per day from 
35 per cent in 1993 to 67 per cent in 2006 (World Bank, 2009). The conflict in 
Burundi also affected social ties, reportedly leading to low levels of interpersonal 
trust, solidarity, and reciprocity (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005; Uvin, 2009; Vervisch, 
Vlassenroot, & Braeckman, 2013). Horizontal networks of close friends and family 
members based on solidarity expressed through gift-giving and mutual support 
have historically formed an important part of social life in Burundi (Trouwborst, 
1973; Uvin, 2009). However, as described by Vervisch et al. (2013), the insurance 
function of this bonding social capital weakened during the war period as a result 
of the conflict and economic hardship that gave rise to disputes over valuables and 
sometimes led to violence. The conflict, which affected nearly all households, in 
addition to increasing poverty levels, deeply divided community members. 
Burundian society has consequently been described as being characterized by 
‘weak bridges, strong bonds’ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005, p. 6). This description refers 
to a highly fragmented society as a result of inter-ethnic tensions as well as socio-
economic inequity between social classes (principally the urban elite versus the 
rural population), divisions between clans within ethnic groups, and regional 
inequalities (especially between urban and rural areas). Post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes and policies in Burundi have consequently involved both the delivery 
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of economic assistance and peace-building elements that focused on restoring 
social ties (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005; Vervisch, Titeca, Vlassenroot, & Braeckman, 
2013). 
 
3.2.1 Forced migration 
Because of Burundi’s history of conflict, the country experienced large forced 
migrations of both IDPs and refugees. Most refugees fled the country in 1972 and 
1993. These refugees are therefore now referred to as ‘1972’ and ‘1993 caseload’ 
refugees. Detailed statistics on forced migration within and from Burundi are not 
available, but it has been estimated that approximately 300,000 people, primarily of 
Hutu origin, fled the country in 1972. The 1993 conflict resulted in more than 
300,000 casualties and the displacement of an estimated 1.2 million people 
(Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005). According to Watt (2008), approximately 700,000 
Hutus fled – the majority to Tanzania, whereas most Tutsi who were displaced 
took residence in IDP camps in Burundi and often stayed for many years.  
Most 1972 and 1993 caseload refugees fled to Tanzania (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). Other 1972 and 1993 refugees fled to Rwanda or the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and a small number reached European 
countries, the United States and Canada. An unknown number of refugees moved 
to communities in border areas and to Tanzania’s capital, Dar Es Salaam (see, e.g., 
Sommers, 2001). Table 3.2 provides an overview of the refugees and asylum 
seekers from Burundi in the 1993-2002 period. The table indicates that in 1993, 
nearly 880,000 Burundians resided in other countries. Most of them resided in 
Tanzania, Rwanda and DRC. By the end of 2002, more than 570,000 Burundians 
resided in exile, the majority of them in Tanzania and a smaller group in DRC 
(UNHCR, 2002).  
 
Table 3.2. Refugees and asylum seekers from Burundi by country of exile: 1993-2002 
Country of exile1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
           
Tanzania 444,867 202,738 227,216 385,452 459,420 473,768 498,982 538,448 521,180 540,861 
DRC 176,351 180,098 117,902 30,226 47,004 20,000 19,200 19,760 19,485 19,374 
South Africa             - -             - - 389 601 604 632 1,439 1,715 
Zambia            - -        260 330 1,746 1,474 1,629 1,796 2,417 1,583 
Rwanda 250,000     6,000 3,228 9,611 6,933 1,408 1,371 957 1,670 1,554 
Other        164        870 1,976 3,061 3,631 5,317 5,663 6,491 7,808 9,384 
           
Total 871,382 389,706 350,582 428,680 519,123 502,568 527,449 568,084 553,999 574,471 
           
Note. 1 UNHCR estimates for most industrialized countries. Source: UNHCR, 2002. 
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Burundian refugees residing in Tanzania could be roughly divided into 
three groups: 1) 1972 caseload refugees residing in settlements that were 
eventually named the ‘Old Settlements’, 2) 1993 caseload refugees residing in one 
of the nine refugee camps in north-western Tanzania, and 3) refugees from both 
the 1972 and 1993 cohorts who did not settle in designated refugee areas but 
integrated into villages in north-western Tanzania or urban areas (Hovil, 2009). 
Most 1972 refugees, who were agriculturalists from Burundi’s middle and 
southern provinces, resided in one of the three Old Settlements of Ulyankulu, 
Katumba, and Mishamo, located in western Tanzania in the Urambo District of the 
Tabora Region and the Mpanda District of the Rukwa Region. In 1987, the Old 
Settlements of Mishamo and Katumba together reportedly hosted approximately 
110,000 Burundians (Daley, 1991). The regions in which the Old Settlements were 
created had low population densities and much land available for agriculture. This 
setting stimulated local integration and provided a boost to the local economy 
(Fielden, 2008). Refugees received five hectares of arable land per household upon 
arrival (Thomson, 2009). Most refugee households in the Old Settlements became 
self-sufficient. As a result, donor support for the Old Settlements was withdrawn 
in the 1980s.  
Burundians who fled the country in the early 1990s were largely hosted in 
refugee camps in Kigoma and Ngara regions in north-western Tanzania. These 
Burundians were spread over nine refugee camps managed by UNHCR and the 
Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs, close to the Burundi-Tanzania border. In the 
early 2000s, eight international and national NGOs worked as implementing 
partners for UNHCR, providing refugees with food aid, health care, education, and 
legal advice (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Although the 1993 refugees began to 
return to Burundi after 2000 (see Section 3.3.3 below), there were still eight refugee 
camps operating in 2007 (Haver, Hatungimana, & Tennant, 2009). Between 2006 
and 2008, six refugee camps in Tanzania were closed. As opposed to the Old 
Settlements, the camps received vast amounts of financial and material support for 
the full duration of their existence.  
 
3.2.2 Migration to the wider diaspora 
As a result of the civil conflicts, Burundi has a large and heterogeneous diaspora 
scattered around the globe. In total, more than 350,000 Burundians, or 4.2 per cent 
of the population, were living abroad in 2010 (World Bank, 2011c). Although the 
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largest share of the diaspora resides in the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, 
Rwanda, and the DRC, a small minority migrated to Europe and North America, 
where they established a small but active diaspora. Migration to the wider 
diaspora occurred in roughly four phases and resulted in the creation of a 
heterogeneous group in terms of skills, migration motives and political views 
(Turner, 2008a, 2008b; Turner & Bronden, 2011). The first wave of emigrants 
consisted of a few wealthier Burundians who temporarily moved to Belgium for 
study purposes before Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962. Most 
were part of the political elite or the Burundi monarchy (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006), 
primarily consisting of Tutsi whose positions were strengthened through these 
privileges while supported by colonizers (Turner, 2008b). Despite being small, this 
migration trend persisted after the 1960s (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006). The second 
wave consisted primarily of Hutu asylum seekers who fled the 1972 genocide (De 
Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Lemarchand, 1996). Many, however, also had scholarships 
and either were already living in Belgium or had been living there previously 
(Turner, 2008a, 2008b). Over time, this diaspora formed networks that attracted 
more students and people seeking business opportunities, which generated the 
third wave of emigration between 1972 and 1993 (ibid.). The re-ignition of conflict 
in 1993 and the economic downturn that followed generated the fourth wave of 
emigrants to the wider diaspora (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006). These emigrants were 
asylum seekers as well as ‘young Tutsi and a similar group of young, urban, elite 
Hutu’ who were seeking better economic opportunities (Turner, 2008b, p. 751). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that highly skilled Burundians largely migrated from 
Bujumbura, Burundi's capital (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006). 
 
3.3 Migration in the transition from war to peace 
As described in Chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on two migration-related 
phenomena in Burundi: remittances and return migration. Remittances and return 
migration are regarded as important factors influencing development in Burundi’s 
transitional period from war to peace. This section describes the current 
knowledge on remittances and return migration in Burundi.  
 
3.3.1 Remittances 
Remittances are believed to be a low but increasing financial inflow in Burundi. 
Remittances were estimated at between three million USD (World Bank, 2011c) 
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and 28 million USD (Banque de la Republique Burundi (BRB), 2010) in 2010.3 
Compared with other countries in the region, such as Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, Burundi received few remittances in 2010, despite having the highest 
stocks of emigrants as a percentage of its population (see Table 3.3). For example, 
Kenya, one of Africa's most successful countries with regard to tapping its 
diaspora potential, received 1,758 million USD in 2010. Bordering Burundi in the 
north, Rwanda received 91 million USD in 2010. It is unclear whether these 
numbers underestimate remittances because they represent formal flows only. De 
Bruyn and Wets (2006) reported that most remittances to Burundi were sent 
informally, whereas Fransen and Andersson (2011) argued that the remittance 
market has become increasingly formalized as a result of innovations and 
increasing competition. 
 
Table 3.3. Stocks of emigrants and remittances in the Great Lakes region (2010) 
 Stock of emigrants 
in 2010 
Stock of emigrants as a 
percentage of the population in 
2010 
Remittances  
(Million USD) in 2010 
   
Rwanda 263,400 2.6      91 
Burundi 356,000 4.2        3 
Kenya 457,100 1.1 1.758 
Uganda 757,500 2.2    773 
Tanzania 316,900 0.7      17 
   
Source: World Bank, 2011c. 
 
Apart from these formal statistics, little is known about remittances in 
Burundi. Small-scale studies have suggested that most remittances are sent from 
Europe and North America (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Fransen & Andersson, 2011). 
Remittance-receiving households would primarily reside in urban areas and 
would generally be wealthier than non-receiving households. In contrast, regional 
remittances are believed to be negligible despite the large regional migration flows 
(Fransen & Andersson, 2011). As described, the top three destination countries for 
Burundi’s emigrants were Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda in 2010 (World Bank, 
2011c). However, most of these regional migrants reside in temporary settlements 
                                                 
3 Statistics on remittances from the BRB were derived during an interview that I conducted with the BRB in 
Bujumbura in October 2011. 
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or refugee camps, and their living conditions and the absence of financial 
infrastructure likely do not permit them to send remittances (Fransen & 
Andersson, 2011).  
Nevertheless, remittances are a potential resource for development in 
Burundi (Fransen & Andersson, 2011; Fransen & Siegel, 2010). In the period from 
2005 to 2008, remittance inflows into Burundi were negligible relative to FDI and 
ODA. From 2008 onwards, however, remittances increased and surpassed FDI 
based on World Bank and BRB measurements. There are several potential reasons 
for this rise in remittances after 2008. First, the measurement of remittances 
improved considerably in Burundi after 2005. Since 2005, BRB includes transfers 
through money transfer operators such as Western Union in its statistics, and in 
2007, foreign exchange bureaus were legalized, also reporting to BRB (Fransen & 
Andersson, 2011). Second, the official end of conflict in Burundi and the beginning 
of the reconstruction of the financial sector may have eased remittance sending to 
Burundi. Third, the end of conflict may have also increased the confidence of 
diaspora members and the ease of travelling to Burundi, which may have boosted 
remittance sending. 
The rise in the relative importance of remittances, combined with 
successful examples of other countries in the region to attract remittances, has 
inspired the Burundi government to begin designing policies to harness and 
increase this financial resource from abroad (Fransen & Andersson, 2011). The first 
draft of Burundi’s first national migration policy was designed in 2011 with the 
aim to enhance remittance flows into the country that would be invested in 
development programmes and hereby contribute to the economic reconstruction of 
the country (Republic of Burundi, 2011). At the time of writing this dissertation, the 
policy has however not been implemented yet. Although the Burundi diaspora 
residing in Europe and North America is relatively small, its members are well 
organized, highly active, and highly engaged in their home country (Fransen & 
Siegel, 2010). However, the effects of remittances on development in Burundi 
remain underexplored. It is unclear, for example, who exactly the main 
beneficiaries of remittances in Burundi are and how they allocate the money that 
they receive from abroad. These questions warrant exploration to assess the 
development potential of remittances in Burundi.  
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3.3.2 Return migration 
Return migration has by far constituted the largest and most significant migration 
flow after the conflict in Burundi. Already during the war, conflict episodes were 
interspersed with periods of relative stability in which many refugees returned 
home again. Graph 3.1 shows the return migration to Burundi between 1993 and 
2014 based on UNHCR data (UNHCR, 2002, 2014a). Before 2002, no official records 
of migration movements in and out of Burundi were maintained. All numbers for 
return migration before 2002 are therefore estimates. The data show a peak in 
return in 1994, which represents an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 returnees who fled 
to Tanzania following the 1993 violence and returned shortly thereafter. This 
return continued, albeit at a slower pace, in subsequent years. After 2000, the 
return to Burundi increased again.  
 
Graph 3.1. Return to Burundi: 1993 - 2014 (in thousands) 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2002, 2014a. 
 
 Following the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements in 
August 2000, many Burundians began to return from exile voluntarily. Official 
repatriation from Tanzania, facilitated by UNHCR in a joint initiative with the 
Burundian and Tanzanian government, was initiated in 2002. Most early returnees 
were former 1993 caseload refugees who returned to their origin communities in 
the Northern provinces of Kirundo, Ngozi and Cibitoke, where the situation was 
relatively stable at the time. In 2002, the first year of the repatriation exercise, more 
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than 50,000 Burundians returned from Tanzania, and more than 45,000 of them 
were assisted by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2002).  
In 2008, UNHCR initiated the repatriation of former 1972 caseload 
refugees from the Old Settlements, who had thus far been reluctant to return 
because they had spent a long time in exile and had lived in relatively good 
conditions. Low rates of return from the Old Settlements had led to increased 
pressure from the Tanzanian government (Haver et al., 2009). The efforts of 
UNHCR increased the return of mainly, but not solely, 1972 refugees in 2008 
(UNHCR, 2011), who primarily settled in the Southern provinces Makamba, 
Rutana and Bururi (see Map A.2 in the appendix of this dissertation). In October 
2008, a total of 23,740 1972 refugees had been repatriated from Tanzania to 
Burundi, of whom 87.12 per cent (20,683 individuals) returned to these three 
provinces.  
In 2008, Tanzania established a naturalization option for 1972 refugees 
from Burundi. More than 160,000 people chose this option, while approximately 
50,000 1972 refugees returned to Burundi, and a small group opted for resettlement 
in a third country. There are no official data on the characteristics of those who 
returned versus those who opted for naturalization, but a study conducted in 2008 
showed that access to agricultural land and education in Tanzania played a major 
role for many 1972 refugees in their choice of naturalization (Hovil & Kweka, 
2008). Likewise, 1972 refugees who expected to regain their land upon return in 
Burundi showed a preference for return. However, information on the 
naturalization and return options and their implications was reportedly poorly 
distributed among the 1972 refugee population, many of whom lacked clarity in 
the long-term implications of their choices. 
UNHCR began repatriation from Rwanda in 2009 and initiated 
repatriation from DRC in October 2010. After 2009, returns to Burundi decreased, 
and it was estimated that in 2011, Tanzania still hosted a ‘residual’ of 37,000 out of 
more than 84,000 Burundian refugees (UNHCR, 2011). Graph 3.1 shows another 
peak in returns in 2012 resulting from the closing of the last refugee camp in 
Tanzania, Mtabila, at the end of 2012. The closing of the camp forced another 
30,000 to 35,000 former 1993 refugees to return to Burundi.  
Between 2002 and September 2014, more than 550,000 formally registered 
former refugees returned to Burundi (UNHCR, 2014c). The majority of them 
(approximately 490,000 refugees) were repatriated from Tanzania, slightly fewer 
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than 15,000 came from DRC, and nearly 8,000 came from Rwanda (see Table 3.4). 
These numbers only represent the returnees who were registered by UNHCR and 
are likely to be underestimates of the actual return flow. In January 2014, more 
than 72,000 Burundian refugees were still residing abroad, and nearly 80,000 were 
internally displaced (UNHCR, 2014c).  
Because of the protracted Burundian refugee settlement in Tanzania, some 
who returned to Burundi were second-generation returnees, the children of 
(primarily 1972) refugees who were born abroad (Fransen and Kuschminder, 2012). 
Bunte and Monnier (2011) cited a 2010 UNHCR report that stated that 82 per cent 
of the returnees in 2008 were born in Tanzania. However, there is little information 
on this group, including their motivations to ‘return’. At the time of repatriation, 
many second-generation returnees were likely under-age and travelled to Burundi 
with their parents. 
Most refugees who returned after 2002 settled in their origin provinces in 
Southern and Northern Burundi. Bururi province, which is located on the fertile 
shores of Lake Tanganyika and is close to Tanzania, also received a substantial 
number of returnees after 2002 (UNHCR, 2014c). Returnees who had been born 
abroad and/or did not have family to return to were referred to as ‘des personnes 
sans terre ni référence’ – people with no land or reference – and were housed in 
rural integrated villages (VRIs). These returnees were largely 1972 refugees and 
second-generation returnees (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). The VRI approach 
has been evaluated by Fransen and Kuschminder, who argued that the VRIs had 
not provided sufficient services to the residents. However, the long-term 
sustainability of the VRIs remains to be explored. 
 Official returnees were supported by UNHCR and other international 
organizations to return to their origin communities. The 1993 and 1972 refugees 
were allowed to take 50 kg and 100 kg of personal belongings with them, 
respectively (Fransen and Kuschminder, 2012). Many Burundians strongly desired 
to return to their origins as a result of their emotional attachments to their family 
land (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Hovil, 2009; Rema Ministries, 2012). Hovil 
(2009, p. 30) stated as follows: ‘Those who are returning from exile, after decades of 
alienation, are searching for continuity with their past, which is most tangible 
through physically returning to the land from which they fled, and on which their 
ancestors lived’.  
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Table 3.4. Repatriation to Burundi by country of exile: 2002 – 2011 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011a Total a 
            
Tanzania 50,899 79,925 89,039 62,338 42,765 39,506 94,891 29,115 1,011 281 489,770 
Rwanda      113 106 151 4,489 615 111 36 2,342 1 4 7,968 
RDC   2,142 2,142 879 1,002 1,284 45 6 95 3,640 3,408 14,643 
Kenya        78 50 62 23 78 16 6 1 - 12 326 
Mozambique - 2 16 17 4 - 32 13 - - 84 
South Africa       16 13 22 58 25 29 47 21 9 13 253 
Benin         3 8 10 10 7 11 2 3 7 3 64 
China - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
Cameroun - 12 37 33 13 7 6 8 - 6 122 
Malawi - 1 1 35 34 - 25 154 64 15 329 
Uganda        4 1 12 17 18 - - - 4 - 56 
Namibia 9 1 16 1 - - - - 3 17 47 
Zambia 9 67 29 32 28 59 16 17 12 10 279 
Zimbabwe - - - - - - - 4 - - 4 
East African 
Republic 
- - - - - - - 3 - - 
3 
Congo Braz. - 18 8 20 16 - - 2 - - 64 
Ivory Coast 6 3 8 11 5 4 1 - - - 38 
Madagascar - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 
Other 4 17 37 22 23 10 - - - 1 114 
            
Total 53,283 82,366 90,327 68,108 44,915 39,798 95,068 31,779 4,752 3,770 514,166 
            
Note.  a Numbers as of September 2011. Source: UNHCR, 2011. 
 
The Burundi repatriation became internationally known as a major success 
because most returnees were repatriated in ‘safety and with dignity’ (Rema 
Ministries, 2012). Small-scale studies that were conducted after the conflict found 
that return households did not differ from non-return households in terms of 
housing, land and other observables (see, e.g., Terra-P Group, 2008). Others, 
however, have highlighted challenges that returnees still face. Especially the 1972 
cohort and second-generation returnees reportedly experience language barriers, 
cultural differences, low access to legal services, discrimination, and difficulties in 
finding employment (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012).  
Property restitution, however, emerged as the main challenge regarding 
the repatriation process in Burundi. Many returnees found their agricultural land 
occupied by others or sold by family members (Hovil, 2009). The 1986 Land Code 
of Burundi states that people who have been abroad for more than 30 years can no 
longer claim the rights to their ancestral land (Bunte & Monnier, 2011). 
Consequently, returnees who had spent long periods abroad and second-
generation returnees were not entitled to receive their land back, despite the 
promises of property restitution made in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
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Agreements. In some cases, land that was abandoned by refugees was allocated to 
other households by the government, sometimes to former IDPs. This land issue 
has led to difficult situations in which both groups feel entitled to the land.  
A new land code is currently being developed, and it is likely that 1972 
returnees will be exempted from the 30-year rule in the near future. The most 
commonly adopted solution that has been implemented thus far is land sharing, 
but it frequently leads to resentment and is often viewed as a temporary solution 
(Hovil, 2009). Moreover, the agricultural production of a single plot is often 
insufficient to feed multiple families (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). Given these 
challenges, some have argued that return migration to Burundi has increased 
pressure on agricultural land and other resources, thereby enhancing poverty 
levels in areas of high return and creating a breeding ground for conflict (Uvin, 
2009; Watt, 2008).  
Many programmes and projects were implemented to support the return 
and reintegration of former refugees in Burundi. Returnees received food ratios, 
educational items, non-food items such as mosquito nets, cooking materials, and 
other resources, and from 2007 onwards, they also received a cash grant (see, 
Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012, for a detailed overview of the assistance that was 
offered to returnees). UNHCR also implemented a shelter programme that 
provided house-building materials for one-third of the most vulnerable returnees 
each year. Between 2002 and 2010, more than 100,000 houses were built under the 
UNHCR shelter programme in Burundi (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). A so-
called community-based approach was adopted for the majority of other 
programmes and projects regarding reintegration implemented by local and 
international NGOs. The VRIs, for example, contained not only returnees but also a 
small percentage of vulnerable populations from neighbouring villages to 
stimulate the integration of the VRIs into surrounding communities. In general, the 
restoration of community cohesion has been a focus of many post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes in Burundi.  
Although the effects of return migration on development in Burundi are 
expected to be significant, scarcely any research has investigated the linkages 
between return migration and development in Burundi. This lack of research is 
largely caused by a lack of available data. The studies on return migration in 
Burundi that have been conducted provided important insights, but most were 
conducted in specific localities and focused on specific groups of returnees. 
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Fransen and Kuschminder (2012), for example, conducted ethnographic fieldwork 
in two villages in southern Burundi that primarily received 1972 caseload 
returnees. The effects of return migration on development on a national level 
therefore remain to be explored. The same holds true for the effects of remittances 
on development. There are no micro-level data on remittances to estimate the 
significance and effects of remittances for remittance-receiving households. The 
data that were used in this dissertation therefore provide a unique opportunity to 
explore the effects of remittances and return migration on development in 
Burundi. These data will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
  
  
 
 
Chapter 4: Data and methods  
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Section 4.2 (Data collection and sampling) of this chapter draws heavily from the 
following report: Fransen, S. (2011). Migration and Development, A world in Motion. 
Fieldwork report Burundi: Methodology and Sampling. Maastricht: Maastricht 
Graduate School of Governance.  
 
Section 4.4.1 (Challenges during data collection: infrastructure, electricity and 
safety) of this chapter draws heavily from the following working paper: Fransen, 
S., Kuschminder, K., & Siegel, S. (2012). Implementation of cross-country migration 
surveys in conflict-affected settings: Lessons from the IS Academy survey in Burundi and 
Ethiopia. UNU-MERIT Working Papers, ISSN 1871-9872. Maastricht: UNU-MERIT. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Survey data are increasingly used to study migration and its consequences for 
development. Survey data offer various advantages vis-a-vis aggregated statistics 
on migration, such as those derived from census data or cross-border statistics (see, 
e.g., Fawcett & Arnold, 1987, for an overview). Important advantages include the 
opportunities to adapt the survey to the goal of the research and to include 
retrospective questions to reconstruct migration trajectories. Most importantly, 
micro-level data enable an investigation of the drivers and consequences of 
migration – the latter being the purpose of this dissertation. When studying 
remittances, for example, micro-level survey data can collect information on 
several other household characteristics, such as income, education or health, to 
facilitate a study of the effects of remittances on these variables (see, e.g., Brown, 
Carling, Fransen, & Siegel, 2014). 
As described in Chapter 1, the data that were used for this dissertation 
were collected for the Migration and Development: A World in Motion project, 
hereafter referred to as the Migration and Development project. The Migration and 
Development project, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the 
heading of the IS Academy, was a five-year research project that studied the 
consequences of migration for four migrant-sending countries (Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco) and one migrant-receiving country (the 
Netherlands). The main methodology in each country consisted of large-scale 
household surveys to study the effects of migration on development using a 
quantitative approach. The same standardized questionnaire was used in each 
country, albeit in a slightly modified form to make it suitable for the context.4  
In the questionnaire that was used for the Migration and Development 
project, questions on migration and remittances were embedded in a so-called 
multi-topic household survey that gathered information on various household 
characteristics, such as income, expenditures, asset ownership, and social capital, 
and individual characteristics of the household members, such as their age, level of 
education and employment status.5 Because of the conflict-affected context of 
Burundi, the questionnaire also contained a module on household conflict 
experiences. The household survey was combined with a community survey that 
                                                 
4 More information on the Migration and Development project is provided on: 
http://www.merit.unu.edu/themes/6-migration-and-development/is-academy/ 
5 The questionnaire that was used in Burundi can be found here: http://www.merit.unu.edu/themes/6-migration-
and-development/is-academy/is-academy-research-methodology-and-fieldwork-materials/ 
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collected information on the communities in which the households resided, 
including the availability of infrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity), the availability 
of services (e.g., schools, hospitals) and the history of conflict and migration. Taken 
together, these data enable detailed research on the linkages between the migration 
experiences of household members and how these experiences have affected both 
households and the communities in which households reside. 
The Migration and Development data from Burundi are unique in the 
sense that they offer a detailed view of the livelihoods of households and 
communities following the conflict. Large-scale survey data from conflict-affected 
settings are scarce because of the challenges that accompany data collection in 
these settings (see, e.g., Fransen et al., 2012, for an overview of these challenges). 
Continuing insecurity and damaged infrastructure, including roads and electricity, 
and limited communication networks, may all impede large-scale data collection 
efforts. Several of these challenges were encountered during the Migration and 
Development survey data collection process, and they will be discussed in detail 
below. Another feature that makes the Migration and Development data from 
Burundi unique is that the data collection occurred nation-wide. Burundi is a 
relatively small country, which offered an opportunity to establish a survey that 
covered all provinces, thus yielding results that are nationally representative. 
As a PhD researcher, I was fortunate to work on the Migration and 
Development project within an interdisciplinary team of researchers. Together, we 
designed the questionnaires, established the sampling strategies for each country, 
and faced the variety of challenges that are encountered when conducting large-
scale survey data collection. My primary role in the project was to manage the data 
collection in Burundi. I was given the opportunity to travel to Burundi several 
times and to supervise the data collection on location. After training the team of 
interviewers, I travelled with them from village to village to conduct the 1,500 
household interviews and later in the city to conduct the 810 household interviews 
there. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will reflect on my experiences during 
each stage of the data collection process. 
 The rest of this chapter first details the data collection process, the 
sampling strategy that was employed in Burundi, the selection of the main 
respondents, the practicalities concerning data collection, and ethical 
considerations in Section 4.2. Then, Section 4.3 presents descriptive statistics on the 
main variables of interest in this dissertation – remittances and return migration – 
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to provide preliminary insights into the data. This section also checks the 
representativeness of the data by comparing the distributions of age, gender and 
education in the data with the distributions of these variables in census data that 
were collected in Burundi in 2008. Section 4.4 describes the challenges of data 
collection, potential biases, sensitivities in questionnaire design, and data 
limitations. Finally, Section 4.5 briefly introduces the estimation methods that were 
used in the empirical chapters (Chapter 5 to Chapter 8) of this dissertation.  
   
4.2 Data collection and sampling 
The data collection occurred over a three-month period between January and 
March 2011, during which we worked in close cooperation with a local research 
company, a local university, and several NGOs, international organizations, and 
government officials. Several months before the start of the data collection, the 
project manager, Dr. Melissa Siegel, and I had travelled to Burundi for a so-called 
‘scoping visit’, during which we had established contacts with these local 
institutions and organizations and had involved them in our research. This visit to 
Burundi also enabled us to gain detailed knowledge of the current migration and 
development patterns in Burundi and provided input for the design of the 
questionnaire and the sampling strategy. Permission for data collection was 
granted by the Burundian Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Although the day-to-day situation in Burundi was relatively calm when 
we conducted the survey in 2011, incidents of violence were frequently reported. 
This violence was mainly politically motivated and resulted from the 2010 
elections (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The political situation was therefore tense 
and there was widespread fear among the population that conflict would erupt 
again. In early 2012, after the fieldwork, the security situation improved. This 
context needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results. The data 
collection was not affected by the political situation in 2011. The extent to which 
safety and security affected the data collection will be explained in more detail in 
Section 4.4.1. 
The data collection consisted of two parts. First, a nationally representative 
household survey was conducted in all provinces of Burundi (including urban 
areas). The national household survey gathered information on 1,500 households 
that resided in 100 different communities across the country (see Table 4.1). 
Second, an urban household survey was conducted in Burundi’s capital, 
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Bujumbura. For the urban household survey, 810 households were interviewed in 
54 different blocks in the capital. As described, the household interviews were 
combined with a community survey: in each community or block, a community 
representative was interviewed to gather contextual data on the communities. The 
urban survey was not part of the original fieldwork plan. However, during the 
national survey, we found that remittances were largely absent in rural areas and 
were more common in urban areas. Because the effect of remittances on 
development was one of the main foci of the Migration and Development project, 
we decided to add a separate urban survey that was conducted in the capital only.  
 
Table 4.1. National household survey: households interviewed per province 
Province No. of 
households 
interviewed 
per province 
% of 
households 
interviewed per 
province 
No. of 
community 
representatives 
interviewed per 
province 
% of 
community 
representatives 
interviewed per 
province 
     
Bubanza      60     4.00     4     4.00 
Bujumbura Rural    105     7.00     7     7.00 
Bururi    105     7.00     7     7.00 
Cankuzo      45     3.00     3     3.00 
Cibitoke      90     6.00     6     6.00 
Gitega    121     8.07     8     8.00 
Karuzi      75     5.00     5     5.00 
Kayanza    119     7.93     8     8.00 
Kirundo    120     8.00     8     8.00 
Makamba      75     5.00     5     5.00 
Muramvya      60     4.00     4     4.00 
Muyinga    120     8.00     8     8.00 
Mwaro      60     4.00     4     4.00 
Ngozi    120     8.00     8     8.00 
Rutana      60     4.00     4     4.00 
Ruyigi      75     5.00     5     5.00 
Bujumbura Mairie (urban)      90     6.00     6     6.00 
     
Total 1,500 100.00 100 100.00 
     
Source: Migration and Development national survey data. 
 
67 
 
4.2.1 Sampling and main respondents 
Burundi is divided into 17 provinces, 117 communes (similar to a district or 
municipality) and 2,639 collines (literally: hills). Each colline consists of several 
sous-collines (literally: sub-hills), which represent the smallest administrative unit 
in Burundi. These sous-collines are small agglomerations of houses and typically 
consist of between 150 and 300 households.  
Sampling was based on the Burundi census data from 2008 provided by 
our local research partner. For the national household survey, we followed a two-
step self-weighting design. The primary sampling unit (PSU) was the sous-colline, 
of which 100 were selected based on budget and time constraints. The sous-collines 
were distributed throughout the 17 provinces in Burundi according to the 
demographic weight of these provinces (step 1), after which the sous-collines 
within the provinces were sampled proportionally to the population size (step 2). 
Within each sous-colline, 15 household interviews were conducted. A similar 
sampling strategy was applied for the urban household survey. The PSUs in 
Bujumbura were quartiers (literally: neighbourhoods). In each quartier, one block, 
consisting of 2 to 4 streets, was randomly chosen for conducting the interviews. In 
total, 810 interviews were conducted in 54 blocks.  
Households were randomly selected to be interviewed based on the lists of 
households residing in the community or neighbourhood that were provided by 
the community leaders or neighbourhood representatives. In some urban 
neighbourhoods, a random walk method was applied to select households. This 
method was used in relatively new neighbourhoods where no household lists were 
available or in neighbourhoods where the neighbourhood representative was not 
present when the survey occurred. In the rural areas, lists were available in all 
cases.  
The main respondent within each household was interviewed. This person 
was over 18 years of age and was the most knowledgeable person on household 
financial and social affairs. Preferably, the main respondent was the head of the 
household or a senior household member, such as a mother/father or 
grandmother/grandfather. The respondent for the community questionnaire was a 
senior person in the community and preferably the community leader. The final 
module of the household questionnaire contained questions specifically designed 
for return migrants in the household. One return migrant per household (if there 
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was one) was interviewed. If there were multiple return migrants in the household, 
one return migrant was randomly selected to be interviewed.  
The main respondent provided information on all household members, 
with a household defined as ‘all individuals who are living together and have 
communal arrangements concerning subsistence and other necessities of life and 
inclusive of all individuals presently residing elsewhere (in the country or abroad) 
whose principal commitments and obligations are to this household’. Following 
this definition, household members who had migrated were thus included in the 
sample as well. The average size of the households that were interviewed during 
the national survey was 5.32, yielding a total sample of 7,983 individuals in the 
national survey data. In urban areas, households were slightly smaller, with an 
average household size of 5.14. The urban survey yielded information on 4,163 
individuals. 
 
4.2.2 Practicalities 
The enumerator team consisted of 15 enumerators divided into three teams, each 
with its own supervisor. The three teams with their supervisors were also 
supervised by an overall field supervisor who arranged the logistics and were 
responsible for the detailed planning of each day (which community to visit and 
when). Each team went to a different community each day to interview 
households. Each enumerator conducted three interviews per day; hence, 45 
household interviews were conducted per day. In each community, one 
community questionnaire was administered. In total, 3 community questionnaires 
were therefore administered each day. The enumerator teams were visited in their 
fieldwork locations each day by the field supervisor and me. These visits were 
conducted to enhance data quality and to ensure the safety of the enumerators. 
Each evening, we held debriefings with the enumerators to determine whether any 
problems had arisen.  
Data were collected electronically using personal digital assistants (PDAs). 
This method of data collection, also called computer-assisted personal interviewing 
(CAPI), offers various advantages relative to the use of, for example, paper and 
pencil interviewing (PAPI). CAPI enhances data quality, facilitates data 
management and data control, and eliminates the need for data entry, which 
eliminates the possibility of data entry mistakes and reduces the time between data 
collection and data analysis. Each evening after data collection, we obtained the 
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data from the PDAs and uploaded the data to a computer. The data were checked 
for inconsistencies or errors each evening – provided that we had access to 
electricity that day. 
 
4.2.3 Ethical considerations 
There are several ethical issues that researchers working in conflict-affected 
contexts should be aware off (see, e.g., Goodhand, 2000). Ethical issues that should 
be considered by researchers include ensuring the safety of the research team and 
the respondents and confidentiality of potential sensitive information that the 
respondents provide. Furthermore, certain questions that are asked during 
research may re-open wounds for people that are traumatized. As will be 
described in Section 4.4.2 (Sensitivities in questionnaire design), the Migration and 
Development questionnaire contained several, potentially sensitive subjects.  
During the Migration and Development survey, several measures were 
taken to adhere to international ethical standards. First, before each interview, the 
respondents were informed that the information that they provided would be 
treated confidentially and that we would respect the anonymity of the 
respondents. We emphasized that we were not related to any government, NGO or 
international organization and that the information that we received would not be 
used for any purpose other than research. Second, to avoid to ‘do harm’ when 
asking sensitive questions, the potentially sensitive questionnaire items were 
embedded in other modules in the questionnaire and therefore followed ‘logically’ 
from other questions. All questions were introduced while emphasizing to the 
respondent that he or she had the option to decline to reply to these questions. 
Third, all interviewers were trained to be aware of the potential sensitivity of the 
questions on remittances and return migration and were given tools to either ask 
for more information (‘probing’) or to stop asking questions if the interviewer did 
not want to reply. More information on potentially sensitive questions and the 
measures that were taken to avoid ‘doing harm’ are described in Section 4.4.2. 
Fourth, to ensure the safety of our interviewer teams and the respondents, we 
designed detailed safety protocols and worked in close collaboration with our local 
research partner who provided us with up-to-date information on our working 
locations. More information on safety issues that were encountered during data 
collection can be found in Section 4.4.1. 
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4.3 Remittances and return migration: descriptive statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics on the main variables of interest – 
remittances and return migration – to provide some preliminary insights into the 
data. Remittances were defined in the questionnaire as international monetary 
transfers that were received by a household from a migrant in the 12 months prior 
to the interview. The national survey data revealed that remittances are most 
common in Burundi’s urban areas. The national survey that preceded the urban 
survey showed that 2.40 per cent (n = 36) of the 1,500 sampled households had 
received remittances in the past year and that most of these receiving households 
(38.89 per cent) lived in Bujumbura. This result is illustrated in Map 4.1. The 
finding that remittances were more common in the capital was confirmed by the 
urban data: of the 810 households, 15.93 per cent (n = 129) were remittance-
receiving households. The empirical chapters on remittances in this dissertation are 
therefore based on the urban data.  
An individual was defined as a first-generation return migrant if he or she 
had returned to Burundi either voluntarily or had been forced to live there full 
time after having lived abroad for a consecutive period of at least three months. 
The three-month period was chosen to ensure that the migrant had spent a period 
abroad that was long enough to affect his or her livelihood upon return. If 
someone returned to Burundi after spending two weeks abroad, for example, it is 
likely that this migration episode only had minimal effects on the reintegration of 
this person. Using the three-month period also ensured that we excluded most of 
the cross-border seasonal migration that takes place between Burundi and 
Tanzania. 
A total of 491 individuals in the national survey data were first-generation 
return migrants, representing 6.17 per cent of the total sample of 7,983 individuals. 
Another 206 individuals (2.59 per cent of the total sample) were identified as so-
called second-generation return migrants – the children of return migrants who 
were born abroad. Hence, 8.73 per cent (n = 697) of the individuals in the national 
sample were either first- or second-generation returnees. Map 4.1 shows the 
proportion of return migrants for each province in Burundi. Nearly 9 per cent of 
the first-generation return migrants resided in the capital city of Bujumbura. 
Because of the high prevalence of return migration across the country, the 
empirical chapters on return migration in this dissertation rely on the national 
survey data.  
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Map 4.1. Prevalence of remittances and return migration in Burundi 
 
Source. Migration and Development national survey data. 
 
4.3.1 Data representativeness 
To examine whether the Migration and Development data are indeed 
representative of the country as a whole, this section compares the distribution of 
certain characteristics in the sample data with 2008 census data from Burundi. 
Table 4.2 shows that in terms of age, gender, household size, and marital status, the 
Migration and Development sample does not deviate much from the 2008 census 
data. However, individuals in the Migration and Development sample are 
considerably better educated. For example, more than 70 per cent of respondents 
aged 9 and older reported being able to read and write, whereas the 2008 census 
data reported a literacy rate of 43 per cent. Likewise, the proportion of people 
(aged 3 and older) without any education was nearly 13 per cent lower in the 
sample than in the census data. These differences, albeit large for a three-year 
period, may result from the increases in government expenditures on education 
after the war and the launch of free primary education in 2005, which has led to a 
sharp increase in primary school enrolment and a 20 per cent increase in literacy 
rates after the war (UNESCO, 2011). Apart from the differences, the distribution of 
characteristics in the sample seems comparable to that of the Burundi population.  
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Table 4.2. Comparing census data with the Migration and Development data 
Note. 1 includes individuals aged 10 and older, 2 includes individuals aged 3 and older.  
 
 
4.4 Challenges of data collection, biases & sensitivities 
This section first describes the challenges that were encountered during data 
collection, which include the lack of physical infrastructure, access to electricity 
and safety in Section 4.4.1. Second, I reflect on potential biases that may arise from 
the research design in Section 4.4.2. Third, the limitations of the data that resulted 
from unforeseen errors and the implications of these errors for the analyses and 
research findings are described in Section 4.4.3.  
4.4.1 Challenges during data collection 
Several challenges were encountered during the data collection in Burundi.6 Some 
of these challenges are commonly encountered when conducting survey research 
in a developing country context, and others were specific to the conflict-affected 
                                                 
6 See Fransen, Kuschminder and Siegel (2012) for a detailed comparison of the data collection challenges 
encountered during the Migration and Development project in Burundi and Ethiopia. 
 Burundi census 
 data 2008 
Migration and 
Development 
national survey data 
2011 
Difference 
    
Age distribution    
   Age group <14 (%) 44.10 42.60 -1.50 
   Age group 15-59 (%) 50.90 50.01 -0.08 
   Age group 60> (%) 2.10 4.56 2.46 
    
Gender    
   Male (%) 49.20 48.50 -0.70 
   Female (%) 50.80 51.50 0.70 
    
Average household size rural 4.7 5.3 +0.6 
Average household size urban 4.9 5.1 +0.2 
    
Literacy (%)1 43.20 70.50 27.30 
    
No education (%)2 50.30 37.46 -12.84 
Primary education (%)2 39.10 18.80 -20.30 
    
Married (%) 46.70 43.86 -2.84 
    
73 
 
context in which this study occurred. First, the lack of physical infrastructure, 
especially in rural areas, posed challenges for data collection. Some parts of the 
country were difficult to reach, and interviewers often had to travel large distances 
to reach, first, the fieldwork locations and, second, the households to be 
interviewed. Fieldwork locations were reached by vehicle, often with an additional 
walk. In the end, all sampled locations were reached, but travel times significantly 
increased working hours and limited the number of interviews that could be 
conducted per day.  
Second, access to electricity was a critical issue. As described, the data 
collection was performed using PDAs, which need to be recharged regularly. This 
issue was resolved by recharging the PDAs in the cars in which the interviewer 
teams travelled and by carrying paper questionnaires in case the PDAs could not 
be recharged. Because of these precautions, access to electricity did not affect the 
number of interviews that were conducted or the data quality. 
 Third, safety posed a key concern in the data collection process in Burundi. 
During the data collection period, there were incidental reports of violence, human 
rights violations and rumours of new rebel group formations. The security 
situation at each fieldwork location was evaluated daily, and decisions regarding 
safety measures were taken in close collaboration with the research partner and the 
interviewer teams. All interviewers carried a safety protocol that detailed how to 
act in an emergency situation. The security situation limited travel times for the 
interviewer teams, which also limited the number of interviews that could be 
conducted per day. Travelling during evening, nights and early mornings was not 
possible. In the end, all sampled communities were considered safe at the times 
that they were visited for data collection; therefore, the sampling strategy did not 
need to be adjusted due to safety concerns.  
 
4.4.2 Sensitivities in questionnaire design 
Several parts of the questionnaire contained questions that were potentially 
sensitive for the respondents. These parts included questions on our two main 
variables of interest – remittances and return migration – and conflict experiences. 
The issue of ethnicity was also sensitive in Burundi and was therefore not 
addressed in the questionnaire. This section details the reasons for the sensitivity 
of these subjects and the effects on the research design and the findings.  
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First, our two main variables of interest, remittances and return migration, 
are known to represent sensitive issues for respondents in some contexts. Whether 
someone financially supports family members or friends, for example, often has a 
moral dimension and may lead to over- or under-reporting (see Brown, Carling, 
Fransen & Siegel, 2014, for an overview). A household that has a migrant abroad 
but does not receive remittances may feel ashamed and decide to report 
remittances that are not received. These issues are closely linked to social norms in 
receiving areas regarding migrants and remittances. Under-reporting of 
remittances may also occur, for example, when households believe that correctly 
reporting their income may jeopardize their potential support from NGOs or from 
the state. Households may also under-report remittances if they receive 
remittances via informal channels and fear that this activity is illegal.  
 Return migration may also be sensitive topic for respondents. Migration 
experiences in Burundi were often the result of conflicts that people had 
experienced. Discussing their migration experiences could therefore prompt bad 
memories. In addition, social reintegration is a current problem in Burundi and 
there are many social tensions between returnees and non-returnees (Fransen and 
Kuschminder, 2012). It was therefore a possibility that returnees did not want to be 
identified as former refugees because they feared stigmatization. This problem has 
been described in the literature as one of the challenges that researchers may 
encounter when conducting research with returnees or former refugees (Rogge, 
1994).  
Because we were aware of the potential sensitivity of the survey questions 
on remittances and return migration, we took several measures to reduce over- or 
under-reporting. As described, we stressed issues of anonymity and confidentially 
before each interview. The questionnaire items on remittances were also embedded 
in a module on the migration of household members and therefore followed 
‘logically’ from the questions on migration. The questions were introduced while 
emphasizing to the respondent that he or she had the option to decline to reply to 
these questions. In addition, all interviewers were trained to be aware of the 
potential sensitivity of the questions on remittances and return migration and were 
given tools to either ask for more information (‘probing’) or to stop asking 
questions if the interviewer did not want to reply. 
 Second, the questionnaire contained a module that asked about the conflict 
experiences of the household during the last war in Burundi. For example, the 
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module asked about the experiences of crime that resulted in the death or 
disablement of an adult household member, imprisonment of household members 
and persecution. These questions may be difficult for respondents to answer and 
may also reduce a respondent’s willingness to answer the questions. When 
integrating questions on conflict experiences in multi-topic household surveys, 
such as the Migration and Development survey, it is critical to keep the conflict 
module as short as possible (Bruck, Justino, Verwimp, & Avdeenko, 2010). We 
therefore chose to use only a few and simple items to measure conflict experiences. 
This limited the interview time, enhanced data quality and response rates and 
reduced the stress that the respondent experienced when answering these 
questions as much as possible. The questions on conflict experiences in the 
Migration and Development questionnaire were reduced to 7 questions. At the 
beginning of the module, we also emphasized again that the questions did not 
need to be answered if the respondent chose not to do so. 
 Third, ethnicity was one of the most sensitive topics that we encountered 
in Burundi. From a research perspective, it would have made sense to incorporate 
the concept of ethnicity into the research design. There are significant historic 
differences between ethnic groups in terms of livelihood activities, wealth and 
social class (Uvin, 2009). Adding a measurement of ethnicity would have allowed 
us to control for these differences. Second, ethnicity played a large role in the 
Burundi conflicts. People from both groups were targeted because of their ethnicity 
at different points in time. Ethnicity is consequently linked to migration as well. 
Members of both the Hutu and Tutsi populations were forced to flee their homes 
to seek refuge elsewhere, either abroad or within the country, at a certain point in 
history. As described in Chapter 3, the Burundi refugee population in Tanzania 
largely consisted of Hutus, whereas the residents of IDP camps were primarily 
Tutsi.  
 Despite the importance of ethnicity in the Burundi context, the concept is 
not further addressed in this dissertation for two reasons. First, because ethnicity 
was used to target violence during Burundi’s conflicts, asking about ethnicity 
during the research may have prompted bad memories or raised fear among the 
respondents. People frequently do not wish to share their ethnic background, and 
asking about it directly could have created suspicion or even fear amongst the 
respondents. Our interviewer teams also expressed that they did not feel 
comfortable asking about ethnicity, and we therefore decided to omit the ethnicity 
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questions from the questionnaire. Second, Uvin (2009) found that ‘Burundians 
genuinely desire to move beyond ethnocentricity’ (Uvin, 2009, p. 188). Ethnicity is 
an extremely sensitive issue, and referring to ethnicity is generally not accepted. 
Both Hutus and Tutsis were and feel that they were victims of the long-lasting 
conflict (Lemarchand, 1996; Uvin, 2009). As a researcher, I chose to respect this 
wish to avoid the concept of ethnicity altogether. 
 Although controlling for ethnicity is not possible with these data, the data 
contain some proxies for ethnicity that were used as control variables in the 
analyses in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. These proxies include the IDP camp 
experiences of households versus the international refugee experiences of 
households. As described above, these variables were strongly linked to ethnicity. 
Moreover, community-level information on ethnic homogeneity (only one ethnic 
group in a community) versus ethnic heterogeneity (two or more ethnic groups in 
a community) was collected using the community questionnaire. This information 
was also used as a control variable in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. In Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6, other variables that controlled for wealth differences were included as 
control variables. These included asset ownership (e.g., housing, land), 
expenditures and education. Although the proxies do not completely capture 
differences between households related to ethnicity, they do eliminate most of the 
variation in terms of wealth that may exist between ethnic groups.  
 
4.4.3 Data limitations 
Data collection is a complex and lengthy process that is rarely completed without 
errors. Some limitations regarding the data should therefore be mentioned. These 
limitations relate to the information that was not collected and unforeseen errors 
that the data contained. The implications of these data limitations for the analyses 
in the empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapter 5 to Chapter 8) are discussed.  
First, the questionnaire did not collect detailed information on previous 
experiences of forced internal displacement of households. This decision was a 
consequence of the thematic focus of the Migration and Development project, 
which concentrated on the effects of international migration on development. As 
described in Chapter 3, internal displacement was common in Burundi during the 
war, and it is likely that internal displacement, or the return of IDPs, had 
significant consequences for development. One item in the questionnaire referred 
to the IDP camp experiences of household members. Household heads were asked 
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whether at least one household member had ever resided in an IDP camp. This 
measurement provides a broad and rather crude measurement of the internal 
displacement experiences of households. First, the item does not capture 
experiences of internal displacement that occurred outside camps. Second, the item 
does not identify the exact household members who had been displaced. Third, the 
item does not provide information on when, where and for how long individuals 
had been displaced.  
Nevertheless, the indicator on IDP camp residence provides important 
information on the wartime experiences of households. First, IDPs who ended up 
in camps usually resided in these camps for a long time. Scarce humanitarian aid 
was provided in the camps, especially compared with the humanitarian aid that 
was given to refugees who resided in the camps in Tanzania. IDP camp 
experiences are thus likely to have had a significant effect on households’ welfare, 
and controlling for the IDP camp residence of at least one household member 
allowed me to capture, or at least control for, these effects. Second, as described in 
the previous section, IDP camp residence can be used as a proxy for ethnicity in the 
Burundi context. Third, in the face of conflict, families often migrated together to 
IDP camps. Information on the IDP camp residence of ‘at least one of the 
household members’ can therefore be used as a proxy for the IDP experiences of all 
household members. For these reasons, the item provided an important control 
variable in many of the analyses that were conducted for the empirical chapters 
(Chapter 5 to Chapter 8). However, because of its crude measurement, the results 
regarding this variable should be treated with caution, and the effect of IDP 
experiences on development in Burundi remain to be explored in future research.  
Second, although the goal of the research was to study the consequences of 
international migration, we were unable to collect reliable information on the 
emigrant connections of households. The questionnaire posed the following 
question: ‘Are there any household members who currently reside abroad and 
have been residing abroad for at least three months?’ In the Burundi context, 
however, a household member who moves abroad is no longer considered part of 
the household. This consideration was not anticipated, and we therefore had very 
few observations on emigrant connections in the data. In the urban survey data, for 
example, only 22 of the 810 households (2.7 per cent) indicated that they had a 
household member residing abroad, while 129 households (15.93 per cent) 
reported having received remittances in the 12 months prior to the interview. 
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Households who receive remittances have an emigrant connection by definition, 
but this emigrant connection was not captured because of the definitions of 
migrants and households that we used.  
The incomplete information on emigrant connections may have affected 
the results of the analyses in Chapter 6 (Remittances, Bonds and Bridges), where I 
study the effects of remittances on the social capital of remittance-receiving 
households. I argue that one of the mechanisms through which remittances may 
affect social capital investments is through the norms and values that are 
transmitted to receiving households by emigrants abroad. Thus, enhanced 
participation in community organizations, for example, may be a result of 
emigrant connections rather than a result of remittances per se. Because of the 
incomplete information on emigrant connections, I am unable to make a distinction 
between the effects of emigrant connections and remittances. This chapter does 
make a valuable contribution to the literature by showing that there are linkages 
between remittances and social capital. Although the exact mechanism through 
which remittances affect social capital cannot be disentangled, this chapter makes a 
valuable contribution to the literature by showing that there are linkages between 
remittances and social capital that warrant further research attention.  
Third, because of a programming error in the PDAs, we did not have 
information on the remittance usage of remittance-receiving households. A specific 
module in the questionnaire asked about how remittances are usually spent by the 
household, with answer categories including items such as education, health care, 
food and drinks, and business investments. This information proved to be 
unreliable and unusable. Although this information would have provided 
interesting insight with descriptive information on the remittance usage of 
remittance-receiving households, the appropriateness of asking about remittance 
usage is also debated in the literature (see Brown, Carling, Fransen, Siegel, 2014; 
McKenzie and Sasin, 2007). Money is considered fungible, meaning that 
remittances are treated as income and are probably not spent differently than any 
other income source. Thus, a question on remittance usage would be difficult to 
answer for the respondents. The best way to determine the effect of remittances on 
other household indicators, such as education or assets, is therefore to use 
econometric methods such as those used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. These 
econometric methods will be described in the next section.  
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4.5 Estimation methods 
When studying the effect of migration or migration-related phenomena such as 
remittances, one of the key challenges is to demonstrate causal relationships 
between the variables of interest. Potential endogeneity issues may arise as a result 
of reversed causality, selection biases or omitted variable bias (see MckKenzie & 
Sasin, 2007). Especially when using cross-sectional data, as in the present study, it 
is important to account for potential endogeneity by means of statistical 
techniques. The estimation methods in the empirical chapters consisted of 
propensity score matching (PSM) (Chapters 5 and 6), regression analyses (Chapter 
7) and regression analyses in combination with an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach (Chapter 8). The statistical techniques that were used in this dissertation 
are introduced in this section and are described in more detail in the empirical 
chapters (Chapter 5 to Chapter 8). In each of the chapters, several post-estimation 
test results are presented to validate the use of the techniques. The estimation 
methods are also complemented with descriptive statistics that provide 
preliminary insights into the data. 
PSM was used to estimate the effects of remittances on the household 
wealth (Chapter 5) and social capital investments (Chapter 6) of remittance-
receiving households. The PSM technique is often used in the absence of 
experimental or longitudinal data. This estimation procedure allows us to control 
for a possible selection effect of migration in which households who receive 
remittances may be wealthier or have more social capital initially and may 
therefore be more likely to migrate. Using PSM, a researcher can match remittance-
receiving households with similar non-remittance receiving households 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to calculate an ‘average treatment effect for the 
treated’ (ATT). The ATT signifies the situation of a household if it had not received 
remittances. Using PSM, we are able to ‘filter out’ the effect of remittances on 
household wealth and social capital by controlling for a possible migration 
selection effect.  
Chapter 7, which studies the sustainability of refugee return in Burundi, 
relies on regression analyses. The purpose of this chapter is to show relationships 
between refugee return and the socio-economic conditions of households. In 
addition, this paper aims to contribute to the literature on the sustainability of 
return by operationalizing the concept at different levels of analysis and by 
comparing different groups (first- versus second-generation returnees). Because I 
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did not take any measures to address potential endogeneity, no causal inferences 
can be drawn from the analyses. However, as will be described in this chapter, the 
relationships that I identify are likely to run in the expected direction. In addition, 
even if the relationships are not causal, this chapter shows the existence of 
significant relationships between return migration and socio-economic conditions 
in areas of return. This finding is important because it emphasizes that return 
migration and socio-economic development are related.   
In Chapter 8, I use regression analyses complemented with an IV approach 
to study the effect of refugee return on thefts, disputes and security in 
communities. The aim of this chapter is to examine causal effects of the return of 
refugees on communities. The relationship between return and security may, 
however, be confounded by a selection bias concerning the communities of return. 
Returnees may have chosen to settle in areas based on area characteristics such as 
the availability of land, the availability of employment or the security levels in 
those areas. If this is the case, any findings on the relationship between return and 
the dependent variables may result from this selection effect. The IV approach is a 
quasi-experimental method in which the independent variable of interest – return 
migration – is instrumented for by another variable that is relevant (correlated with 
the main independent variable) and exogenous (only related to the dependent 
variable via the dependent variable). In this study, the proportion of return 
migrants in the community was instrumented for by the distance of the 
community to the closest border (in km). Because it is not possible to eliminate the 
possibility of endogeneity between return migration and the dependent variables, 
an IV approach using the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) technique was used as a 
robustness check.  
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Remittances and household wealth 
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5.1 Introduction 
Conflict-affected settings have received scant attention in the literature on 
remittances, mainly due to limitations related to data availability and quality in 
unstable settings (Ahmed, 2000; Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). Although some 
studies have been conducted on remittances after conflict (Van Hear, 2002; Weiss 
Fagen & Bump, 2006), most were small scale and based on qualitative research, 
yielding limited knowledge on the role of remittances for households after conflict. 
In addition, the extent to which current theoretical perspectives on remittances are 
applicable to conflict-affected settings remains unclear. People forced to migrate 
due to conflict primarily do so to seek safety and security, not to diversify income 
(Lindley, 2008, 2010). To what extent do these objectives of safety and security lead 
to different remittance usage, than when migration is primarily a means of income 
diversification, as posited by the NELM literature?  
Existing studies on remittances in conflict-affected contexts focus on how 
remittances support households that are ‘recovering from’ violent conflict (see, e.g., 
Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). These studies argue that remittances provide a safety 
net for poorer households, insure them against shocks, and reduce poverty. In the 
face of failing states that are unable to provide members of society with basic 
needs, households are salvaged by family or friends who live abroad. Yet 
quantitative evidence for these claims is missing and consequently several 
unanswered questions remain concerning remittances after conflict. First, it is 
unclear whether remittances are a common resource for households recovering 
from conflict. Second, there is a lack of information regarding who the main 
beneficiaries of remittances after conflict are, and third, the effects of remittances 
on households’ living conditions after conflict remain underexplored.  
 This paper analyses the extent and effects of remittances for households in 
a conflict-affected setting using data from Burundi, a small country in the African 
Great Lakes region. The data include a nationally representative dataset of 1,500 
households and an urban dataset of 810 households living in Burundi’s capital, 
Bujumbura. The analyses for this study are based on the latter dataset. The data 
were collected in 2011, slightly more than 5 years after the official end of conflict in 
the country, and contained information on each household’s economic situation in 
2011 and 5 years prior to the survey. Additional information was collected on 
households’ international migration and remittance-receiving histories. The data 
thus offer a unique insight into the role of remittances for receiving households 
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and allow a quantitative study of the characteristics of receiving households, the 
extent to which they rely on remittances, and the way they allocate this financial 
resource from abroad. 
The study of remittances in a conflict-affected context provides insights 
into the livelihood strategies of households after conflict. It also provides an 
opportunity to test specific tenets of NELM studies of labor migration, to a conflict-
affected setting. This study therefore adopts an explorative approach guided by the 
three hypotheses about the destination and use of remittances derived from NELM 
studies: relative deprivation, insurance, and investment, to research the extent to 
which these hold for remittances to households in Burundi. A multidimensional 
perspective on household wealth is taken to analyze the effects of remittances on 
several indicators, such as asset ownership, living conditions, and education. In 
doing so, we explore the various ways households might allocate remittances in 
this setting. Remittance allocation is also compared among poorer and wealthier 
households to analyze how remittances affect different household types, shedding 
light on the impacts of remittances on different household types after conflict. 
 
5.2 Theoretical perspectives on remittances after conflict 
The majority of micro-level studies on remittances of the past decades are based on 
the NELM approach (Stark, 1980; Stark & Bloom, 1985). In NELM studies, 
migration is conceptualized as a household-level strategy to generate income 
through remittances with which a household can invest, diversify income, and 
insure itself against financial shocks.  
The assumptions of NELM yield three hypotheses regarding migration 
motivations: (1) the relative deprivation hypothesis, (2) the investment hypothesis, 
and (3) the insurance hypothesis. The relative deprivation hypothesis posits that 
households attempt to better their economic position in their community or 
country through migration. Households that are relatively deprived are more 
likely to use migration as a household strategy (Stark & Taylor, 1989). The 
investment hypothesis posits that remittances are invested in income-generating 
activities, such as businesses and agriculture. Remittances thus stimulate 
development in poor countries by relaxing households’ liquidity constraints in 
failing markets (Taylor, 1999). Following this reasoning, the marginal effect of 
remittances is highest for remittance receiving households that face the largest 
financial constraints (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Wyatt, 1996). The insurance or 
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smoothing hypothesis states that households use migration to insure themselves 
against financial risks, such as food insecurity, failing crops, or unemployment. 
Remittances thus smooth consumption by providing a form of insurance during 
difficult times (see, e.g., Lucas & Stark, 1985). 
The past decades of remittance research have provided varying levels of 
support for these hypotheses. With regard to the relative deprivation hypothesis, 
research has shown that remittances generally do not reach those who ‘need’ them 
the most or those who are most deprived in the context of developing countries 
(Ratha et al., 2011). This result is due to the ‘selection effect’ of migration; because 
costs are associated with migration, wealthier households generally have more 
means to send someone abroad and are consequently more likely to receive 
remittances (Adams Jr, 2011). In Ghana, for example, international remittances 
were found to be received by the richest two per cent of households (Mazzucato et 
al., 2008) although another study showed that poorer households benefited more 
from international remittances than richer households (Adams Jr et al., 2008). In 
Pakistan, households with more income were also more likely to receive 
remittances (Adams Jr, 1998). Whether the higher income of remittance-receiving 
households was due to remittances was not clear. 
The investment hypothesis has been supported by meta-analyses that 
showed that remittances spur development and reduce poverty in developing 
countries (Adams Jr, 2011; Page & Plaza, 2006; Ratha et al., 2011). Ratha et al. 
(2011), for example, conclude that remittances are generally invested in human 
capital, physical capital such as large assets (land or housing), businesses, or 
agricultural investments. Other studies have highlighted the insurance or 
consumption smoothing function of remittances by showing that remittances are 
invested in daily needs (Kabki et al., 2004; Mazzucato, 2009).  
 
5.2.1 Remittances after conflict 
Each of the three hypotheses may be applicable to explaining remittances in 
conflict-affected settings. There are however reasons why the applicability of 
NELM to these settings is debated. Many emigrants from conflict-affected settings 
moved because of security reasons, which are different from the economic reasons 
posited in NELM studies (Lindley, 2008). Yet a growing body of literature has 
shown that refugees often support family or friends living back home (Ahmed, 
2000; Carling et al., 2012; Diaz-Briquets & Perez-Lopez, 1997; Horst, 2004, 2008; 
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Lindley, 2009), and authors have argued that motivations to remit do not differ 
substantially between refugees and economic migrants (see, e.g., Horst, 2004). 
Remittance sending may be more of a ‘post hoc strategy’ (Lindley, 2009, p. 1331), 
but migration motives are often multidimensional, and priorities may change over 
time depending on the circumstances of the migrant or the household in the home 
country (Lindley, 2008). In addition, not all emigrants from a conflict-affected 
context are necessarily refugees (see, e.g., Ahmed, 2000). The NELM hypotheses of 
relative deprivation, investment, and insurance can therefore be tested in a 
conflict-affected context. 
Based on the existing literature, we can generate some expectations for 
remittances in a conflict-affected context. First, the relative deprivation hypothesis 
is not likely to hold. Most people flee within the borders of their own country or to 
neighboring countries, where there are few resources to remit (Nyberg-Sørensen et 
al., 2002). Only some people have the means to travel far and to generate income 
that is sufficient to engage in remittance sending (Van Hear, 2004). This situation 
also holds for labor migrants from conflict-affected contexts (Ahmed, 2000). These 
studies, in combination with remittance literature that finds that remittances do not 
accrue to the poorest of the poor (Adams Jr, 2011; Adams Jr et al., 2008; Mazzucato 
et al., 2008) make us expect that remittances will not reach the most disadvantaged 
households because they generally do not have the resources to send an individual 
abroad. 
Second, the limited available evidence suggests that remittances are more 
likely to ‘sustain’ livelihoods after conflict through income smoothing rather than 
to ‘transform’ them through investments (Van Hear, 2002). This evidence provides 
support for the insurance hypothesis rather than the investment hypothesis. 
Households in conflict-affected settings might have limited investment 
opportunities due to damaged economic infrastructures and political and 
economic instability. In addition, remittances may function as insurance in areas 
where formal insurance mechanisms are deficient. Qualitative studies have shown 
that refugees most often remit to support daily needs rather than business 
investments (Van Hear, 2002; Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). For example, Ahmed 
(2000) found that only 15 per cent of households in Somaliland used remittances 
for business or asset investments. Especially in rural areas, remittances were used 
to smooth consumption and to cope with shocks. Similarly, Horst and Van Hear 
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(2002) describe how Somali refugees in Kenyan refugee camps smooth 
consumption by relying on remittances during difficult times.  
In the following sections, the relative deprivation, investment, and 
insurance hypothesis are tested for the Burundi case. The relative deprivation 
hypothesis is tested by examining the prevalence of remittance receiving across 
relatively poorer and wealthier households. The investment and insurance 
hypotheses are tested by analyzing the effect of remittances on different household 
indicators. The hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive; households 
might use remittances both for smoothing and investment purposes, and the uses 
might differ for households with different levels of deprivation. A 
multidimensional view of household wealth is therefore adopted to explore how 
households allocate remittances. Most previous studies have explored remittance 
effects on one or a few economic indicators, such as income or expenditures. 
Because this is one of the few quantitative studies in a conflict-affected context, we 
take a broad, exploratory perspective. 
 
5.3 Burundi: a history of migration and remittances 
Burundi has suffered from civil conflict and population displacements over the 
past four decades. Massive migration flows arose in the African Great Lakes region 
in the early 1960s, which also marked the end of Burundi’s colonial period. These 
migrations were the result of violent conflict that was mostly organized along 
ethnic lines (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Fransen & Andersson, 2011). Burundi 
experienced several periods of conflict, notably in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 
between 1993 and 2005, and became one of the largest migrant-sending countries 
in the world between 1960 and 1980 (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). In 1999, more 
than 800,000 were residing in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, mostly in 
Southern Burundi (UNOCHA, 2000). Also during the late 1990s, another estimated 
800,000 were forcedly relocated in regroupment camps as a result of a government 
policy that aimed to facilitate military operations (Martin, 2003; USCRI, 2000).7 
Many other Burundians sought shelter in the neighboring countries of Tanzania, 
Rwanda, and the DRC. A small minority migrated to Europe and North America. 
                                                 
7 Households were officially relocated for security reasons, to protect citizens against actions of the 
Hutu rebel group FNL (Forces Nationales pour la Liberation). The international community, however, 
condemned the forced relocation activities and accused the government, which consisted of Tutsi 
(minority) rule, of attempting to isolate FNL forces among the rural Hutu population. 
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More than 350,000 Burundians, or 4.2 per cent of the population, were living 
abroad in 2010 (World Bank, 2011c). In January 2012, UNHCR estimated 
Burundian refugees and asylum seekers to approximate 110,000 (UNHCR, 2012). 
Migration to Europe and North America was not only induced by conflict 
but was also due to economic incentives. The Burundian diaspora was created 
during four migration waves and consists of a heterogeneous group in terms of 
skills, migration motives, and political views (Turner, 2008a, 2008b). The first wave 
consisted of a few better-off Burundians who were mostly part of the Tutsi political 
elite or monarchy that moved to Belgium to study before Burundi’s independence 
from Belgium in 1962. This trend persisted after the 1960s (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; 
Turner, 2008a, 2008b). The second wave comprised mainly Hutu asylum seekers 
who fled the 1972 genocide (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Lemarchand, 1996, 2008). 
Many had scholarships and were either already living in Belgium or had been 
living there previously (Turner, 2008a, 2008b). Over time they formed networks 
that attracted students and entrepreneurs, creating the third wave during 1972–93. 
The re-ignition of conflict in Burundi in 1993 and the economic downturn that 
followed generated the fourth wave (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006). These were asylum 
seekers as well as young, urban Burundians of both Tutsi and Hutu origin who 
were in search of better economic opportunities. The first wave thus consisted 
mostly of wealthier emigrants, whereas the subsequent waves were more diverse. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that highly skilled Burundians mostly migrated from 
Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. 
 
5.3.1 Remittances in Burundi 
The long-lasting conflict in Burundi left its people traumatized and impoverished 
(Lemarchand, 1996; Uvin, 2009). In 2006, 67 per cent of the population lived below 
the national poverty line (World Bank, 2011b), and in 2011, Burundi ranked 185 on 
the Human Development Index, the lowest ranking in the world after DRC and 
Niger (UNDP, 2011). Significant differences exist in poverty levels between urban 
and rural areas, with rural areas being more deprived than urban areas 
(Bundervoet, 2006). Remittances are considered an important potential resource for 
development, and policies are now being designed to harness and increase this 
financial resource from abroad (Fransen and Andersson, 2011 and Fransen and 
Siegel, 2010). 
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Remittances to Burundi were estimated at three million USD in 2010 
(World Bank, 2011c). The Burundian Central Bank, Banque de la Republique 
Burundi (BRB), estimated remittances at 27.74 million USD between January and 
October 2010, a sharp increase from the 0.06 million USD that they reported in 2005 
(personal communication with BRB, January 2011). The difference between these 
statistics is most likely due to measurement differences and variations in data 
quality. Compared to other countries in the region, remittances to Burundi are low. 
For example, Kenya, one of Africa’s emblematic countries with regard to tapping 
its diaspora potential, received 1,758 million USD in 2010. When comparing 
Burundi’s remittance inflows to FDI and ODA during 2005–10, remittance and FDI 
inflows were negligible (see Figure 5.1). It is unclear whether these numbers 
underestimate remittances because they represent only formal flows. De Bruyn 
and Wets (2006) report that most remittances to Burundi were sent informally, but 
Fransen and Andersson (2011) argue that due to innovations and increasing 
competition, the remittance market is increasingly formalizing. From 2008 onward, 
remittances increased and surpassed FDI using both World Bank and BRB 
measurements. 
 
Figure 5.1. Remittances, FDI, and ODA in Burundi: 2005 – 2010 
Sources: World Bank, 2011c; Banque de la Republique du Burundi, 2011. 
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A few small-scale studies have been conducted on remittances in Burundi. 
These studies found that regional remittances are negligible despite the large 
regional migration flows (Fransen & Andersson, 2011). Most regional migrants 
reside in temporary settlements or refugee camps, and their living conditions, 
combined with the absence of financial infrastructure, likely do not permit them to 
send remittances. Remittance sending is more common among the Burundian 
wider diaspora, and it is generally assumed that most remittances are sent from 
Europe and North America (De Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Fransen & Andersson, 2011). 
These studies were based on a small number of qualitative interviews with key 
stakeholders. The data collected for the present study, provide a first, larger-scale 
analysis of remittances in Burundi and will show that, indeed, regional remittances 
are small. 
 
5.4 Data and empirical strategy 
Two datasets were used for this paper based on a national and an urban household 
survey conducted in Burundi in 2011. For the national survey, 1,500 households 
were interviewed in all 17 provinces of Burundi (including Bujumbura) based on a 
two-step self-weighting sampling design between January and February 2011.8 The 
national survey was followed by an urban survey that took place in March 2011 
and collected information on 810 households in Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. 
Data collection took place in 54 randomly selected blocks within the 17 zones or 
quartiers (neighborhoods) in the city. On each block, 15 randomly selected 
households were interviewed. In this paper, the national data are used to provide 
general statistics on remittances in Burundi, and the urban data are employed to 
quantitatively explore the effects of remittances on household wealth.  
 
5.4.1 Remittances 
Remittances were defined in the survey as international monetary transfers that 
were received by a household from a migrant in the 12 months previous to the 
interview. Information was collected on the frequency of the financial transfers, 
their value, and the characteristics of the remittance senders. The national survey 
that preceded the urban survey revealed that 2.40 per cent (n = 36) of the sampled 
                                                 
8 See the Burundi fieldwork report of the Migration and Development: A World in Motion project for a 
detailed account of the sampling strategy of the survey, available at: 
http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ISacademie/publications.php. 
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households had received remittances in the past year, and that most receiving 
households (38.89 per cent) lived in Bujumbura. The finding that remittances were 
more common in the capital was confirmed by the urban data: of the 810 
households, 15.93 per cent (n = 129) were remittance-receiving households. Further 
analyses were therefore based on the urban household data.   
 
5.4.2 Household wealth 
Six indicators were constructed to measure household wealth. All items for the 
survey questionnaire in Burundi were derived from standard questions in multi-
topic household surveys that are often applied in developing countries, such as the 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), the Demographic Health Survey 
(DHS), and the World Values Survey (WVS).9 First, an asset index was created with 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), following Filmer and Pritchett (2001). This 
index included whether the household owned a house, land, livestock, and other 
assets, such as a radio, a television, a car, or a motorbike. Asset data represent a 
household’s long-term wealth (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001) and are generally more 
reliable than income or expenditure data (Sahn & Stifel, 2003). Especially in a poor 
country such as Burundi, where many households do not have a regular income 
source, asset ownership is a good indicator of household wealth. 
The second indicator was the average educational attainment of all adult 
household members, ranging from one (no education) to four (bachelor’s degree or 
higher). This indicator was chosen because primary education (up to 13 years old) 
is freely available in Burundi and because a substantial number of households in 
the sample did not have children aged 14 to 18. Third, a financial access index 
measured the household’s access to financial services, including the use of a bank 
account, the ability to generate money in case of an emergency, and savings. This 
index ran from zero, for households that answered ‘no’ to all questions, to three, 
for households that answered ‘yes’ to all. Financial access is increasingly covered 
in household surveys in developing countries because it is considered important 
for poverty alleviation.10 
                                                 
9 See http://http://econ.worldbank.org/ for more information on the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey, http://www.measuredhs.com/ for the Demographic Health Survey, and 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ for the World Values Survey. 
10 An example of data collection on financial inclusion is the World Bank’s Global Findex Questionnaire. 
For more information, visit http://http://econ.worldbank.org/. 
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The fourth indicator, a living conditions index, was also constructed with 
PCA and was composed of the type of water, toilet, and cooking fuel the 
household used as well as housing characteristics. Details on the PCA results are 
available upon request. Fifth, food security measured the frequency with which the 
household had difficulties meeting food needs, ranging from one (every day) to 
five (never). Finally, for subjective wealth, the household head was asked to rate 
the household’s economic situation on a scale from one (we are finding it very 
difficult) to five (we are living very comfortably). These items were based on 
standard measurements in surveys such as the DHS and WVS. Table 5.1 shows the 
summary statistics of the wealth variables. Correlations between variables ranged 
from 0.24 (p < 0.01) (between the asset index and food security) to 0.60 (p < 0.01) 
(between the living conditions index and average educational attainment).  
 
Table 5.1. Summary statistics of the wealth indicators 
Variable n M SD Min Max 
      
Assets (index) 810 0.00 1.58 -2.45 5.67 
Educational attainment 809 2.02 0.75 1 4 
Financial access (index) 761 1.12 1.26 0 3 
      
Living conditions (index) 808 0.00 2.37 -4.04 4.44 
Food security 808 3.66 1.66 1 5 
Subjective wealth 807 2.85 0.91 1 5 
      
 
5.4.3 Empirical strategy 
The analyses in this paper were based on descriptive statistics, logistic regression 
analysis, and propensity score matching (PSM). Descriptive statistics provide 
insight into remittance flows in Burundi. We use logistic regression analysis to 
explore which households are more likely to receive remittances. Because this 
technique does not take into account the selectivity of migration, PSM was 
employed. PSM matches remittance-receiving households with similar non-
remittance-receiving households (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) to calculate an 
‘average treatment effect for the treated’ (ATT). The ATT signifies what a 
household would have looked like had it not received remittances. This estimation 
procedure allows us to control for a possible selection effect of migration in which 
it may be that households who receive remittances may be wealthier to begin with 
and therefore more likely to migrate. Using PSM we are able to ‘filter out’ the effect 
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of remittances on household wealth, controlling for possible migration selection 
effect. 
The matching variables for PSM include age, gender, educational 
attainment, employment, and marital status of the household head and household 
characteristics such as the dependency ratio and the number of economic shocks 
that the household experienced in the past 5 years. These variables cover the most 
important migration determinants identified in the literature (McKenzie & Sasin, 
2007) and play a role in Burundi’s emigration. The displacement camp and 
regroupment camp experiences of households were included to control for 
internal, forced displacement experiences. Regroupment camps (camps de 
regroupement) were part of a forced relocation scheme in Burundi that occurred in 
the late 1990s and mainly affected the Hutu majority in Burundi, whereas 
displacement camps were mostly inhabited by Tutsi Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) who fled violent conflict. Almost 37 per cent of households in the sample 
had either displacement camp experiences or had at least one household member 
that had been placed in a regroupment camp. Households were also matched on 
whether they had a current or return migrant. Retrospective data on house and 
land ownership were used to match households on characteristics from the period 
before they started receiving remittances. These indicators refer to the household’s 
situation 5 years earlier. The five-year period was used because it marks the official 
transition from the pre-conflict to the post-conflict situation in Burundi and was 
therefore the most reliable reference point for interviewees to provide retrospective 
information. Descriptive statistics of the matching variables are available upon 
request.  
Sensitivity analyses were conducted after matching using the bounding 
approach (Rosenbaum, 2002) to explore the extent to which unobserved 
heterogeneity, or ‘hidden bias,’ between remittance-receiving households and non-
remittance-receiving households would affect the estimates. To verify the 
robustness of the results, three estimation methods were used to calculate the ATT: 
Nearest Neighbor (5), Kernel (Gaussian), and Radius matching (Caliper 0.01) (see, 
Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). For the final part of the analyses, Kernel matching was 
used, in which weighted averages of all individuals in the control group were 
calculated to produce the counterfactual. Balancing tests, which check whether 
systematic differences between groups are eliminated through matching, were 
performed by comparing mean absolute standardized biases (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
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1985), pseudo R2, and p-values of the likelihood ratio tests before and after 
matching (Sianesi, 2004).    
 
5.5 Results: remittances and household wealth 
The results are presented in three steps. First, descriptive statistics are presented on 
remittance flows and channels in Section 5.5.1. These descriptive statistics will 
provide a general insight into remittance inflows in Burundi. Second, the 
characteristics of remittance-receiving households are explored in Section 5.5.2. 
These findings are used to test the relative deprivation hypothesis. Finally, the 
effects of remittances on different household types are analyzed to test the 
insurance versus investment hypothesis in Section 5.5.3.  
 
5.5.1 Remittance flows and channels: descriptive statistics 
The urban data revealed that in the capital, almost 16 per cent of all households 
received remittances in the previous year. Some remittance-receiving households 
in Bujumbura received remittances from more than one sender: for the 129 
receiving households, the average number of senders was 1.26, for a total of 162 
senders. Descriptive statistics on the financial transfers of these 162 senders yield 
some interesting insights (see Table 5.2). First, remittances were an irregular or 
infrequent source of income for most households. Most remittances were sent to 
the households irregularly, once, or twice in the previous 12 months. A smaller 
percentage of senders sent the money either every month or every 3 months. 
Second, the vast majority of senders were family members of the receiving 
household. This finding indicates that remittance flows are mostly a family affair. 
Third, regional remittances were small compared to ‘North–South’ flows. The 
majority of senders were located in Europe and North America, which is in line 
with anecdotal evidence on Burundi (Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006) and with 
findings of studies conducted both in non-conflict settings (see, e.g., Mazzucato et 
al., 2008) and forced migration contexts (see, e.g., Horst, 2004).  
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Table 5.3. Remittance-receiving households per wealth quartile/category 
 Quartiles/Categories 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
       
Assets 16 16 36 61 - 129 
 (7.69) (8.00) (17.91) (30.35)  (15.93) 
Educational attainment 8 29 26 65 - 128 
 (2.97) (12.39) (22.03) (34.57)  (15.82) 
Financial access 20 9 32 61 - 122 
 (5.22) (10.59) (28.83) (33.52)  (16.03) 
       
Living conditions 6 12 43 68 - 129 
 (2.96) (5.94) (21.08) (33.83)  (15.93) 
Food security 3 5 3 6 111 128 
 (1.81) (6.10) (6.12) (8.22) (25.34) (15.84) 
Subjective wealth 0 13 54 51 10 128 
 (0.00) (6.34) (14.63) (33.77) (41.67) (15.86) 
       
 
 This finding also confirms expectations that regional remittances are 
relatively small, likely because of the dire living conditions of migrants in 
neighboring countries. Fourth, most senders used formal channels, the most 
popular of which were Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) and banks. This finding 
suggests that formal remittance statistics on Burundi such as those provided by the 
World Bank and BRB provide good estimates because they capture the majority of 
transfers. On average, households received 1827 USD (SD = 4780), with a minimum 
of less than one USD and a maximum of 25,530 USD per household in the previous 
twelve months. The median was 400 USD per household. Given that GNI per 
capita in PPP was 250 USD in Burundi in 2011 (World Bank, 2011b), it is safe to say 
that remittances are an important resource for receiving households in Bujumbura. 
 
5.5.2 Do remittances reach the poorest of the poor? 
Table 5.3 above presents the number and percentage of remittance-receiving 
households per quartile (for the indexes) and categories of the Likert scale (for food 
security and subjective wealth). It is clear that there are more remittance-receiving 
households in the higher quartiles or categories of the indicators. For example, 8 
per cent of the households that are in quartile one of the asset index were 
remittance-receiving households, whereas in quartile four, more than 30 per cent 
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were remittance receivers. These findings indicate that the urban remittance-
receiving households in our sample generally had more assets, higher educational 
attainment, more financial access, and better living conditions, food security and 
subjective wealth than non-remittance-receiving households. T-tests show that 
remittance-receiving households scored significantly (p < 0.01) higher on all 
outcome variables than non-receiving households.Logistic regression analysis 
shows comparable results (Table 5.4). Households with higher average educational 
attainment had higher odds of receiving remittances, as did households that scored 
higher on the asset index, keeping all other variables constant.8 At this point, no 
causal inferences can be made because there may be a migration selection effect at 
play. It is not yet clear whether wealthier households had more migration 
opportunities and were therefore more likely to receive remittances or whether 
households became wealthier because of remittances. 
The analysis shows that employment of the household head decreased the 
odds of receiving remittances. A likely explanation is that households in which the 
household head was unemployed had a greater need for financial support. 
Surprisingly, households that experienced more economic shocks had lower odds 
of receiving remittances. This may be because wealthier households experienced 
less economic shocks or were less affected by them and therefore underreported 
them in the survey. There is a small but significant correlation between the asset 
index and the number of economic shocks that households experienced (r = −0.15, 
p < 0.01). Households in which members had ever been in a regroupment camp 
had lower odds of receiving remittances, which yields two possible explanations: 
(1) the Hutu majority that mainly inhabited these camps and that was 
marginalized during the war period (Lemarchand, 1996; Uvin, 2009) had lower 
opportunity for mobility and therefore for receiving remittances, or (2) households 
with regroupment camp experiences were more vulnerable due to their 
resettlement. A t-test reveals that households with regroupment camp experiences 
scored significantly lower on the asset index (t = 5.08, p < 0.01), but it is not clear 
whether this was due to their relocation. Internal displacement and return 
migration experiences were not related to receiving remittances. 
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Table 5.4. Logistic regression: the odds of receiving remittances (n = 793) 
 B SE Z OR 
     
     
Household. head characteristics     
Age 0.01 0.01 0.49 1.03 
Gender (1= female) -0.19 0.45 -0.44 1.97 
Educational attainment 0.89*** 0.18 4.89 3.49 
 Marital status        
   Single (= ref.)     
   Married -0.09 0.42 -0.22 2.07 
   Divorced 0.79 0.62 1.28 7.36 
   Widowed 0.14 0.51 0.27 3.15 
Employed (1=yes) -0.47* 0.25 -1.90 1.01 
Household characteristics     
Asset index     
   Quartile1 (= ref.)     
   Quartile2 -0.07 0.40 -0.18 2.03 
   Quartile3 0.59 0.37 1.59 3.75 
   Quartile4 0.83** 0.39 2.11 4.97 
Dependency ratioa -0.02 0.07 -0.26 1.13 
Economic shocks in the past 5 years -0.14** 0.07 -1.99 1.00 
Migrant abroad (1 = yes) 1.74*** 0.49 3.54 14.94 
Return migrant (1 = yes) 0.14 0.31 0.44 2.11 
Displacement camp experiences (1 = yes) 0.49 0.31 1.57 3.02 
Regroupment camp experiences (1 = yes) -0.85** 0.38 -2.22 0.91 
Constant    -3.80 0.68 -5.58 - 
Model evaluation     
   Likelihood ratio test 119.74***    
   Pseudo R squared 0.1733    
     
  
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  a Dependency ratio is calculated as: [(no. of children, 
younger than 18) + (no. of elderly, 65 and older)]/ (number of adults, 18-65)*100.  
  
While better off households were more likely to receive remittances (Table 
5.3), here we investigate how significant remittances were to those households 
receiving them. Table 5.5 shows that wealthier households, on average, received 
higher values of remittances. The table also shows the importance of remittances 
relative to the households’ yearly expenditures. On average, remittances 
constituted 61 per cent of household expenditures, with a minimum of 0.01 per 
cent and a maximum of 934.12 per cent (median = 9.81 per cent). Generally, for 
99 
 
wealthier households remittances constituted a higher average percentage of total 
household expenditures. Specifically, the asset index and the education variable 
followed a clear upward trend, meaning that households with more assets and 
higher educational attainment received more remittances, which constituted larger 
percentages of their total household expenditures. For the other household 
indicators, the relative importance of remittances is non-linear. This is likely due to 
the small sample sizes in the lower categories of some of the indicators, which 
yield statistics sensitive to outliers. 
 
Table 5.5. Remittance-values and percentages of yearly expenditures (in USD) 
Quartile/
Category 
Assets Education Financial access 
M P n M P n M P n 
     
          
1   341.09 28.97   13   114.90   6.95     8   263.21 26.67 18 
2   589.75 44.09   14   235.88 16.82   24   438.90 20.07 9 
3 1112.02 50.15   31 1359.92 55.34   24 1088.88 53.02 27 
4 2936.95 78.92   53 3027.84 91.51   54 3069.00 86.38 51 
5 - - - - - - - - - 
Total 1827.23 60.64 111 1842.93 61.17 110 1827.23 60.64 111 
          
Quartile/
Category 
Living conditions Food security Subjective wealth 
M P n M P n M P n 
    
          
1   160.75   7.50     5   111.02   5.67     3 - - - 
2   663.08 57.42     9   365.42 43.18     5   333.37 40.36   11 
3   852.55 32.09   41   140.83   5.78     3 1191.69 43.14   45 
4 2876.71 86.88   56   637.75 89.21     4 2454.36 76.28   45 
5 - - - 2079.88 64.44   95 3346.06 32.26     9 
Total 1827.23 60.64 111 1827.23 60.64 111 1827.23 60.64 111 
          
Note: 18 observations on remittance values were missing. 
 
5.5.3 Remittances and household wealth – investment versus insurance 
In this section, we analyze the extent to which remittances affect the wealth of 
remittance-receiving households. The previous analyses may have been 
confounded by the selection effect of migration. As described in Section 5.4, we 
make a distinction between productive and non-productive assets to test to what 
extent remittances are used for investments and insurance purposes. The first PSM 
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logit estimates are shown in Table 5.6. The table shows the mean values for the 
treated (remittance receivers) and untreated (non-remittance receivers), the ATT, 
and the results of the sensitivity analyses. The analyses reveal that remittance-
receiving households scored higher on non-productive assets, such as living 
conditions, food security, and subjective wealth, compared to non-remittance-
receiving households. Remittances did not have a significant effect on productive 
assets, such as asset ownership and the household’s average educational 
attainment. An exception is the financial access indicator; households invested part 
of their remittances in savings and a bank account. Based on these results, we are 
unable to reject either the insurance or investment hypothesis, although it seems 
that remittances were used for insurance purposes to a larger extent. 
The results are robust across the different matching estimations. The asset 
index analyses show lower robustness, but the differences between the results are 
small. The critical levels of sensitivity to hidden bias are presented in Table 5.6. 
Values of gamma (Γ) that are close to 1.0 indicate that the estimates are sensitive to 
potential hidden bias, whereas larger values mean that the estimates are insensitive 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Γ values range from 1.0 to 4.3, showing higher sensitivity for 
the asset index and education and lower sensitivity for the other outcome 
variables. The value 1.5, for example, indicates that in the case of an unobserved 
covariate, this variable should affect the odds of receiving remittances by a factor 
of 50 per cent to alter the estimates. It is unlikely that the estimates suffer from 
hidden bias because we matched households on all theoretically relevant variables. 
Table 5.7 shows a comparison of the pseudo R2, p-values of the likelihood 
ratio tests, and the mean absolute standard biases before and after matching. These 
balancing tests were based on the asset index outcome variable. The table shows 
lower pseudo R2 and insignificant p-values of the likelihood ratio tests after 
matching. This result indicates that there were no systematic differences in the 
covariates between remittance-receiving and non-remittance-receiving households, 
meaning that the non-remittance-receiving households can be considered a good 
control group. The mean standardized bias reduction after matching ranged from 
79 per cent to 90 per cent. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) proposed that when the 
mean standardized bias after matching is larger than 20 per cent, there is residual 
bias. In our case, the mean standardized biases after matching ranged from 2.0 to 
4.9 across the different matching algorithms, meaning that bias was significantly 
reduced by matching.   
101 
 
Table 5.6. PSM: remittances and household wealth 
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 1 Caliper 0.01. 
Outcome 
variable per 
matching 
algorithm 
M  
Treated 
M  
Untreated 
ATT t Critical 
level of 
hidden 
bias (Γ) 
No. of 
treated 
No. of 
untreated 
   
      
Assets      
   NN (5) 0.99 0.79 0.20 0.97 1.1 123 642 
   Kernel 1.00 0.71 0.28 1.49 1.1 123 642 
   Radius1 0.95 0.47 0.48** 2.49 1.5 123 642 
Education        
   NN (5) 2.56 2.49 0.07 0.87 1.0 123 642 
   Kernel 2.55 2.48 0.07 0.95 1.0 123 642 
   Radius1 2.53 2.42 0.11 1.38 1.2 123 642 
Financial access        
   NN (5) 2.10 1.74 0.37** 2.50 1.7 118 604 
   Kernel  2.09 1.64 0.45*** 3.31 2.2 118 604 
   Radius1 2.09 1.56 0.54*** 3.88 2.4 118 604 
Living conditions        
   NN (5) 1.66 1.06 0.60** 2.55 1.7 123 642 
   Kernel 1.67 1.01 0.67*** 3.25 2.1 123 642 
   Radius1 1.62 0.88 0.74*** 3.43 2.3 123 642 
Food security        
   NN (5) 4.69 4.08 0.61*** 3.99 3.6 123 641 
   Kernel  4.69 4.10 0.59*** 4.37 4.1 123 641 
   Radius1 4.68 4.04 0.63*** 4.49 4.3 123 641 
Subjective wealth        
   NN (5) 3.45 3.10 0.35*** 3.62 2.0 112 640 
   Kernel  3.44 3.12 0.33*** 3.81 2.1 122 640 
   Radius1 3.41 3.03 0.38*** 4.25 2.2 122 640 
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Table 5.8. PSM (Kernel, Gaussian) per quartile of the asset index 
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Outcome 
variable 
M  
Treated 
M  
Un- 
treated 
ATT t Critical 
level of 
hidden 
bias (Γ) 
No. of 
treated 
No. of 
untreated 
    
       
Assets       
   Index q. 1&2 -1.10 -1.01 -0.09 -0.65 1.4 31 348 
   Index q. 3 0.44 0.39 0.05 0.80 1.0 35 159 
   Index q. 4 2.47 2.11 0.36 1.54 1.1 57 135 
Education        
   Index q. 1&2 2.14 1.98 0.16 1.22 1.1 31 348 
   Index q. 3 2.49 2.54 -0.05 -0.37 1.7 35 159 
   Index q. 4 2.83 2.74 0.09 0.82 1.0 57 135 
Financial access        
   Index q. 1&2 1.18 0.89 0.29 1.04 1.0 30 340 
   Index q. 3 2.25 1.56 0.69*** 3.06 2.2 34 143 
   Index q. 4 2.51 2.29 0.22 1.17 1.5 54 121 
Living conditions        
   Index q. 1&2 0.07 -0.60 0.67* 1.70 1.2 31 348 
   Index q. 3 1.32 0.95 0.38 1.04 1.1 35 159 
   Index q. 4 2.92 2.64 0.29 1.30 1.4 57 134 
Food security         
   Index q. 1&2 4.00 3.10 0.90*** 2.62 1.8 31 348 
   Index q. 3 4.79 4.24 0.55** 2.48 4.0 35 159 
   Index q. 4 4.94 4.85 0.09 0.78 3.7 57 134 
Subjective wealth        
   Index q. 1&2 2.79 2.62 0.17 1.13 1.1 31 347 
   Index q. 3 3.52 2.95 0.57*** 4.27 4.3 34 158 
   Index q. 4 3.74 3.59 0.15 1.08 1.0 57 135 
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 The previous analyses were based on the complete sample of households. 
However, it may be that poorer and wealthier households allocated remittances 
differently and were therefore affected by remittances in different ways. As 
described, the marginal effects of remittance investments are generally highest for 
households with larger capital constraints (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Wyatt, 1996). To 
explore whether this was the case, the households were split into four equally 
sized groups depending on their score on the asset ownership index. Matching 
(Kernel, Gaussian) was performed for the households in each quartile separately 
(see Table 5.8). Because remittances are less common among relatively less wealthy 
households, quartiles one and two were merged to ensure a sufficient sample size 
for these categories. 
The results show that poorer and wealthier households allocated 
remittances differently. For households that were in the lowest quartiles of the 
asset index, remittances significantly improved their living conditions and food 
security. The poorest households in our sample seem to have allocated remittances 
mostly to non-productive assets, which rejects the investment hypothesis for this 
group. For households that were in the third quartile, the results are more mixed: 
remittances increased access to finances and subjective wealth for these households 
and improved their food security. These households therefore invested in both 
productive and non-productive assets. 
None of the ATTs were significant for households that were in the fourth 
asset index quartile, meaning that these remittance-receiving households did not 
score significantly differently on the indicators compared to non-remittance-
receiving households that were in the same quartile. Wealthier households thus 
seemed unaffected by remittances despite the fact that they were more likely to 
receive remittances and received higher values of remittances. As in the previous 
analyses (Table 5.6), the ATTs for the productive assets of asset ownership and 
education are not significant in Table 5.8. The critical levels of sensitivity to hidden 
bias (Γ) are higher than in the previous analyses, meaning that the estimates are 
more sensitive to potential hidden bias. 
 Table 5.9 shows the balancing tests results for the PSM estimates from 
Table 5.8. The results again show that the non-remittance-receiving group of 
households was a good matching group for the non-remittance-receiving 
households. After matching, the pseudo R2 values were significantly lower, and 
the p-values of the likelihood ratio test became insignificant, suggesting little 
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systematic difference in the covariates between both groups. The mean 
standardized bias was significantly reduced by matching, showing reductions 
ranging from 65 per cent to 83 per cent. 
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper explored the role of remittances for households recovering from conflict 
in Burundi, slightly more than 5 years after the official end of conflict in the 
country. Three hypotheses (relative deprivation, investment, and insurance) 
proposed by NELM were tested. The analyses showed that remittances are largely 
absent in rural areas. This rejects the relative deprivation hypothesis, which would 
anticipate that rural households, being the most deprived, would be more likely to 
migrate and therefore to receive remittances. In Bujumbura, remittance receiving is 
more frequent, particularly among wealthier and higher-educated households. 
This seems to be the result of a (historical and current) selection of migration to the 
wider diaspora (Europe, North America). The data therefore corroborate anecdotal 
evidence that few remittances are sent from the region and that remittance 
receivers in a conflict-affected setting are primarily the better-off households 
(Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Van Hear, 2004). These findings are similar to those 
in other development contexts (Adams Jr et al., 2008; Mazzucato et al., 2008) and 
corroborate with a general trend found in the remittance literature that most 
remittance receivers are relatively well-off (Adams Jr, 2011). The contribution of 
remittances to the household budgets of receiving households in Bujumbura was 
substantial in the previous year, totaling an average of 61 per cent of household 
expenditures. Wealthier households were found to receive higher values of 
remittances, both in absolute terms and relative to their yearly expenditures. 
We hypothesized that remittances would mostly serve as insurance and 
would be used for investment purposes to a more limited extent as a result of the 
conflict-affected setting. The analyses partly confirmed these expectations. 
Remittances were found to be mostly allocated to non-productive assets. 
Remittances significantly affected the living conditions and food security of the 
remittance-receiving households in urban Burundi. Subjective wealth also 
increased due to remittances. These findings verify qualitative studies that argued 
that remittances are mostly used to sustain households during or immediately after 
crises (see, e.g., Van Hear, 2002) and confirm those from non-conflict-affected 
settings where remittances are often spent on daily needs (Kabki et al., 2004; 
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Mazzucato, 2009). Productive assets, including asset ownership and education, 
were not affected by remittances in Burundi. This corroborates with other studies 
from conflict-affected settings (Ahmed, 2000), but contradicts studies from ‘normal’ 
development contexts, where remittances are often found to be invested in 
schooling and assets such as housing and agricultural land (Ratha et al., 2011). It is 
likely that the unstable nature of a conflict-affected context lowers households’ 
opportunities and incentives to invest their remittances. Future research should 
address these issues in more detail. 
Poorer households were less likely to receive remittances and received less. 
These findings highlight that remittances cannot replace official state and 
international aid initiatives on development and poverty alleviation programs, as 
is sometimes suggested by ‘co-development’ initiatives in which migrants are seen 
as a way to channel development aid more directly to the ‘grass roots’ (see, e.g., 
Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002, for a discussion on co-development). At the same 
time though, migration can help poor households. In our study, remittances did 
make a difference to those poor households that received them, especially in 
improving their living conditions and food security. This finding confirms 
expectations that the effects of remittances are stronger for households with higher 
capital constraints (Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Wyatt, 1996) yet rejects the investment 
hypothesis for this group. Similar findings were found in other non-conflict 
development contexts (Adams Jr et al., 2008). 
This study offered a unique perspective into the role of remittances for 
households after conflict. The multidimensional view of household wealth allowed 
us to research the various ways that households allocate remittances in this 
context. The fact that remittance allocation differs for poorer and wealthier 
households is an important finding. This paper has limitations with regard to 
estimating the long-term effects of remittances on development in Burundi due to 
the cross-sectional nature of the data. Further research should analyze the long-
term effects of the remittance-allocation decisions of receiving households in 
conflict and conflict-affected settings. Although collecting data in unstable settings 
will continue to pose a challenge for scholars, efforts should be made to sustain 
data collection after conflict in order to gain a better understanding of the long-
term effects of remittances in conflict-affected settings. 
Future research is needed to determine whether this support from 
remittances during and after crises results in longer-term benefits for receiving 
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households. It could be that remittances improve wealth prospects for poorer 
households, because having better food security, living conditions, and subjective 
wealth may contribute to increased productivity. For example, households with 
better food security due to remittances are probably more fit to work than 
households without such support. Wealthier households in our sample were 
largely unaffected by remittances. This finding hints at a ‘ceiling effect’ of 
remittances, meaning that their wealth reaches a point beyond which it does not 
improve in this context. Yet wealthier households may invest in other income-
generating activities, such as businesses, or spend remittances on leisure or luxury 
goods. These investment possibilities were not addressed in this research and 
should be explored by further research. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Remittances, bonds and bridges: 
investing remittances in social capital 
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This chapter has been accepted for publication as: Fransen, S. Remittances, bonds 
and bridges: investing remittances in social capital in Burundi. Journal of 
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6.1 Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed a rise in micro-level studies examining the impact 
of remittances on development. Most studies have employed the NELM approach, 
in which migration is considered a household strategy to generate income through 
remittances that a household uses to diversify its income and insure against 
financial shocks (Stark, 1980; Stark & Bloom, 1985). Remittances would also reduce 
household liquidity constraints, enabling households to invest, thereby stimulating 
economic development in remittance-receiving areas (Taylor, 1999). When 
exploring the effects of remittances on development, most studies have examined 
economic outcomes such as increased income or expenditures (Adams, 2006), 
assets and agricultural outputs (Azam & Gubert, 2006), or human capital 
investments such as schooling (Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes & 
Pozo, 2010). While prior studies provided important insights, few studies have 
focused on the relationship between remittances and social development in 
receiving countries. 
In the absence of formal insurance mechanisms, such as those provided by 
the state, households often rely on informal networks for support. These networks 
are used to share risks and function as reciprocal insurance mechanisms during 
periods of hardship (Fafchamps, 2006; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). From an 
economic perspective, this so-called social capital is an asset based on the 
assumption that it is fungible, meaning that it can be turned into other forms of 
capital if needed (Bourdieu, 1986; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In unstable settings 
where economic investment opportunities are limited, households may allocate 
(part of) their remittances to their social capital (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). By 
investing in social capital by, for example, participating in community 
organisations or financially supporting family members or friends, remittance-
receiving households insure themselves against future risks.  
Some studies have touched upon the relationship between remittances and 
social capital by examining the organisational participation (Caarls et al., 2013), 
church donations (James, 1997; Kabki et al., 2004), funeral participation (Kabki et 
al., 2004; Mazzucato et al., 2006), or gift-giving practices (Gerber & Torosyan, 2010) 
of remittance-receiving households. These studies provided interesting 
preliminary insights into the effects of remittances on social relations in remittance-
receiving areas. Most studies, however, were small-scale and used single indicators 
of social capital. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature on remittances 
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and social development by treating social capital as a multifaceted concept to 
investigate the link between remittances and social capital in greater detail.  
The case study selected for this study is Burundi, a small country in the 
African Great Lakes Region. Data were collected from 810 households in Burundi’s 
capital, Bujumbura, in 2011, just over five years after the official end of conflict in 
the country. The data contain information on the households’ migration and 
remittance-receiving histories, as well as their economic well-being and social 
capital investments, such as participation in organizations, expenditures on 
religious organizations and gifts to family members and friends. This information 
allows us to investigate the extent to which remittance-receiving households 
allocate remittances to their social capital. A distinction is made between bonding 
and bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000, 2002), which allows an exploration of 
the extent to which remittance-receiving households invest in social capital that 
benefits their in-group, as opposed to social capital that crosses social divides. This 
is especially relevant in a conflict-affected setting, such as Burundi, where decades 
of conflict have led to social tensions that are considered a risk for renewed 
conflict. In this paper, the bonding versus bridging social capital distinction is 
based on networks of family members and friends. These networks have an 
important insurance function for households in Burundi (Uvin, 2009; Vervisch, 
Vlassenroot, et al., 2013). 
By exploring the link between remittances and social capital in Burundi, 
this paper contributes to the remittances and development debate by analysing the 
effects of remittances on social development in remittance-receiving areas. 
Remittances used for social capital investments may have spill-over effects, 
strengthening networks and social relations. Such investments may restore social 
ties and foster reconciliation, especially in conflict-affected settings where social 
ties have been damaged (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). Investing remittances in social 
capital may also have economic implications. There is growing evidence that social 
capital is associated with economic development (Fafchamps, 2006; Fukuyama, 
2001; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In conflict-
affected states, social capital is considered a prerequisite for reconstruction and 
economic development (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). This paper examines the 
relationship between remittances and social capital using a unique dataset, which 
provides an opportunity to explore how households allocate remittances in a 
conflict-affected context.  
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6.2 Theoretical perspectives on social capital and remittances 
 
6.2.1 Social capital and development 
The importance of networks and social relations for development gained 
increasing recognition in the 1990s (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). These networks 
and social relations are conceptualised as social capital, a concept introduced by 
Bourdieu (1986) and subsequently elaborated on by Coleman (Coleman, 1988, 
1994) and Putnam (Putnam, 1995, 2000, 2002). Since its introduction, numerous 
scholars have attempted to define and operationalise social capital (Portes, 2000a, 
2000b). Social capital is most commonly defined as the 'features of social 
organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Another commonly used 
definition is 'the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively' 
(Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 226). These definitions treat social capital as a 
communal or societal resource that contributes to the development of these 
communities or societies.  
In this study, social capital is treated as an economic, micro-level concept. 
This resembles the views of Bourdieu (1986), who regarded social capital as an 
individual- or household-level resource that can be created and maintained 
through investments. Social capital provides individuals or households with access 
to the economic resources of members of their network, enhances their access to 
information and cultural capital, and increases their access to institutional credit 
(Portes, 2000a). Research has demonstrated that households with higher levels of 
social capital occupy better socio-economic positions within their communities 
(Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert et al., 2002; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). Social capital 
investments are an insurance strategy that reduces vulnerability to shocks, 
particularly for poorer households that live in unstable environments that offer 
little institutional protection (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Poorer households 
generally have fewer resources to make social capital investments (Cleaver, 2005; 
Fafchamps, 2006), but they tend to receive higher returns from social capital than 
wealthier households (Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002). 
 
6.2.2 Social capital and remittances 
In the migration literature, social capital has been identified as an important 
enabler of migration and, consequently, remittances. Households may, for 
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example, facilitate the migration of a household member by relying on finances, 
information, or physical help derived from their social networks (see, e.g., Haug, 
2008, for an overview). This paper argues that social capital in remittance-receiving 
areas may also be affected by remittances, through the social capital investments of 
remittance-receiving households. 
Remittances may affect social capital through three main mechanisms. 
First, remittances relax the liquidity constraints of receiving households, enabling 
them to invest the resource from abroad (Taylor, 1999). In unstable settings, such as 
those affected by conflict, other investment opportunities may be limited or 
involve high risk, incentivizing remittance-receiving households to invest in their 
social capital (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). Second, remittances increase the income of 
remittance-receiving households, which may increase their civic engagement. 
Investing in social capital involves contributions of both resources and time – two 
goods that are generally more available to wealthier households. The remittance 
literature has shown that remittance-receiving households generally have higher 
consumption levels and more leisure time than non-receiving households, because 
of the income-smoothing function of remittances (Adams Jr, 2011). As described, 
social capital studies have shown that wealthier households participate more in 
networks (Fafchamps, 2006; Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). Remittances may thus 
increase social capital investments, both in terms of resources and time, by 
increasing wealth.  
Third, households that have migrants abroad may be exposed to different 
values and norms, which incentivize them to be more civically engaged. Research 
has shown that so-called ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ (Lyons, 2007, p. 530) are 
often highly organized and engaged in their home country (see, e.g., Lyons, 2007; 
Mohamoud, 2006; Orjuela, 2008) through lobbying, protesting, participating in 
development activities, and remittance sending. These norms to be civically 
engaged may be transferred to relatives and friends residing in the migrant 
sending country, through social remittances, or ‘the ideas, behaviors, identities, 
and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities’ 
(Levitt, 1998, p. 926), enhancing participation in organizations and other forms of 
civic engagement among households in the migrant-sending country. 
The limited evidence available on the effects of remittances on social 
capital has shown mixed results. Kabki et al. (2004) demonstrated that remittances 
in rural Ghana were used for, among other things, church donations. These 
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donations function as investments because churches in Ghana often provide 
financial support for their members during periods of hardship. Similarly, 
remittance-receivers in Tonga were found to donate part of their remittances to 
churches (Brown & Conneil, 1993; James, 1997). Putnam (1995) used church 
membership or affiliation as an example of civic engagement, and such behaviour 
is frequently used as a social capital indicator (Lochner, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 
1999). Research has also revealed remittances being spent on funerals in Ghana 
(Mazzucato et al., 2006). Funerals are important social gatherings in Ghana 
through which attendees create and maintain networks. Migrants residing abroad 
were found to finance funerals through remittances to reinforce their position in 
the family and broader networks. Gerber and Torosyan (2010) found that 
remittance-receiving households in Georgia gave more financial gifts to other 
households than non-receiving households.  
Research on Rwanda, however, has called the previously observed, 
positive relationship between remittances and social capital into question. In a 
study by Caarls et al. (2013), remittance receivers were found to participate less in 
community organisations and reported lower levels of reconciliation than non-
receivers. According to the authors, household reliance on remittances reduced 
motivations to invest in bridging social capital in particular and led to cooperative 
behaviour that only benefitted their own group. Remittances allowed individuals 
to behave more financially independent and therefore ‘crowded out’ their 
incentives to participate in activities that crossed social divides. This, in turn, led to 
reduced feelings of reconciliation. This finding shares similarities with a moral 
hazard effect that has been linked remittance reception. Research has shown that 
remittance-receivers may become less productive, because remittances provide 
them with insurance from abroad (see, e.g., Azam & Gubert, 2006, for an 
overview).  
Gerber and Torosyan (2010) argued that gift-giving practices in Georgia 
sustained social relations and fostered networks of reciprocity and mutual help in 
remittance-receiving areas in the post-conflict period. In conflict-affected contexts 
in which social ties are damaged, investing remittances in social capital may thus 
be particularly important. However, if remittance-receiving households withdraw 
from their social relations and invest remittances exclusively in in-group, or 
bonding, social capital, as Caarls et al. (2013) suggested, this may intensify social 
divides. The extent to which remittance-receiving households invest in bonding 
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versus bridging social capital has yet to be examined in depth, leaving room for 
further exploration of the complex relationship between remittances and social 
capital.  
 
6.2.3 Social capital as a multifaceted concept 
Social capital can be divided into a structural and cognitive component (Uphoff, 
2000). Structural social capital refers to organisational forms of social capital such 
as the 'roles, rules, precedents and procedures as well as networks that contribute 
to cooperation' (Uphoff, 2000, p. 218), whereas cognitive social capital comprises 
the shared norms, values and attitudes that underlie structural social capital. 
Examples of structural social capital include all types of formal or informal 
organisations, associations, or cooperatives. Cognitive social capital is often 
operationalised as trust, norms of reciprocity, or cooperation (see, e.g., Knack & 
Keefer, 1997). Structural social capital provides the structure through which group 
members cooperate, while cognitive social capital is the set of attitudes that 
encourages group members to employ structural capital (Uphoff, 2000).11 
This study focuses specifically on structural social capital, which is 
captured by people’s participation and financial investments in networks. Within 
structural social capital, a distinction is made between bonding and bridging social 
capital (Putnam, 2000, 2002). Bonding social capital refers to connections between 
homogeneous groups or individuals, while bridging social capital unites 
individuals or groups that are dissimilar in terms of characteristics or beliefs, 
thereby bridging social divides. The concepts of bonding and bridging social 
capital are relevant in a conflict-affected setting, such as Burundi, because bridging 
social capital in particular is believed to prevent conflict and foster reconciliation in 
the wake of a conflict. Colletta and Cullen (2000), for example, concluded that low 
stocks of bridging social capital led to low social cohesion and therefore impeded 
reconstruction efforts in Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. Similarly, 
Varshney studied the relationship between civic engagement and ethnic conflict in 
India, calling inter-ethnic networks 'agents of peace' (Varshney, 2001, p. 363) and 
intra-ethnic networks a conflict hazard. Formal forms of engagement, such as clubs 
                                                 
11 The distinction between structural and cognitive social capital stems from Putnam’s definition, 
described above, and that of Coleman, who referred to social capital as 'a variety of different entities 
having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure and they 
facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure' (1990, p. 302). 
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and associations, are argued to be particularly important conflict buffers, as they 
make society more resilient to political polarisation.  
Treating social capital as a multifaceted concept, comprising networks of 
bonding and bridging social capital, acknowledges that households may invest 
remittances differently in different types of social capital. This information sheds 
light on the various channels through which remittances affect households’ social 
capital and, consequently, social relations in remittance-receiving areas.  
 
6.3 Conflict, migration and social ties in Burundi 
Burundi has experienced waves of civil conflict since it gained independence from 
Belgium in 1962 (Lemarchand, 1996). These conflict episodes spurred large 
population movements and had harmful effects on both economic and social 
aspects of Burundian society. Per capita income decreased by nearly 40 per cent in 
the period 1993-2007 (World Bank, 2009), which in combination with a substantial 
decrease in international aid (Bundervoet, 2006), drove the percentage of 
individuals living below the poverty line of 1 dollar per day from 35 per cent in 
1993 to 67 per cent in 2006 (World Bank, 2009). The signing of the Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreements in August 2000 and the election of a new 
government in 2005 signified the beginning of the peace and reconstruction phase 
in Burundi. Poverty, however, remains one of Burundi’s main challenges, despite 
recent economic improvements. In 2011 Burundi still ranked 185 on the Human 
Development Index, which is the lowest in the world after the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Niger (UNDP, 2011).  
 As a result of this civil conflict, Burundi has a large and heterogeneous 
diaspora scattered around the globe. The largest share of the diaspora resides in 
the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Rwanda, and the DRC. A small minority 
migrated to Europe and North America. In total, more than 350,000 Burundians, or 
4.2 per cent of the population, were living abroad in 2010 (World Bank, 2011c). 
Recently, new migration patterns from Burundi have arisen, primarily comprising 
skilled migrants moving to Western Africa, South Africa, and Europe to seek 
employment and education opportunities (Fransen & Siegel, 2010).  
The Burundian government is currently exploring strategies to access the 
resources of the Burundian diaspora for reconstruction purposes. The first draft of 
the national migration policy aims to enhance remittance flows into the country 
and invest them in development programmes (Republic of Burundi, 2011). The aim 
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is to create social stability through economic development. Although the Burundi 
diaspora residing in Europe and North America is relatively small, its members are 
well organized, highly active, and engaged in their home country (Fransen & 
Siegel, 2010).  
International remittances are believed to be a small, but growing, financial 
inflow into Burundi. Remittances were estimated at between three million USD 
(World Bank, 2011c) and 28 million USD (Banque de la Republique Burundi (BRB), 
2010) in 2010.12 Most remittances are sent from Europe and North America (De 
Bruyn & Wets, 2006; Fransen & Andersson, 2011). Remittance-receiving 
households primarily reside in urban areas and a recent study has shown that they 
are generally wealthier than non-receiving households (Fransen & Mazzucato, 
2014, or Chapter 5 of this dissertation). Urban-rural financial transactions have also 
increased due to increasing rural-urban migration flows, primarily consisting of 
young, rural men seeking better job opportunities in the capital. These remittances 
typically pass through informal channels; they are sent either through hand 
delivery or couriering and are transferred within family networks that are based 
on trust and reciprocity (Fransen & Andersson, 2011; Uvin, 2009). 
The conflict in Burundi also affected social ties within society, reportedly 
leading to low levels of interpersonal trust, solidarity, and reciprocity (Brachet & 
Wolpe, 2005; Uvin, 2009; Vervisch, Vlassenroot, et al., 2013). The conflict, in which 
nearly all households were affected, combined with increasing poverty levels, 
deeply divided community members. This led scholars to describe Burundian 
society as characterised by ‘weak bridges, strong bonds’ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005, p. 
6). They refer to a highly fragmented society, due to inter-ethnic tensions, but also 
socio-economic inequity between social classes (principally the urban elite versus 
the rural population), divisions between clans within ethnic groups, and regional 
inequalities (especially between urban and rural areas). Tensions between former 
refugees and other community members have also been reported, due to disputes 
regarding land and other assets (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012).  
Social relations with friends and relatives are an important form of 
insurance and support for Burundian households (see, e.g., Trouwborst, 1973; 
Uvin, 2009). Horizontal networks of close friends and family members, based on 
                                                 
12 The difference between these statistics is due to measurement differences. The BRB estimate refers to 
the period from January to October 2010 and was provided by BRB during a personal interview with 
the author. 
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solidarity expressed through gift-giving and mutual support, have historically 
formed an important part of social life in Burundi (Trouwborst, 1973). Financial 
transactions are an important manifestation of these social ties. Many households 
engage in gift giving for (religious) celebrations, educational support or other 
necessities (Uvin, 2009). Vervisch et al. (2013) described how the insurance function 
of this bonding social capital weakened during the war period, due to conflict and 
economic hardship that gave rise to disputes over valuables, and sometimes led to 
violence. Uvin (2009) however argues that poverty and limited economic 
opportunities have increased households’ dependency on social capital:  
 
There seems no doubt that this results from Burundian’s profound 
vulnerability: they need to maintain relations at all cost, for, apart from 
their bodies, the little bit of social capital they have is the only thing that 
may make the difference between total destitution and simple poverty, 
especially in the context of complete absence of law. The capacity to 
maintain relations with people who crossed you, whom you distrust, is 
crucial, for one never knows – they may be necessary one day (Uvin, 
2009, p. 167).  
 
The restoration of social relations has been a focus of many post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes in Burundi (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005; Vervisch, Titeca, et 
al., 2013). Since the end of the conflict, the number of civil society organisations 
and community associations has increased in Burundi and civil society has become 
more active in areas such as women and youth issues, development and 
reconciliation, human rights, and religion (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005; Vervisch, Titeca, 
et al., 2013). Given these unique social dynamics, characterised by low trust but 
high inter-household dependency because of economic hardship, and increasing 
civic engagement, Burundi provides an interesting case study to explore the effects 
of international remittances on bonding and bridging social capital.  
 
6.4 Data and empirical approach  
The dataset includes information on 810 households residing in Bujumbura, 
Burundi's capital. The data were collected in March 2011 in 54 randomly selected 
blocks within the 17 zones or quartiers (neighbourhoods) of the city. The 
distribution of blocks across the different neighbourhoods was based on a 
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neighbourhood’s population size, meaning that more blocks were visited in more 
densely populated neighbourhoods. In each block, consisting of two to four streets, 
15 randomly selected households were interviewed. The household interviews 
were conducted with a main respondent, who was at least 18 years of age and 
knowledgeable on household financial and social affairs. In 82 per cent of the cases 
the main respondent was the household head or his/her spouse. In 11 per cent of 
the cases the main respondent was a child of the household head. The main 
respondents were, on average, 34 years old.  
 
6.4.1 Remittances 
Remittances were defined as international monetary transfers that were received 
by a household in the 12 months preceding the interview. Remittance receipt was 
common in Bujumbura: of the 810 households in the sample, 15.93 per cent (n = 
129) had received remittances. For these 129 receiving households, the average 
number of senders was 1.26, yielding a total of 162 remittance senders in the data. 
Most remittance senders lived in Europe or North America: 34.57 per cent (n = 56) 
and 33.95 per cent (n = 55), respectively. Other senders lived in non-neighbouring 
African countries (15.43 per cent, n = 25), neighbouring countries (12.35 per cent, n 
= 20), Asia (1.23 per cent, n = 2), or Australia (0.62 per cent, n = 1).13 These findings 
confirm anecdotal evidence that most remittances to Burundi are sent from Europe 
and North America (Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). The majority of senders (93.83 
per cent, n = 152) were not considered household members, but most of them 
(90.79 per cent, n = 138) were family members.14 International remittances are thus 
primarily a family affair in Burundi. 
 
6.4.2 Social capital indicators 
As described, this study focused on structural social capital, which was divided 
into bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital was defined in this 
paper as networks of close friends and family members, acknowledging the 
importance of these horizontal social networks in Burundi (see, e.g., Trouwborst, 
                                                 
13 Three households (1.85 per cent) indicated that they were unaware of the location of their remittance 
sender(s). 
14 A household was defined as 'all individuals living together with communal arrangements concerning 
subsistence and other necessities of life and including all individuals presently residing elsewhere (in 
the country or abroad) whose principal commitments and obligations are to this household' (Fransen, 
2011). 
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1973; Uvin, 2009; Vervisch, Vlassenroot, et al., 2013). Networks of close friends and 
family members are frequently, but not necessarily, aligned with ethnic ties in 
Burundi, and should therefore not be treated as a proxy for ethnicity. Bridging 
social capital is defined as social capital that transcends these networks of close 
friends and family members. Because of the ethnic character of the conflict in 
Burundi, it would have been interesting to link remittances with inter- or intra-
ethnic social capital. However, the survey data contain no references to the 
households' ethnicity, due to the sensitivity associated with the concept of ethnicity 
in Burundi. 
Four indicators were used to measure households’ structural social capital: 
1) membership in organisations, 2) monthly expenditures on religious 
organisations, 3) monthly expenditures on gifts to family members and friends, 
and 4) internal remittance sending. These indicators thus included social capital 
investments in the form of both investing time (organisation membership) and 
money (religious organisations, gifts to family members and friends, and internal 
remittances). First, the number of organisation memberships per household, 
measuring households’ associational involvement, is often used to study social 
capital (see, e.g., Grootaert, 1999; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999). As described, formal 
forms of engagement, such as clubs and associations, are also particularly 
important in conflict-affected settings (Varshney, 2001). In this study, organisations 
included credit or savings associations, agricultural associations, religious 
organisations, political organisations, and sports clubs.15 The indicator refers to 
membership only and does not include monetary contributions. Organization 
membership is therefore perceived as a social capital investment that is made by 
donating time.  
The second indicator, monthly expenditures on religious organisations, 
was considered separately from organisation memberships, as it specifically relates 
to financial contributions. This indicator was selected because previous studies 
have linked remittances to church donations (Brown & Conneil, 1993; James, 1997; 
Kabki et al., 2004) and churches may offer financial safety nets for their members. 
                                                 
15 The data also contained information on donations to community projects, agricultural cooperatives, 
and saving and credit groups. These donations were, however, not common, which made it impossible 
to run separate analyses for these indicators due to small sample sizes. Analyses performed with 
averaged scores of all donations did not yield significantly different results (results available upon 
request). 
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Churches are important meeting places in Burundi and the data showed that 
church donations were frequent among both remittance and non-remittance 
receiving households. The third indicator referred to gifts to family members and 
close friends that were not part of the household that the household had given in 
the month previous to the interview. The second and third indicator were derived 
from the expenditure section of the questionnaire, where the households were 
asked about their average, monthly spending on several items.  
The fourth indicator measured households' financial transfers to family or 
friends residing in other provinces in Burundi over the past 12 months. These final 
two indicators were selected due to the importance of gift-giving in maintaining 
social relations in Burundi (see Section 6.3). Practices of gift giving have been 
studied extensively by anthropologists, pioneered by the work of Mauss (2005), 
and are considered an important part of building reciprocity, trust and social ties - 
terms that are highly linked to current notions of social capital. Although the 
fourth indicator specifically refers to monetary support to households that live in 
other provinces in Burundi, there may be some overlap between the third (average 
monthly expenditures on gifts to family and friends) and fourth indicator. 
Nevertheless, both indicators are used because they refer to different support 
networks. Whereas indicator number three makes reference to both family 
members and close friends, urban-rural remittances primarily represent intra-
family financial transactions. The data used in this paper show that over 99 per 
cent of the rural recipients were family members of the sending households in the 
capital. The indicators were therefore used separately in the analyses. 
Of the four structural social capital indicators, organisational membership 
and expenditures on religious organisations were treated as bridging social capital 
indicators. Brachet and Wolpe (2005) have described that civil society 
organizations, including religious organizations, have become increasingly 
(ethnically) mixed in Burundi after the war. In addition, the development 
community has focused on so-called community-based development, using an 
inclusive approach to strengthen social cohesion (Vervisch, Titeca, et al., 2013). The 
assumption is therefore made in this study that organisations, such as saving 
associations, sport clubs, political organisations, and agricultural associations are 
larger social structures that cross social networks of close friends and family 
members. Gift giving to family and friends was considered a bonding social capital 
investment, based on the ethnographic work of Trouwborst (1973) and Vervisch et 
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al. (2013) described in Section 6.3. Finally, urban-rural remittance sending was also 
used as an indicator of bonding social capital.  
As described, the information on social capital investments was derived 
from the main respondent. Just like information on, for example, income may not 
be shared with all household members (see, e.g., Fisher, Reimer, & Carr, 2010), 
household information on social capital investments may also not be pooled. In the 
absence of individual data on social capital investments, the data derived from the 
main respondent is therefore used as a proxy for the households’ total social 
capital investments. 
 
6.4.3 Empirical approach 
The empirical approach consisted of descriptive statistics and propensity score 
matching (PSM). Although descriptive statistics provide interesting insights, PSM 
addresses the possibility that households differ in their social capital investments 
due to household characteristics other than remittances. For example, remittance-
receiving households in Burundi are generally wealthier than non-remittance 
receiving households, which might affect their social capital. Studies have shown 
that wealthier households are more able to make social capital investments (see, 
e.g., Cleaver, 2005; Fafchamps, 2006). Using PSM, remittance-receiving households 
were matched to non-remittance receiving households that are similar, following 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This yielded an average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT), which approximates a household’s circumstances with respect to 
social capital under the counterfactual that it had not been treated, meaning that it 
had not received remittances.  
For the analyses in this paper, households were matched based on the 
characteristics of the main respondent, including his or her age, gender, 
educational attainment, employment, and marital status. Matching variables also 
included household characteristics including asset ownership, the number of 
economic shocks the household experienced over the past five years, and the 
number of adults in the household (see Table 6.1). These variables have been 
identified as important migration determinants and are therefore closely related to 
remittance receipt (McKenzie & Sasin, 2007). Households were also matched based 
on the past migration experiences of their household members, including 
international return migration and internal displacement, and the current 
migration status of a household member.  
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Table 6.1. Variables used for matching 
Variable n M SD Min. Max. 
   
      
Main respondent characteristics      
   Age  810 33.53 12.66 17 80 
   Gender (1 = male) 810   0.28   0.45   0  1 
   Years of education 810   7.68   5.38   0 19 
   Employment status (1 = employed) 810   0.41   0.49   0  1 
   Marital status        
      Single (ref.) 810   0.25   0.43   0  1 
      Married 810   0.59   0.49   0  1 
      Divorced 810   0.05   0.21   0  1 
      Widowed 810   0.11   0.31   0  1 
Household characteristics      
   House ownership (1 = yes) 810   0.45   0.49   0  1 
   Land ownership (1 = yes)  807   0.21   0.41   0  1 
   Other assets (index) 810   0.00   1.55 -2.42 4.84 
   House ownership five years ago (1=yes) 810   0.44   0.50   0  1 
   Land ownership five years ago (1=yes) 810   0.30   0.46   0  1 
   Number of economic shocks in the past 5 years 810   1.07   1.91   0  7 
   Number of adults in the household 810   2.99   1.58   1 11 
   Migrant abroad in the household (1 = yes) 810   0.03   0.17   0  1 
   Return migrant (1 = yes) 809   0.13   0.34   0  1 
   Displacement camp experiences (1=yes) 809   0.20   0.40   0  1 
      
   
 
The questionnaire that was used for this study contained questions on 
retrospective home and land ownership. This information was used in the analyses 
to match households based on their status from before they began receiving 
remittances. A previous study on remittances in Burundi showed that wealthier 
and higher educated households were more likely to receive remittances; a finding 
that the authors ascribed to a selection into migration - wealthier households have 
more means to send a household member abroad, and are therefore more likely to 
receive remittances (Fransen & Mazzucato, 2014, or Chapter 5 of this dissertation). 
By including retrospective information on wealth (assets), the aim is to control for 
this selection. The indicators refer to five years in the past and are therefore not 
necessarily linked to the pre-remittance period for all households. The data reveal 
that 44 of the 162 senders (27.16 per cent) began sending remittances prior to 2005. 
However, this five-year period was used in the survey, as it was linked to the pre- 
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to post-conflict transition in Burundi. This was considered the most reliable 
reference point for interviewees to provide retrospective information. 
 Three estimation methods were used to calculate the ATT: Nearest 
Neighbour (5), Kernel (Gaussian) and Radius matching (calliper 0.01), to verify the 
robustness of the results. The assumption required for PSM is that all relevant 
differences between groups are captured by observable characteristics in the data. 
Balancing tests, which calculate the reduction of systematic differences between 
groups through matching, were performed by comparing mean absolute 
standardised biases (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985), pseudo R2 and p-values of the 
likelihood ratio tests before and after matching (Sianesi, 2004). In addition, 
common support graphs were constructed to determine whether there were 
remittance and non-remittance receivers in the data for all values of the dependent 
variables.  
 
6.5 Results: remittances and social capital in urban Burundi 
 
6.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics on the households' social capital. The 
table indicates that nearly half of the households had at least one organisation 
membership and, on average, households spent nearly 0.70 US dollars on religious 
organisations per month. Almost 4.70 US dollars were spent, on average, on gifts to 
family members and friends. Urban-rural remittances were relatively common as 
well: 30 per cent of the households in the sample had sent money to family 
members living in rural areas in the 12 months preceding the interview. The values 
of these remittances differed significantly. The mean value across all 810 
households was nearly 40 US dollars, with a minimum of zero, for households that 
had sent no remittances, and a maximum of 2760 US dollars for households that 
had sent remittances. The average amount sent per transaction was just over 22 US 
dollars.
12
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The descriptive statistics reveal that remittance-receiving households 
invested significantly more in their structural social capital, both bonding and 
bridging, than non-receiving households. Receiving households had on average 
0.88 organisation memberships, versus 0.39 for non-receiving households. 
Receiving households also spent more on religious organisations: 1.33 US dollars 
versus 0.57 US dollars in the past month, for remittance-receiving and non-
remittance receiving households, respectively. Receiving households also gave 
significantly more financial gifts to family and friends, with almost 8 US dollars 
per month, versus 4.69 US dollars for non-receiving households. Finally, receiving 
households were more likely to send urban-rural remittances and sent higher 
values. Forty-two per cent of households that had received international 
remittances in the past 12 months had sent internal remittances. Of the households 
that had not received international remittances, 28 per cent had sent internal 
remittances. As described earlier, remittance-receiving households may differ in 
their social capital investments due to household characteristics other than 
remittances, which may explain why remittance-receiving households score higher 
on social capital in Table 6.2. The following section therefore presents the PSM 
estimates, for which remittance-receiving households were matched to similar, 
non-remittance receiving households. 
 
6.5.2 Remittances and social capital: addressing selection effects 
The PSM estimates are presented in Table 6.3, which shows the mean values for 
remittance-receiving households (the treated) and non-remittance receiving 
households (the untreated), and the ATT, which signifies the average difference 
between the treated and untreated.16 The assumption is that the analyses are 
controlled for all theoretically relevant variables, so that the ATT signifies the 
difference in social capital between remittance-receiving and non-remittance 
receiving households, due to remittances.   
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Logit regression analyses were used for the estimates, to predict the probability of receiving 
remittances (results are available upon request). 
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Table 6.3. Remittances and structural social capital: PSM results 
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
 
Bonding 
versus 
bridging 
Matching 
algorithm 
M 
Treated 
M 
Untreated 
ATT t No. of 
treated 
No. of 
untreated 
    
     
Bridging Number of 
organisation 
memberships 
   
 NN (5) 0.93 0.36 0.57** 2.54 124 663 
 Kernel (Gaussian) 0.93 0.44 0.49** 2.21 124 663 
 Radius, cal. (0.1) 0.93 0.44 0.48** 2.23 124 663 
Bridging Expenditures on 
religious 
organisations (USD) 
      
 NN (5) 1.31 2.09 -0.78 -1.42 107 617 
 Kernel (Gaussian) 1.31 1.50 -0.20 -0.43 107 617 
 Radius, cal. (0.01) 1.31 1.37 -0.07 -0.16 107 617 
Bonding Expenditures on gifts 
to family and friends 
(USD) 
      
NN (5) 8.02 12.81 -4.79** -2.43 103 566 
 Kernel (Gaussian) 8.02 13.46 -5.44*** -3.30 103 566 
 Radius, cal. (0.1) 8.02 11.97 -3.95** -2.58 103 566 
Bonding Urban-rural 
remittance sending (1 
= yes)  
      
 NN (5) 0.43 0.30 0.13** 2.21 122 661 
 Kernel (Gaussian) 0.43 0.28 0.15*** 2.62 122 661 
 Radius, cal. (0.1) 0.43 0.29 0.14** 2.51 122 661 
Bonding Value of urban-rural 
remittances (USD) 
      
 NN (5) 111.97 32.30 79.67** 2.30 113 641 
 Kernel (Gaussian) 115.08 36.57 78.51** 2.29 113 641 
 Radius, cal. (0.1) 112.99 38.32 74.68** 2.22 113 641 
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Table 6.3 shows mixed results for the effects of remittances on bridging 
social capital. Remittance-receiving households had significantly more 
organisation memberships per household, compared to similar, non-remittance 
receiving households. The effect of remittances on the second bridging indicator, 
expenditures on religious organisations, however, became insignificant after 
matching. This signifies that remittance-receiving households do not spend 
significantly more or less on religious organizations than similar, non-remittance 
receiving households. As explained above, organisation memberships and 
expenditures on religious organisations refer to social capital investments that are 
made by donating time versus money, respectively. Remittance-receiving 
households thus seemed to invest more in their bridging social capital by donating 
time, but did not make larger monetary contributions than non-remittance 
receiving households. 
The estimates in Table 6.3 reveal mixed effects of remittances on bonding 
social capital as well. Remittance-receiving households spent significantly less on 
gifts to family members and friends. Yet, remittance-receiving households sent 
more and higher values of urban-rural remittances. Sending urban-rural 
remittances was classified as a bonding social capital investment, because internal 
remittances, like international remittances, are mostly a family affair in Burundi: 
remittances tend to stay within close family networks. Remittances thus seemed to 
incentivize receiving households to spend less on their networks comprised of 
family members and close friends and more on family networks only.  
The estimates for the indicators of social capital in Table 6.3 are robust 
across the different matching estimations. Common support graphs, illustrating 
the distribution of the propensity scores and the area of common support for the 
propensities of remittance-receiving households and non-remittance receiving 
households, are presented as Figure A.1a to Figure A.1e in the appendix of this 
dissertation. The graphs indicate that few observations are outside the common 
support area, meaning that non-remittance receiving households can be considered 
a good control group for the remittance-receiving households.  
The balancing tests that present the pseudo R2s, the p-values of the 
likelihood ratio tests, and the mean absolute standard biases before and after 
matching, are presented in Table 6.4. Declines in mean standardised bias after 
matching ranged from 81 per cent to 85 per cent. The residual mean standardised 
bias ranged from 3.7 to 4.7, indicating that bias was significantly reduced through 
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matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). The pseudo R2s were also significantly 
smaller after matching, and the p-values of the likelihood ratio tests became 
insignificant, indicating that systematic differences in the covariates between 
remittance-receiving and non-remittance receiving households were eliminated 
through matching. 
 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion  
This paper explored the relationship between remittances and households’ social 
capital in Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi. Social capital is considered a 
prerequisite for post-conflict reconstruction and development but has largely been 
overlooked in the substantial literature researching the effects of remittances on 
development in migrant-sending areas. Remittances were hypothesized to increase 
social capital investments by 1) relaxing liquidity constraints, thereby facilitating 
investments, 2) raising the income of remittance-receiving households, 
incentivizing them to civically engage, and 3) the transfer of norms and values 
regarding civic engagement from the diaspora. Urban Burundi provided an 
interesting setting to study the link between remittances and social capital because 
of its unique social dynamics, characterised by ‘weak bridges, strong bonds’ 
(Brachet & Wolpe, 2005, p. 6).  
 Two main findings emerged from this study. First, remittances seemed to 
incentivize households to invest in structural social capital by donating time 
(associational involvement), but not money (church donations). Although the exact 
mechanisms through which remittances affect social capital were not addressed, 
some possible explanations can be mentioned. The finding that remittance-
receiving households participated more in organizations may be explained by the 
income-smoothing effect of remittances, which generates leisure time, or the fact 
that remittance-receiving are more likely to participate in networks because they 
have more to offer to other members. Remittance-receiving households may also 
be affected by norms and values regarding civic engagement through contacts with 
the diaspora. Previous studies have shown that the Burundi diaspora is highly 
organized and active (see, e.g., Fransen & Siegel, 2010). These norms of civic 
engagement may have incentivized remittance-receiving households to participate 
in organizations as well. 
The observation that remittance-receiving households participated more in 
organizations contradicts findings from Rwanda, a country neighbouring Burundi, 
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where remittance-receiving households were found to participate less in 
community organisations (Caarls et al., 2013). It is unclear why these findings 
differ. The contrasting findings might be due to economic differences between the 
countries. Burundi is significantly poorer than Rwanda and has a more recent 
history of conflict. Research has demonstrated that social capital investments are 
especially important for poorer households (Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert et al., 2002; 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The finding that remittance-receiving households did 
not contribute more to religious organizations than non-remittance receiving 
households also contradicts previous research findings (Brown & Conneil, 1993; 
James, 1997; Kabki et al., 2004). It is not clear why this is the case. Future research 
should provide further insights into the effects of context on the relationship 
between remittances and social capital. 
 The second important finding that emerged is that remittance-receiving 
households invested more in their bonding social capital than non-remittance 
receiving households, but only when the network comprised family members. 
Receiving households sent more and higher values of urban-rural remittances, 
which, as the data showed, are almost always sent within family networks. 
However, receiving households spent significantly less on gifts to family members 
and close friends, compared to similar, non-receiving households. This indicator 
was used to capture social networks that have historically performed an important 
insurance function in Burundi society (Uvin, 2009; Vervisch, Vlassenroot, et al., 
2013). Remittances seem to crowd out gifts to these networks, to the extent that 
remittance-receiving households spend less than similar, non-remittance receiving 
households. This may be due to the crowding-out effect that Caarls et al. (2013) 
mentioned: remittance reception may reduce incentives to invest in social capital, 
because it creates financial independence. The crowding-out effect is similar to a 
moral hazard effect that predicts that remittances reduce the receiver’s incentives 
to be productive, because remittances provide insurance (see, e.g., Azam & Gubert, 
2006). Another possible explanation is that remittance-receiving households have 
shifted their investment priorities to their network members residing abroad, from 
whom they receive financial support. Horizontal social networks have reportedly 
weakened in Burundi during the war (Vervisch, Vlassenroot, et al., 2013), which 
may have incentivized remittance-receiving households to invest more in their 
emigrant connections.  
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Based on these results, the expectation that remittances are invested in 
networks for insurance purposes (Gerber & Torosyan, 2010; James, 1997; Kabki et 
al., 2004; Mazzucato et al., 2006) can only partly be confirmed. Remittance-
receiving households spent more time on their bridging social capital, but did not 
make higher monetary contributions to their bridging social capital. Remittance-
receiving households spent more money on their bonding social capital, but only 
when the network comprised family members. Overall, these findings seem to 
suggest that financial investments due to remittances strengthened mainly the 
bonding social capital of remittance-receiving households, and family networks in 
particular. Despite the fact that remittance-receiving households made fewer 
monetary contributions to their bridging social capital, their participation in 
organizations may have positive, long-term effects. Participation in formal 
organisations such as associations is particularly important for conflict prevention, 
as they make society more resilient to political polarisation (Varshney, 2001). 
Because of small sample sizes, it was not possible to explore the types of 
organizations that remittance-receiving households participated in, leaving room 
for further exploration of the associational involvement of remittance-receiving 
households. 
This paper studied the linkages between remittances and social capital in a 
conflict-affected setting. The use of a multifaceted social capital measure 
demonstrated that the relationship between remittances and social capital is 
complex and dependent on the measure of social capital considered. Some 
limitations should be mentioned. First, the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between remittances and social capital could not be disentangled with 
the present data. Whether remittances increase social capital investments by 
relaxing households’ liquidity constraints or by increasing the income of 
remittance-receiving households is unclear. In addition, it was not possible to 
distinguish between monetary remittances and the transfer of norms and values 
(social remittances) from the diaspora as driving forces of social capital 
investments. The mechanisms underlying the relationship between remittances 
and social capital investments therefore warrant further research attention. Second, 
because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is difficult to draw causal 
inferences. PSM is an empirical approach that is commonly used in the absence of 
longitudinal or experimental data to create a counterfactual situation. However, 
there may be unobservable variables that simultaneously affect the assignment of a 
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household into the treatment group and the dependent variable, potentially 
creating a ‘hidden bias’ that may drive the results. Future research is therefore 
needed to study the long-term effects of remittances on social capital formation in 
conflict-affected settings. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 7: The socio-economic sustainability of 
refugee return 
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This chapter has been invited for revision and resubmission as: Fransen, S. The 
socio-economic sustainability of refugee return: Insights from Burundi. Population, 
Space and Place. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The concept of sustainable return has been used extensively in policy circles to 
refer to the successful reintegration of returnees in conflict-affected societies. 
Sustainability is often seen as the equivalent of ‘effective reintegration’ (UNHCR, 
1997, p. 2); it assumes that when returnees are similar to the local population in 
terms of socio-economic conditions and security, return is sustainable. However, 
return migration may affect not only returning individuals or households but also 
other households in return areas (Black & Gent, 2006). In some contexts, return has 
led to increased competition for resources such as land (Huggins, 2007; Kamungi, 
Oketch, & Huggins, 2005; Musahara & Huggins, 2005; Özerdem & Sofizada, 2006), 
resulting in lower living standards for all households. Accordingly, scholars have 
argued for a wider definition of sustainability that includes reintegration outcomes 
for individual returnees and the effects of return at the community or country level 
(see, Black and Gent, 2006). This wider view of sustainability remains an 
underexplored topic, primarily due to a lack of reliable and large-scale data from 
conflict-affected settings.  
 Some studies have addressed the sustainability of return in conflict-
affected contexts by conducting in-depth case studies. These studies have often 
focused on factors related to the sustainability of return, such as property 
restitution. Ozerdem and Sofizada (2006), for example, have studied the 
sustainability of refugee return in Afghanistan in the early 2000s by focusing on 
land-related challenges for returnees. Similarly, Williams (2006) has addressed the 
process of property restitution for returning refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite these contributions, the 
research field on sustainable return is small. Little is known about the lives of 
former refugees after their return to their countries of origin, and even less is 
known about the effects of their return on their communities. Moreover, few 
studies are based on quantitative data that allow a comparative, cross-national or 
sub-national perspective.  
 This paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature on refugee return 
by studying the sustainability of refugee return in Burundi, a small and densely 
populated country in the African Great Lakes region. More than 500,000 former 
refugees returned to Burundi between 2002 and 2011, mainly from neighbouring 
Tanzania (UNHCR, 2011). The Burundi case became internationally known as a 
major success because most returnees were repatriated in ‘safety and with dignity’ 
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(Rema Ministries, 2012), which are the main principles underlying the repatriation 
activities of UNHCR. Some studies found no significant differences between 
returnees and non-returnees, suggesting that reintegration had been successful 
(Terra-P Group, 2008). Several humanitarian organisations consequently closed 
their country offices, convinced that the ‘humanitarian crisis’ had ended. However, 
the long-term sustainability of return in Burundi was questioned by others, who 
argued that return had put additional pressure on scarce resources such as 
agricultural land, intensifying poverty in areas of return (Fransen & Kuschminder, 
2012; Rema Ministries, 2012). Instead of comparing return to non-return 
households, these studies focused on communities and took into account changes 
to households over time. Whereas previous studies provided important insights, 
most were small-scale, conducted in specific localities, or focused on specific 
groups of returnees. 
 This study provides a nationwide study on refugee return in Burundi by 
analysing nationally representative household and community survey data 
collected in 2011, a little more than five years after the official end of conflict and 
after most former refugees had returned. Following Black and Gent’s (2006) wider 
definition of sustainable return, this paper a) compares return and non-return 
households, and b) estimates the relationship between return migration and the 
socio-economic conditions of all households in communities that host returnees. A 
distinction is made between the return of first- and second-generation returnees, 
the latter of whom are the children of former refugees who were born in exile. This 
distinction is especially relevant in the Burundi context because, due to their time 
spent in exile, many former refugees had children who returned with them to 
Burundi. Few studies have addressed second-generation returnees (exceptions are: 
Christou, 2006; King & Christou, 2010; Wessendorf, 2007) and none have been 
conducted in conflict-affected contexts. This paper aims to fill these gaps and 
investigates whether in Burundi, there are key differences between these two 
groups related to the sustainability of return. Because of this paper’s country 
context, it focuses specifically on the socio-economic dimension of sustainability. 
Economic issues such as poverty and land scarcity have been identified as the 
primary factors hampering the reintegration of former refugees in Burundi 
(Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema ministries, 2012).  
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7.1.1 Operationalizing sustainability 
Sustainable return is defined as a ‘longer-term, contextual, and challenging 
understanding of return that encompasses social and economic dimensions’ (Black 
& Gent, 2006, p. 26). The concept of sustainable return goes beyond the livelihoods 
of returnees and refers to structural conditions in the country of return that enable 
all households to generate viable livelihoods. Sustainable return is therefore ‘more 
than simple development’ or the provision of basic needs; it also implies good 
structural conditions in return areas. Sustainability may be understood as 
comprising three dimensions: physical, socio-economic, and political sustainability 
(Black, 2004) (see Table 7.1). Physical sustainability refers to the perpetuity of 
migration, meaning that returnees are not re-displaced after return. Socio-
economic sustainability focuses on the living conditions of returnees and other 
households in areas of return, whereas political sustainability refers to security 
levels after return and access to public services.  
 
Table 7.1. Measuring sustainable return 
Source: Black et al. (2004), modified by author. 
  
Level of 
analysis 
Operationalisation Indicators of the three dimensions 
   
 
 
Physical 
sustainability 
Socio-
economic 
sustainability 
Political-
security 
sustainability 
   
     
Micro (individual 
or household) 
Objective conditions of 
returnee 
Proportion of 
returnees 
who (do not) re-
emigrate 
Actual socio-
economic 
status of 
returnees 
Actual 
persecution or 
violence against 
returnees 
     
 Subjective perception of 
returnee 
(Lack of) desire 
to re-emigrate 
Perceived socio-
economic 
status 
Perception of 
safety, 
security threats 
     
Meso/Macro 
(community or 
country) 
Aggregate conditions of 
home country 
Trends in levels 
of emigration 
and asylum 
seeking 
abroad 
Trends in levels 
of poverty and 
well-being 
Trends in levels 
of persecution, 
conflict and 
violence 
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Sustainability can be measured at two levels: micro (individual/household) 
and meso/macro (community/society). At the micro level, return is sustainable 
when a) it is permanent, meaning that returnees are not re-displaced again, and b) 
return migrants are doing well socially and economically compared to non-
returnees. At the meso or macro levels, return migration is sustainable if has no 
negative influences on socio-economic conditions or security levels in the areas of 
return and if it does not spur new emigration flows (Black et al., 2004). Defining 
sustainability as the permanence of return is referred to as a ‘narrow’ definition of 
sustainability, whereas focusing on the living conditions of returnees and the 
wider impact of return on return areas is considered the ‘wider’ definition of 
sustainable return (Black & Gent, 2006).  
The narrow definition of sustainability is hotly debated (Black & Gent, 
2006; Black & King, 2004; Stigter, 2006). Migration theories hypothesise that 
migration is inspired by relative deprivation and offers economic benefits for 
poorer households. From a development perspective, mobility thus provides 
livelihood opportunities for households. Maconachie, Binns, Tengbe and Johnson 
(2006), for example, argued that seasonal labour migration was essential for the 
sustainability of return for IDPs in Sierra Leone. These views contrast with the idea 
that the permanence of return migration is an indicator of ‘success’. Accordingly, 
the narrow view of sustainability is disregarded in the rest of this paper.  
 The individual or household measurement of sustainability is often used in 
research on return migration and has been applied in Burundi (see, e.g., Terra-P 
Group, 2008). It offers clear benchmarks to estimate the ‘success’ of return, is easy 
to operationalise for research purposes and is informative for policy makers 
because it highlights the areas in which returnees need support. It can also be used 
to study which returnees reintegrate, or the aspects that underlie successful 
reintegration (Black & Gent, 2006). Sustainability at the micro level can be 
measured using either objective or subjective indicators (Black & Gent, 2006). 
Whereas objective indicators focus on tangible aspects such as asset ownership, 
subjective indicators consider the perceptions of returnees or of returning 
households.  
 A further distinction involves the use of either absolute or relative 
standards. Black et al. (2004) use an absolute measure, arguing that when returnees 
have an ‘adequate level of well-being’ (p. 27), their return is socio-economically 
sustainable. In contrast, relative measures compare returnees to other society 
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members. When returnees are on par with local populations in terms of, for 
example, employment and living conditions, their return is considered sustainable. 
There are disadvantages to using either absolute or relative standards to assess the 
sustainability of return. The absolute measurement begs the question of the 
definition of an ‘adequate’ level of well being, whereas a relative measurement 
overlooks the fact that living conditions may be poor in general.  
 The primary disadvantage of the micro-level perspective on sustainability 
is that it overlooks potential changes experienced by other members of society. 
Although from an objective viewpoint returnees and non-returnees may have 
equal assets and opportunities, the overall pie may have become smaller due to 
return, leading to (increased) poverty for all of the households in areas of return 
(Black & Gent, 2006; Hammond, 1999). Given these potential effects, it is important 
not only to take into account the effects of displacement on individuals or 
households but also to explore how return migration has affected entire 
communities using a long-term perspective (Black & Gent, 2006). A meso/macro 
level perspective on sustainable return offers the advantage of providing insight 
into the long-term development implications of return because it refers to all 
households (both return and non-return) in areas of return and incorporates 
changes over time that may occur due to return. The macro perspective, however, 
is more difficult to apply because it requires large-scale data collection, which is 
often a challenge in unstable settings. Consequently, the macro perspective has 
been largely overlooked in research on return migration.  
 
7.2 Burundi: a decade of refugee return 
Refugees fled from Burundi during waves of political instability and civil conflict 
that emerged after Burundi’s independence in 1962. Most refugees left the country 
as a result of conflict episodes in 1972 and 1993 that generated refugee flows of 
approximately 300,000 and 700,000 individuals, respectively. Approximately two- 
thirds of the 1972 refugees fled to neighbouring Tanzania, where they inhabited 
refugee sites that were eventually named the ‘Old Settlements’. Refugees in 1993 
mostly settled in refugee camps in Northwest Tanzania (Fransen & Kuschminder, 
2012). An unknown number of refugees moved to communities in border areas 
and Tanzania’s capital, Dar es Salaam. Others, both 1972 and 1993 refugees, fled to 
Rwanda or the DRC, and a small number reached Europe, the United States and 
Canada.  
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After the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements in 
August 2000, many Burundians began to return voluntarily from exile. The Arusha 
Agreements stated that everyone affected by the conflict would be compensated 
for their losses and would be entitled to property restitution (Republic of Burundi, 
2000), which incentivised many refugees to return (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). 
Official repatriation movements, facilitated by UNHCR in a joint initiative with the 
Burundian and Tanzanian governments, began in 2002. Between 2002 and 
September 2011, more than 500,000 formally registered Burundians crossed the 
border back into their home country (UNHCR, 2011). Approximately 490,000 
returnees were repatriated from Tanzania, approximately 15,000 returned from 
DRC, and almost 8,000 returned from Rwanda.17 In 2008, UNHCR initiated the 
repatriation of 1972 refugees from the Old Settlements. Until then, few had 
returned, and the Tanzanian government increased pressure to return (Haver et al., 
2009).18 The efforts of UNHCR led to an increase in the return of primarily 1972 
refugees in 2008 (UNHCR, 2011). In 2009, UNHCR started the repatriation of 
Burundians living in Rwanda, and in October 2010, repatriation from the DRC was 
launched. In 2011, approximately 84,000 refugees were in exile, of which 37,000 
were in Tanzania (UNHCR, 2011).  
Because of the protracted Burundian refugee settlement in Tanzania, some 
who returned to Burundi were second-generation returnees, the children of 
(mostly 1972 cohort) refugees who were born in exile. Most second-generation 
returnees were born and raised in the Old Settlements in Tanzania and were 
migrating to a country unknown to them (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). Bunte 
and Monnier (2011) cite a 2010 UNHCR report that stated that 82 per cent of the 
returnees in 2008 were born in Tanzania. However, there is little information on 
this group, including their motivations to return. It is likely that at the time of 
repatriation, many of the second-generation returnees were under-age and 
travelled to Burundi with their parents. 
Most returnees settled in their provinces of origin in Southern and 
Northern Burundi, which border Tanzania and Rwanda (see Map A.2 in the 
                                                 
17 These numbers represent only returnees who were registered by UNHCR and are likely to be an 
underestimate of the actual return flow. 
18 In 2008, Tanzania also established a naturalization option for 1972 refugees from Burundi. More than 
160,000 people chose this option, whereas approximately 50,000 1972 refugees decided to return to 
Burundi, and a small group opted for resettlement in a third country.  
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appendix of this dissertation). However, the country offered few opportunities; 
Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 185th out of 187 
countries on the Human Development Index in 2011 (UNDP, 2011). World Food 
Programme (WFP) estimated that approximately 1.5 million people suffered from 
food insecurity in October 2012, primarily because of scarcity of agricultural land.19 
Agricultural land is the most important source of livelihoods in the rural areas, 
where the majority of households rely on subsistence farming. Land is inherited in 
Burundi; therefore, it is also an important identity marker (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). Due to their emotional attachments to family land, most of 
the returnees strongly desired to return to their origin communities (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012; Hovil, 2009).  
However, returnees frequently found their agricultural land either 
occupied by others or sold by family members (Hovil, 2009), leading to various 
land disputes. In 2006, the Burundian government established the National 
Commission on Land and other Properties (CNTB) to address land (and other 
property) disputes (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). Land sharing is the most 
common resolution to land disputes, but it has frequently led to resentment, and 
most people see it as a temporary solution (Hovil, 2009). Moreover, the agricultural 
production of a single plot is often insufficient to feed multiple families (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). Returnees who spent more than 30 years abroad (notably, the 
1972 cohort), as well as second-generation returnees, often are not entitled to re-
claim their land. Burundi’s 1986 land law provides that those who reside on land 
or other property for a consecutive period of 30 years gain legal tenure (Bunte & 
Monnier, 2011). This situation has led to additional challenges for the returning 
groups in terms of, for example, food security (Rema Ministries, 2012). 
 
7.3 Data and definitions 
Data were collected in all 17 provinces of Burundi and included 1,500 households 
residing in 100 different communities. Within each sous-colline (sub-hill), which is 
the smallest administrative unit in Burundi, 15 household heads and one 
community representative were interviewed using a standardised questionnaire. 
Urban households residing in the capital of Bujumbura were eliminated from the 
analyses to create a more homogeneous sample in terms of migration experiences. 
                                                 
19 See http://www.wfp.org/countries/burundi/food-security for more information.  
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Urban areas are significantly wealthier than rural areas and display different 
migration dynamics, including migration for educational or employment 
opportunities. In rural areas, migration has been mostly conflict-related. Because 
this study’s purpose was to focus on refugee return, only rural households were 
included in the analyses. This approach yielded a sample of 7,477 individuals 
living in 1,410 households distributed over 94 communities. 
 
7.3.1 Return migration: an overview 
A first-generation return migrant was defined as a former international migrant 
who had lived abroad for a consecutive period of at least 3 months. Of the 7,477 
rural household members in the sample, 447 individuals (5.99 per cent) were first-
generation returnees. If the household contained a first-generation return migrant, 
he or she was interviewed in-depth about his or her migration experiences. If there 
were multiple first-generation return migrants, one person was randomly selected 
for the in-depth interview. These interviews revealed that most first-generation 
returnees had returned from countries in the region: Tanzania (57.79 per cent), 
Rwanda (22.13 per cent), the DRC (15.57 per cent), and Uganda (4.10 per cent). The 
reasons they had returned were mostly related to emotional attachment to Burundi 
and the improved political and security situation since 2005. This finding confirms 
that migration was mostly conflict-related in rural areas. Most returnees in the 
sample had returned between 1993 and 1997 and between 2001 and 2008. These 
peaks in return aligned with the aftermath of the 1993 conflict and the signing of 
the Arusha agreements in 2000 that signalled the start of the reconstruction phase, 
respectively. 
Second-generation returnees were identified as children of former 
migrants who were born abroad. In this sample, 190 individuals (2.54 per cent) 
were second-generation returnees. Descriptive statistics show that second-
generation returnees were generally younger than first-generation returnees (see 
Table 7.2). Most of them were not married, and they were more likely to be in 
school as opposed to being employed. Seventy-three per cent of the second-
generation returnees lived with first-generation returnees at the time of the survey; 
these first-generation returnees were their parents in 97 per cent of cases.  
A household was classified as a first- or second-generation return migrant 
household if it contained at least one first- or second-generation return migrant, 
respectively. Because of this classification, some households were categorized as 
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both a first- and second-generation return household. This categorization was 
chosen because the main purpose of the analyses is to compare first- and second-
generation return migrant households to non-migrant households. The variables 
indicating whether the household was a first- or second-generation return migrant 
household were included separately in the analyses, to avoid multicollinearity. 
Individual data on return were aggregated to the community level to 
create proportions of community populations consisting of returnees (see Table 
7.3). These proportions varied significantly, ranging from zero to 43 per cent and 
from zero to 33 per cent for first- and second-generation returnees, respectively. 
The highest proportions of return migrants were found in communities in the 
Southern provinces of Rutana, Makamba, and Ruyigi, and the lowest proportions 
were found in Mwaro and Muramvya provinces in the interior of the country. 
 
7.3.2 Measuring socio-economic sustainability 
Five indicators were used to measure the socio-economic sustainability of return: 
1) land ownership, 2) living conditions, 3) food security, 4) subjective wealth, and 
5) subjective change in wealth over the previous five years. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 7.3. The first three indicators provided objective measurements 
of households’ economic conditions, whereas indicators 4 and 5 measured 
subjective experiences. First, land ownership referred to whether the household 
owned land that was used for agricultural purposes, herding or other activities. 
Eighty-two per cent of the households in the sample reported owning land. 
Second, a living conditions index was constructed based on the households’ 
primary water source, toilet type, cooking fuel, lighting type, and housing 
conditions. The index was constructed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
(results available upon request) and yielded a unique score for each household, 
ranging from -1.23 to 12.51. Third, food security measured the frequency with 
which the household experienced difficulties in meeting its food needs, ranging 
from one (every day) to five (never). More than 42 per cent of the sampled 
households reported difficulties meeting food needs on a daily basis. The average 
score on the five-point food security scale was 2.80.  
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Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
Notes. 1 1 = daily, 2 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 4 = once every few months, 5 = never. 2 1 = we are 
finding it very difficult, 2 = we are finding it difficult, 3 = we are coping, 4 = we are living 
comfortably, 5 = we are living very comfortably. 3 1 = (our living conditions) became much 
worse, 2 = became worse, 3 = stayed the same, 4 = improved, 5 = improved a lot. 4 1 = no 
formal education, 2 = pre-school, 3 = primary school, 4 = secondary school. 
 M SD Min. Max. n 
  
      
Community return migration      
First-generation returnees (prop.) 0.06 0.08 0 0.43 94 
Second-generation returnees (prop.) 0.03 0.06 0 0.33 94 
  
Socio-economic sustainability variables   
Land ownership (1 = yes) 0.82 0.38 0 1 1,410 
Living conditions (index) 0.00 1.94 -1.23 12.51 1,409 
Food security1 2.80 1.76 1 5 1,405 
Subjective wealth2 2.43 0.90 1 5 1,409 
Subjective change in wealth3 2.64 0.99 1 5 1,359 
      
Community control variables  
Population size (ln) 6.70 0.76 5.21 8.93 91 
Infrastructure (index) 0.00 1.39 -0.61 3.94 94 
Households that own land (prop.) 0.82 0.19 0.20 1.00 94 
No. of environmental shocks in the past five years 4.55 2.78 0 14 94 
No. of conflict experiences 12.48 23.64 0 180 94 
Households with IDP camp experiences (prop.) 5.31 4.41 0 19.35 94 
Ethnic heterogeneity (1 = yes) 0.85 0.36 0 1 94 
Hum. org./NGO presence (1 = yes) 0.26 0.44 0 1 94 
 
Household control variables 
Age of the household head 39.17 14.47 18 98 1,401 
Gender of the household head (1 = male) 0.43 0.49 0 1 1,410 
Marital status (1 = married) 0.77 0.42 0 1 1,410 
Educational attainment of the household head4 1.71 0.84 1 4 1,408 
Household size 5.30 2.27 1 14 1,410 
Internal displacement (IDP) experiences (1 = yes) 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,407 
First-generation return household (1 = yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1 1,410 
Second-generation return household (1 = yes) 0.05 0.22 0 1 1,410 
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Fourth, subjective wealth was measured by asking the household head to 
rate the household’s economic situation on a scale from one (we are finding it very 
difficult) to five (we are living very comfortably) and yielded an average score of 
2.43. Most of the respondents (36 per cent) chose the second answer category, 
indicating that they were having a difficult time. The fifth indicator, which referred 
to subjective changes in household wealth over the previous five years, was 
measured on a scale from 1 (became much worse) to 5 (improved a lot). The 
average score on this indicator was 2.64. Most of the respondents (39 per cent) 
indicated that their situation had worsened. 
 
7.3.3 Analyses 
The analyses are conducted in two phases. First, descriptive statistics are presented 
to explore the economic sustainability of return at the household and community 
levels in an absolute and relative manner using the five socio-economic indicators. 
Second, regression models are employed to estimate the relationship between 
return migration and the socio-economic conditions of all households (return and 
non-return) in the communities while controlling for other household and 
community variables. These control variables are presented in Table 7.3. The 
community control variables include the community’s population size, the 
availability of land in the community, availability of employment, the number of 
conflicts experienced by the community during the conflict, the number of 
environmental shocks that the community experienced over the previous five 
years, and an infrastructure index that included whether the community had 
electricity, lighting, drinking water, and facilities such as schools and health care 
facilities. This index was constructed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
(results available upon request) and yielded a unique score for each community. 
Other community control variables included the proportion of households with 
IDP camp experiences, ethnic heterogeneity and NGO presence. The household 
control variables include the age, gender, marital status and educational 
attainment of the household head along with the household size and the 
households’ IDP camp experiences. This latter variable referred to whether at least 
one household member had ever resided in an IDP camp.  
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7.4 Results: The socio-economic sustainability of return in Burundi 
 
7.4.1 Descriptive statistics: comparing households and communities 
Table 7.4 presents descriptive statistics for the return and non-return households in 
the sample. The table shows that 23 per cent and 32 per cent of the first- and 
second-generation return households, respectively, did not own land. These 
percentages are high given the importance of agricultural land in rural Burundi. 
First- and second-generation return households also regularly experienced food 
insecurity. The median score was 2 for both groups, meaning that most return 
households experienced food insecurity on a weekly basis. The median responses 
for subjective wealth and subjective change in wealth were also 2 for both groups, 
which corresponds to the answer categories ‘we are finding it difficult’ and ‘our 
living conditions became worse’. This result indicates that most return households 
experienced economic difficulties and witnessed negative changes in wealth over 
the previous years.  
Compared to non-return households, both first- and second-generation 
return households were significantly less likely to own land. Eighty-four per cent 
of non-return households owned land, versus 77 per cent and 68 per cent for first- 
and second-generation return households, respectively. Return households did not 
report lower food security. This finding may indicate that returnees continued to 
have access to agricultural land because of land-sharing practices, that returnees 
had chosen other livelihood strategies, such as business activities, herding or 
fishing, or that they were more likely to be food aid recipients than were non-
return households. However, the data show no differences in livelihood activities 
or receipt of food aid between return and non-return migrant households (results 
available upon request). 
For all other socio-economic indicators, first-generation return households 
did not differ significantly from non-return households. Second-generation return 
households scored lowest on all indicators. They were the least likely to own land 
and reported worse living conditions and lower subjective wealth compared to 
non-return households. In terms of food security and a perceived change in wealth 
over the previous years, second-generation return households did not differ 
significantly from non-return households. 
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To compare the socio-economic conditions in communities with relatively 
low and high numbers of returnees, the communities were split into four (for first-
generation returnees) and two (for second-generation returnees) equally sized 
groups. The results are presented in Table 7.5. The community comparisons show 
no significant differences between communities with relatively lower and higher 
percentages of either first- or second-generation returnees. These descriptive 
results suggest that in terms of socio-economic conditions, communities with 
higher shares of return migrants do not differ significantly from communities with 
lower shares of return migrants. 
 
7.4.2 Regression estimates 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 present the results of the regression analyses that simultaneously 
estimate a) the relationship between being either a first- or second-generation 
return household and the household’s socio-economic living conditions and b) the 
relationship between the proportions of first- and second-generation returnees in 
communities and the socio-economic conditions of all households residing in the 
communities. Table 7.6 presents the results for the proportion of first-generation 
returnees, and Table 7.7 presents the results for the proportion of second-
generation returnees. The analyses are controlled for other household and 
community variables. Tobit regressions were used to estimate the effect of return 
on land ownership, whereas Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses 
were employed for the other socio-economic indicators. Standard errors were 
clustered at the community level to control for intra-community correlations. 
The results in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 confirm the descriptive statistics in Table 
7.4 indicating that both first- and second-generation return migrant households are 
less likely to own land compared to non-return households. Controlling for all 
other household variables, such as the age and level of education of the household 
head and various community variables, return households score significantly 
lower on land ownership. In addition to being less likely to own land, the results in 
Table 7.6 confirm the results from Table 7.4 that first-generation return households 
do not differ significantly from non-return households in terms of the other socio-
economic indicators. 
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Table 7.6. Regression analyses: first-generation returnees 
Notes. Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1. The analyses are controlled for the community’s population size (ln), land availability in 
the community, employment availability in the community, the number of conflicts the community 
experienced during the conflict, the number of environmental shocks the community had experienced 
over the previous five years, the proportion of households with IDP camp experiences, an infrastructure 
index, ethnic heterogeneity, and NGO presence.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Land 
ownership 
(Tobit) 
Living 
conditions 
(OLS) 
 
Food security 
(OLS) 
 
Subjective 
wealth 
(OLS) 
 
Subjective 
wealth 
change (OLS) 
 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
     
           
Community return           
First-generation returnees 
(prop.) 
0.11 0.10 0.13 0.35 0.29 0.21 -0.33 -0.12 0.07 0.27 
 (0.32) (0.34) (1.94) (2.01) (1.18) (1.16) (0.57) (0.53) (0.68) (0.62) 
Household characteristics           
Age of household head 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00** -0.00** -
0.01*** 
-
0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender of household head 0.06* 0.06* -0.21 -0.21 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.09+ 0.12* 0.12* 
   (1 = male) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Married (1 = yes) 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.18 0.18 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.22** 0.22** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education of household 
head  
-0.00 -0.01 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household size 0.03**
* 
0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04+ 0.02* 0.03* 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
IDP camp experiences 
   (1 = yes) 
0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -
0.46*** 
-0.44** -0.10+ -0.08 -0.01 0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
First-generation return 
household 
-
0.09** 
 -0.04  -0.18  0.05  0.04  
   (1 = yes) (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
Second-generation return 
household (1 = yes) 
 -0.24**  -0.44+  -0.41+  -0.18  -0.18 
 (0.09)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
           
Constant 0.70**
* 
0.66*** -3.27** -3.36** 0.83 0.77 1.93*** 1.89*** 2.27*** 2.22*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (1.09) (1.10) (0.77) (0.77) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
           
Observations 1,353 1,353 1,353 1,353 1.348 1.348 1,352 1,352 1,231 1,231 
Number of communities 14 14 14 14 14 14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.10 
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Table 7.7. Regression analyses: second-generation returnees 
Notes. Robust standard errors (clustered at the community level) in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1. The analyses are controlled for the community’s population size (ln), land availability in 
the community, employment availability in the community, the number of conflicts the community 
experienced during the conflict, the number of environmental shocks the community had experienced 
over the previous five years, the proportion of households with IDP camp experiences, an infrastructure 
index, ethnic heterogeneity, and NGO presence.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Land 
ownership 
(Tobit) 
Living 
conditions 
(OLS) 
Food 
security 
(OLS) 
Subjective 
wealth 
(OLS) 
Subjective 
change in 
wealth (OLS) 
 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
     
Community return           
Second-generation returnees 
(prop.) 
-0.81 -0.52 -3.65+ -3.38+ -1.90 -1.55 -
2.11*** 
-
2.02*** 
-1.54* -1.38* 
 (0.64) (0.61) (1.91) (1.99) (1.93) (2.04) (0.51) (0.54) (0.64) (0.68) 
Household characteristics           
Age of household head 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00** -0.00** -
0.01*** 
-
0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender of household head 0.07** 0.06* -0.19 -0.19 0.18+ 0.17 0.09+ 0.10* 0.13* 0.13* 
   (1 = male) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Married (1 = yes) 0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.17 0.17 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.21** 0.21** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Education of household 
head  
-0.01 -0.01 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household size 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
IDP experiences 0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.09 -
0.46*** 
-0.46** -0.10+ -0.09 -0.01 0.00 
   (1 = yes) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
First-generation return 
household 
-0.06+  0.04  -0.12  0.07  0.07  
   (1 = yes) (0.04)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
Second-generation return 
household  (1 = yes) 
 -0.19**  -0.12  -0.26  -0.01  -0.04 
 (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
           
Constant 0.66*** 0.64*** -3.49** -3.51** 0.72 0.70 1.80*** 1.80*** 2.18*** 2.17*** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (1.14) (1.14) (0.80) (0.79) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) 
           
Observations 1,353 1,353 1,353 1,353 1,348 1,348 1,342 1,352 1,231 1,231 
Number of communities 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 
155 
 
Table 7.4 suggested that second-generation return households had lower 
living conditions and lower subjective wealth compared to non-return households. 
The significant relationship between being a second-generation return household 
and the household’s living conditions remained visible when controlling both for 
other household characteristics and for the community control variables. However, 
when the proportion of second-generation returnees in the community was added 
to the model, the significance of the estimate disappeared (see Table 7.7, column 4). 
This finding suggests that second-generation returnees did not necessarily have 
lower living conditions than non-return households. Instead, it seems that the 
proportion of second-generation returnees in the community is related to the living 
conditions of all households residing in the community, including those of second-
generation return households. When controlling for household and community 
characteristics, second-generation returnees no longer scored significantly lower on 
subjective wealth, which was instead associated with other household 
characteristics, such as the age, gender, marital status, and education of the 
household head, the household size, and, to a lesser extent, IDP camp experiences 
of the household. Table 7.7 confirms the results from Table 7.4 that second-
generation return migrant households did not experience different changes in 
wealth in previous years.  
Return migration at the community level showed varying relations to the 
socio-economic conditions of households residing in the communities. The 
proportion of first-generation returnees in the community was not significantly 
related to any of the socio-economic indicators (see Table 7.6). The return of 
second-generation returnees, however, showed significant relationships with some 
of the socio-economic indicators. Table 7.7 shows that in communities with higher 
proportions of second-generation returnees, households had significantly lower 
living conditions (column 4) and subjective wealth (column 8) and reported a more 
negative change in wealth in previous years (column 10). The proportion of 
second-generation returnees was not significantly associated with food security 
and land ownership.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In the past decade, Burundi has received more than a half-million former refugees. 
In a context of poverty, population pressure and land scarcity, most returnees 
moved to their origin communities, some after spending more than 30 years 
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abroad. Some were second-generation returnees, the children of former refugees 
who were born in exile. Although the majority of returnees were repatriated 
successfully, questions have been raised concerning the sustainability of their 
return. Due to the size of the return movement, the short time period in which it 
took place and the concentration of return in certain areas, it is feared that the 
return of former refugees will destabilise Burundi’s transition to peace. This paper 
explored the socio-economic sustainability of return migration to Burundi based on 
household and community survey data collected in 2011. This paper opted for a 
wider view of sustainability, following Black and Gent (2006) and incorporating 
both household comparisons and an analysis of the relationship between return 
migration and the socio-economic conditions of all households in communities of 
return. By doing so, this paper aimed to go beyond household comparisons and 
one-dimensional measurements that have often been used in studies on 
reintegration or the sustainability of return in conflict-affected contexts. 
The analyses revealed that from both a household and a community 
perspective, the socio-economic sustainability of return in Burundi is questionable. 
Using absolute standards, it is clear that return households are struggling. Land 
ownership among first- and particularly second-generation return households was 
low. Most such households experienced food security on a weekly basis and 
reported low subjective wealth. Most return households also reported a decline in 
their wealth over the previous years. Relative to non-return households, both first- 
and second-generation return households were less likely to own land. These 
findings contradict other studies in Burundi that did not find significant 
differences between returnees and non-returnees (see, e.g., Terra-P Group, 2008). 
Previous studies were small-scale and often conducted in a single location or in a 
few locations, which may explain these different findings.  
Communities also seemed to be affected by return migration. In 
communities with higher proportions of second-generation returnees, food 
insecurity for both return and non-return households was higher, on average. This 
finding corroborates with the findings of Fransen and Kuschminder (2012), who 
found that population increases due to large-scale return led to food shortages in 
high return communities. In communities with higher proportions of second-
generation returnees, all households had lower living conditions and reported both 
lower subjective wealth and a more negative change in wealth in previous years. 
From both an objective and a subjective perspective, households that resided in 
157 
 
communities with more second-generation returnees were thus worse off than 
households residing in other communities. This finding corresponds to previous 
findings that second-generation returnees face more challenges upon return 
(Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012).  
The purpose of this paper was to show relationships between return 
migration in rural Burundi and the socio-economic conditions of households and 
communities. In estimating the relationship between return migration and the 
socio-economic conditions of households residing in the communities, return 
migration is assumed to be exogenous from these socio-economic conditions. 
However, there may be a selection at play: returnees may have chosen to settle in 
areas based on area characteristics such as land availability or living conditions. If 
this is the case, any positive relationship that is found between return migration 
and the dependent variables may be due to this selection regarding the 
communities of return. This is unlikely, however, due to the fact that most 
returnees were repatriated to their communities of origin (Hovil, 2009). The data 
show that approximately 85 per cent of first-generation returnees returned to their 
original provinces. Although this information was not available for second-
generation returnees, most second-generation returnees resided in a household 
with first-generation returnees, which indicates that the majority of second-
generation returnees also settled in communities of their families’ origin.  
It is not possible to rule out the possibility that a significant share of 
second-generation returnees chose a different community in which to settle. 
Second-generation returnees experienced more problems retrieving their family 
land (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012), which may have incentivised some of them 
to migrate further. If a bias regarding the community of return exists, one would, 
however, expect to find a positive relationship between return migration and the 
socio-economic conditions of households because return migration is expected to 
be higher in communities where socio-economic conditions are better. Any 
negative relationship between these variables is therefore likely to underestimate 
the true relationship. 
Overall, the results indicate that although most returnees have been 
repatriated successfully to their home country, many of them live in poor socio-
economic conditions and are worse off than households that did not experience 
forced international migration. The issue of property restitution, which in this case 
mainly concerns agricultural land, comes forward as a central issue driving these 
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poor socio-economic conditions. The Arusha Agreements stated that everyone 
affected by the conflict would be entitled to property restitution and would be 
compensated for their losses (Republic of Burundi, 2000). These objectives 
incentivised many refugees, including those from the 1972 cohort, to return. These 
objectives could not be reached. The unequal distribution of land raises concern 
because of the importance of land for livelihoods in rural Burundi and the 
emotional ties felt by many people to their ancestral land (Rema Ministries, 2012). 
Other studies in Burundi have shown that inequity in terms of land ownership has 
led to disputes (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012).  
The findings validate the use of a wider approach to studying the 
sustainability of return. At different levels of analysis and across different socio-
economic indicators, different challenges were highlighted for return versus non-
return households. Sustainability is therefore best measured at the household and 
community levels simultaneously using a multi-dimensional approach that 
incorporates both objective and subjective indicators. The finding that the return of 
second-generation returnees had a particularly negative effect on socio-economic 
conditions in communities indicates that returnees are not a homogenous group. 
Second-generation returnees face particular challenges upon return, but are an 
understudied group in the literature on return and reintegration and therefore 
warrant future research attention. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 8: A return-related crisis? Refugee return 
and security 
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8.1 Introduction 
The return of former refugees to conflict-affected areas is often considered a threat 
to peace, especially when return flows are large. Countries recovering from conflict 
are frequently politically unstable and impoverished, offering few opportunities 
for returnees to re-establish their livelihoods (Chimni, 2002; Crisp, 2000). In the 
absence of resources and favourable conditions in areas of return, a rapid 
population increase resulting from return flows may lead to increased competition 
over scarce resources such as land and lower living standards for all households 
(see, e.g., Hammond, 1999). The relationship between refugee return and 
increasing land scarcity has been observed in various contexts, such as Sudan 
(Pantuliano, 2009), Rwanda (Musahara & Huggins, 2005), and Mozambique 
(Unruh, 1998). When the return of refugees leads to scarcity, community relations 
may be unsettled, leading to a vicious cycle of conflict and forced migration (Crisp, 
2000).  
These ideas are consistent with neo-Malthusian views that a rapid 
population increase will lead to scarcity of renewable natural resources, such as 
agricultural land and natural water sources, which may in turn instigate violence 
(Homer-Dixon, 2010). Such an outcome is more likely to occur in countries that are 
more dependent on natural resources and that have a lower capacity to address 
natural resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 2010). With damaged institutional 
capacity, conflict-affected states that experience a rapid population increase are 
therefore more likely to be affected by conflict (again). Various studies have been 
conducted to examine the linkages between population pressure, land scarcity and 
conflict (Andre & Platteau, 1998; Urdal, 2005; Verpoorten, 2012), but few have 
addressed population increases resulting from large-scale migration. An exception 
is Urdal (2005), who used a cross-country design to study whether armed conflict 
was more likely to occur in countries with large refugee populations. The author 
found no effect but used an absolute and crude measurement of a refugee 
population, defining it as large when it consisted of more than 100,000 individuals. 
Thus, there is little empirical evidence of a potential destabilizing effect of 
population increases as a result of migration, especially at sub-national level.  
This paper tests the neo-Malthusian hypothesis in the context of refugee 
return in conflict-affected Burundi, a small and densely populated country in the 
African Great Lakes region. After decades of civil conflict, nearly 600,000 formally 
registered former refugees returned to Burundi between 2002 and 2014 (UNHCR, 
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2014c). Most of them returned to their origin communities in southern and 
northern Burundi, increasing the population sizes of some communities by 50 per 
cent (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). Because of the size of the return flow, its 
concentration in certain areas, the short time period in which it occurred, and 
existing problems of land shortage and population density, return is feared to 
destabilize Burundi’s transition to peace (Hovil, 2009). Others, however, contend 
that land-related problems have been too strongly ascribed to return migration and 
that the structural nature of poverty and land scarcity are underestimated 
(Huggins, 2007; Van Leeuwen, 2010). Van Leeuwen (2010) concluded that a 
significant group of returnees did not face conflict over land and that land disputes 
are therefore not a direct cause of return migration.  
This study investigates the extent to which refugee return to Burundi has 
led to more thefts and disputes and less security based on nationally representative 
household and community data. The data were collected in 2011, approximately 
five years after the official end of conflict in the country and after the bulk of 
refugees had returned (UNHCR, 2014c). A total of 1,500 households throughout 
100 communities were interviewed on their migration history and current well-
being in an effort to conduct a subnational comparative study on the effects of 
refugee return. Whereas most studies that have investigated the relationship 
between population growth and conflict have concentrated on the outbreaks of 
civil conflict as outcome variables (Koubi, Spilker, Böhmelt, & Bernauer, 2014), this 
study focuses on issues such as land disputes and thefts and overall security levels 
in areas of return. These variables have been identified as factors underlying past 
conflicts in Burundi (see, e.g., Kamungi, Oketch, & Huggins, 2005) and are 
therefore considered risk factors for future conflict. This study also presents 
preliminary findings on how the effects of return may change over time by 
studying the return of different cohorts of returnees. An instrumental variable (IV) 
approach is applied to control for potential endogeneity in the relationship 
between return migration and security. By investigating the effects of large-scale 
refugee return on thefts, disputes and security in Burundi, this study aims to 
contribute to the literature on the relationship between population growth and 
conflict using unique data from a conflict-affected setting. 
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8.2 Migration, land scarcity and conflict 
Neo-Malthusian ideas arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see, e.g., Urdal, 2005, 
for an overview). Observing rapid population increases across the world, neo-
Malthusianists feared that resources would deplete, leading to poverty and 
ultimately resulting in violence. Neo-Malthusian ideas originated from Malthus’ 
hypothesis from the 19th century that stated that arithmetically growing food 
production could not maintain pace with exponential population growth, which 
would result in food shortages, disease, or conflict.  
Neo-Malthusians predicted that scarcity of natural resources could cause 
certain ‘social effects’, including economic downfall, out-migration and social 
tensions (Homer-Dixon, 2010). These social effects, either individually or 
combined, may generate conflict. The social effects of resource scarcity are most 
likely to lead to internal civil or ethnic conflicts rather than inter-state conflicts 
because of their local character (Homer-Dixon, 2010). Compared with Malthusians, 
neo-Malthusians thus focus on local dynamics in the role of population growth 
regarding resource scarcity and conflict (Verpoorten, 2012). Different forms of 
scarcity have been distinguished, including demand-induced, supply-induced, and 
structural scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Demand-induced scarcity is caused by 
population growth in combination with a constant resource base, such as the 
availability of agricultural land. Supply-induced scarcity is the result of resource 
degradation, as in the case of land degradation, and structural scarcity results from 
unequal access to resources within a society.  
Neo-Malthusian ideas have been tested across various contexts using 
different research designs. Early work primarily relied on qualitative analyses, 
with in-depth examinations of single-country case studies (see, e.g., Andre & 
Platteau, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994, 2010), and these studies generally found 
support for the neo-Malthusian hypothesis (Koubi et al., 2014). These studies were, 
however, criticized for their methodological shortcomings and lack of 
generalizability. More recent studies have applied quantitative methods using 
either cross-national (see, e.g., Urdal, 2005) or subnational (see, e.g., Bundervoet, 
2009; Verpoorten, 2012) perspectives. Quantitative studies have largely yielded 
mixed results, perhaps because of the large variety in the type of scarcity that is 
addressed, the way that conflict is measured, the level of analysis that is adopted, 
and the region of focus (Koubi et al., 2014). Quantitative studies are also criticized 
for not properly addressing potential endogeneity problems in the relationship 
164 
 
between scarcity and conflict and for not considering the role of context in the 
relationship between scarcity and conflict (Theisen, 2008). Empirical evidence on 
the linkages between resource scarcity and conflict at subnational levels is 
especially scarce (Koubi et al., 2014; Verpoorten, 2012).  
Migration was considered a potential outcome of resource scarcity by 
Homer-Dixon (2010), who claimed that resource scarcity would hamper economic 
development and incentivize people to migrate to areas with better economic 
opportunities. It is argued in this study that migration can also cause resource 
scarcity by rapidly increasing population pressure. Countries that experience 
substantial conflict often generate large forced migration flows, which can lead to 
large population increases in receiving areas. After conflict, many of those who fled 
return, leading to large population increases in home countries, typically in the 
areas that were affected by conflict. Notorious examples are the return movement 
to Afghanistan after 2002, which involved approximately 5.7 million Afghans 
(approximately 25 per cent of Afghanistan’s population) (UNHCR, 2014b), and the 
return of approximately 700,000 and 2 million Rwandans following the 1994 
genocide and in the late 1990s, respectively (Bruce, 2007). 
  Large-scale return migration may lead to two types of scarcity. First, it may 
generate demand-induced scarcity of natural resources, which originates from a 
rapid population increase while resources remain fairly constant. If this scarcity 
arises, resources must be shared with more people, competition over resources will 
increase, and social tensions may arise. Second, large-scale return may lead to 
structural natural resource scarcity. This scarcity arises when returnees have less 
access to resources than other households do. Research has shown that returnees 
frequently lack (access to) important assets such as land and housing. That 
challenges faced by (primarily) rural returnees who are unable to (re-)gain land are 
well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Bruce, 2007; Özerdem & Sofizada, 2006; 
Pantuliano, 2009; Unruh, 1998, 2009). Such challenges are especially likely when 
former refugees have spent long periods abroad and have therefore lost property 
rights. In fact, land disputes between former displaced and non-displaced 
populations have been argued to lie at the heart of renewed social tensions in many 
conflict-affected societies (Unruh, 2003).  
The extent to which migration flows affect resources in destination areas 
depends on the scale of migration, the extent to which migration is concentrated in 
certain areas, and the time period over which migration occurs (Urdal, 2005). 
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Population movements that are large relative to local populations, are concentrated 
in certain areas, and occur quickly are more likely to increase resource scarcity, 
potentially creating conflict. As will be described in the following sections, all of 
these conditions were present in the Burundi case. The time that a refugee spends 
in exile also has a significant effect on return experiences (Rogge, 1994). Some 
returnees in Burundi spent 30 or 40 years abroad and consequently experienced 
problems regarding property restitution. Refugee reintegration, defined by 
UNHCR as ‘the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between 
returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to services, 
productive assets and opportunities’ (UNHCR, 1997, p. 7), can take as many as 10 
or 15 years, especially when former refugees have spent long periods abroad 
(Rogge, 1994). These time dimensions should therefore be considered when 
studying large-scale return migration.  
 
8.3 Conflict and refugee return in Burundi 
Refugees fled Burundi during waves of political instability and conflict that largely 
emerged after the country’s independence in 1962. Most refugees fled the country 
in 1972 and 1993: approximately 300,000 and 700,000, respectively. These groups 
are now referred to as ‘1972 caseload’ and ‘1993 caseload’ refugees. Approximately 
two-thirds of the 1972 refugees fled to neighbouring Tanzania, where they 
inhabited refugee sites that were eventually named ‘the Old Settlements’. 1993 
refugees primarily settled in refugee camps in north-west Tanzania (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). An unknown number of refugees moved to communities in 
border areas and to Tanzania’s capital, Dar Es Salaam (Sommers, 2001). Other 1972 
and 1993 refugees fled to Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
and a small number reached Europe, the USA and Canada. 
Voluntary return movements to Burundi began in 2000 after the signing of 
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements. Official repatriation activities, 
facilitated by UNHCR in a joint initiative with the Burundian and Tanzanian 
government, commenced in 2002. In 2006, UNHCR changed its repatriation 
strategy from ‘facilitation of return’ to ‘promotion of return’. The promotion of 
return consisted of return promotion campaigns targeted at 1972 refugees who 
were reluctant to return. These promotion campaigns led to a large increase in the 
number of returns of largely 1972 caseload returnees in 2008. In total, 
approximately 490,000 returnees were repatriated from Tanzania between 2002 and 
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2011. Slightly fewer than 15,000 came from DRC, and nearly 8,000 came from 
Rwanda.20 In 2011, Tanzania still hosted a ‘residual’ of 37,000 out of more than 
84,000 Burundian international refugees (UNHCR, 2011). Nearly 90 per cent of 
repatriates between 2002 and 2011 had fled the country in the 1990s. Of the 1972 
caseload refugees, approximately 50,000 returned. Many of the 1972 caseload 
refugees that had settled in the Old Settlements opted for naturalization in 
Tanzania, which was finally granted to them in October 2014.  
Returnees and other conflict-affected people had been promised 
compensation for the losses that they had suffered during the war. Restitution of 
land, housing and other durables was specifically mentioned in the Arusha 
Agreements, which incentivized many former refugees to return (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). Most Burundians strongly desired to return to their family 
land and were reluctant to settle elsewhere (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Hovil, 
2009). As Hovil (2009, p. 30) stated, ‘Those who are returning from exile after 
decades of alienation, are searching for continuity with their past, which is most 
tangible through physically returning to the land from which they fled, and on 
which their ancestors lived’. Land is inherited from father to son in Burundi and 
therefore has high emotional value (Bunte & Monnier, 2011; Rema Ministries, 
2012). Agricultural land is also the most important household asset in rural areas, 
where households largely rely on subsistence farming to fulfil basic needs. 
UNHCR and other international organizations facilitated the return of former 
refugees to their origin communities by providing logistics.  
Property restitution, however, appeared to be one of the major challenges 
for conflict-affected Burundi, especially concerning land. Because of the scarcity of 
agricultural land in rural areas, plots of land were often redistributed while 
refugees were abroad. Upon arrival in their origin communities, returnees 
frequently found their agricultural land occupied by others or sold by family 
members (Hovil, 2009). Restitution of land was especially a problem for the 1972 
refugee cohort and second-generation returnees. Burundi’s 1986 land law stated 
that those who reside on land or other property for a consecutive period of 30 years 
gain legal tenure of the property (Bunte & Monnier, 2011). Therefore, returnees 
who had spent more than 30 years abroad as well as second-generation returnees – 
                                                 
20 These numbers represent only returnees who were registered by UNHCR and are therefore likely to 
be an underestimate of the actual return flow. 
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the children of former refugees who were born abroad – were no longer entitled to 
reclaim their land.  
The government’s official position with respect to land disputes is that 
returnees and non-returnees should share land (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). If a 
dispute cannot be settled within a community, then the returnee can adhere to the 
Commission Terres et Autres Biens (CNTB), which was established in 2006 to 
address land and other property-related conflicts through mediation. In 2011, 70 
per cent of the cases at CNTB were filed by returnees, and 80 per cent of these 
claims concerned land (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). However, the CNTB 
decision is not legally binding. As a last resort, returnees can make a claim at the 
national court of Burundi, but this process is lengthy and expensive, and court 
cases can be filed only in the capital. Because of these challenges, most land 
disputes have not yet been resolved. In practice, land sharing is the most 
commonly applied solution, but it frequently leads to resentment, and most people 
view it as a temporary solution (Hovil, 2009). In many cases, the agricultural 
production from a plot of land is insufficient to feed multiple families (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012).  
Return migration to Burundi therefore appears to have generated both 
structural and demand-induced scarcity of agricultural land by creating differences 
between returnees and non-returnees in terms of land ownership and by reducing 
food security in areas of high return due to a lack of land. Some studies have 
indicated that disputes over land have increased as a result of return migration and 
have led to occasional violence (see, e.g., Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema 
Ministries, 2012). These studies have occurred in areas with high return rates and 
have been focused on specific groups of returnees. Fransen and Kuschminder 
(2012), for example, conducted their fieldwork in high-return communities in 
Southern Burundi and examined the return experiences of 1972 caseload returnees. 
The data that were used for this study offer a unique opportunity to study the 
effects of return on security on a national scale. These data will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
8.4 Data and analyses 
Survey data were collected from 1,500 households residing in 100 communities 
across all 17 Burundian provinces. The data collection was part of the Migration 
and Development: A World in Motion project. Within each sous-colline (‘sub-hill’), 
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which is the smallest administrative unit in the country, 15 household heads and 
one community representative were interviewed using a standardized 
questionnaire (Fransen, 2012). Urban households (n = 90) were eliminated from the 
analyses to create a more homogeneous sample in terms of households’ migration 
experiences. In rural areas, migration has largely been conflict related, whereas 
urban areas are characterized by more diverse migration dynamics, including 
migration to Europe and North America for educational or employment 
opportunities. Eliminating urban households yielded a sample of 1,410 households 
residing in 94 communities. The average household size in rural areas was 5.30. 
The total number of individuals in the rural data was 7,477. 
A first-generation return migrant was defined as a former international 
migrant who was born in Burundi and had lived abroad for a consecutive period 
of at least 3 months. Of the 7,477 rural household members, 447 individuals (5.99 
per cent) were first-generation returnees. Another set of 190 individuals (2.54 per 
cent) in the data was identified as second-generation returnees – the children of 
former refugees who were born abroad. This latter term was derived from the 
literature on this returnee type (see, e.g., Christou, 2006; King & Christou, 2010; 
Wessendorf, 2007). At the time of the survey, 73 per cent of the second-generation 
returnees lived with first-generation returnees, who were their parents or 
grandparents in 97 per cent of the cases. First-generation returnees were generally 
older, more likely to be married, better educated, and more likely to be literate than 
non-returnees (see Table 7.2 in Chapter 7). Educational systems in Tanzania were 
generally better than those in Burundi during the conflict (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012), which may explain the difference in educational levels. 
Employment rates were also higher among first-generation returnees.  
On average, communities consisted of almost 9 per cent returnees. The 
median was 3 per cent per community. The highest proportions of return migrants 
were found in communities in the southern provinces of Rutana, Makamba, and 
Ruyigi, bordering Tanzania. In these provinces, some communities were 40 – 60 
per cent returnees. The lowest proportions of return migrants were found in 
Mwaro and Muramvya provinces in the interior of the country, where some 
communities did not have any international returnees. Of all 94 rural communities, 
15 communities (16 per cent) did not have any returnees. The proportions of first- 
and second-generation returnees in the communities were highly correlated (r = 
0.54, p < 0.001). For this reason, in the analyses presented in the following sections, 
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the proportion of first-generation returnees and the proportion of total returnees 
(first- and second-generation returnees) are the main explanatory variables.  
 
8.4.1 Measuring land disputes, thefts and security 
The analyses were conducted in two steps. First, the effect of return migration on 
thefts, disputes and security was studied by exploring whether more problems 
were reported in communities with higher proportions of returnees. Data on thefts, 
disputes and security were gathered at the community and household levels. Two 
indicators were derived from the community questionnaire, which was conducted 
with a community representative: 1) whether the community experienced 
problems of land disputes at the time of the survey (yes/no) and 2) a subjective 
assessment of the security level in the community, measured on a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). Of the 94 rural communities, 40 per 
cent (n = 38) reported problems with land disputes, and the communities’ average 
score was 3.12 (SD = 0.67) on the security scale. One indicator was derived from the 
household questionnaire: the number of thefts or destruction of crops, livestock 
and agricultural tools that households had experienced in the previous five years. 
The average score for all households was 0.57 (SD = 1.53). 
 Second, the analyses in step 1 were replicated by using different cohorts of 
first-generation returnees (those who returned before 2000, those who returned 
between 2000 and 2005, and those who returned between 2005 and 2011) and by 
controlling for the effect of the time that the returnees spent abroad. Information 
on the year of return and the time spent in exile were collected from one randomly 
selected first-generation returnee in each household who was interviewed in depth 
about his or her migration experience. In total, 241 first-generation returnees were 
interviewed in rural areas. This information therefore serves as a proxy for the 
effects of the return period and the time that first-generation returnees spent 
abroad. These analyses do not address second-generation returnees and should be 
treated as preliminary research because of the small sample size. However, the 
analyses will provide some important insights into the ways in which the effect of 
return migration may change over time.  
Nearly 53 per cent (n = 133) of the returnees returned before 2000, 14 per 
cent (n = 36) returned between 2000 and 2005, and almost 33 per cent (n = 82) 
returned after 2005. Because of the small sample sizes in each of these groups, a 
community was assigned a value of ‘1’ if it had received returnees in these time 
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periods.21 On average, the first-generation returnees had spent 5.75 years abroad 
(SD = 7.35), with a minimum of three months and a maximum of 36 years. The 
median time spent abroad was two years. This individual information was 
aggregated to the community level by calculating a mean and a median time spent 
abroad for all first-generation returnees in the community.  
 
8.4.2 Potential biases 
In estimating the effect of return migration on the dependent variables, we assume 
that return migration to the communities was exogenous. However, several biases 
may be at play. First, there may be a selection bias concerning the communities of 
return. Returnees may have chosen to settle in areas based on area characteristics 
such as the availability of agricultural land. In Burundi, however, such a choice is 
unlikely because most returnees were repatriated to their origin communities 
because of their emotional attachment to their ancestors’ land (Hovil, 2009). The 
survey data show that approximately 85 per cent of first-generation returnees 
returned to their provinces of origin. This information is not available for second-
generation returnees. The previous section has shown that 73 per cent of second-
generation returnees resided in a household with first-generation returnees. This 
finding indicates that the majority of second-generation returnees also settled in 
communities of their families’ origin. It is, however, not possible to eliminate the 
possibility that a significant share of second-generation returnees chose a different 
community to settle in or decided to migrate further after not being able to retrieve 
family land in the origin community.  
Second, self-selection might be involved in the return decisions of 
returnees. For instance, of all Burundians living abroad, only those who were 
confident that they would be able to retrieve their house and family land returned. 
As described, the Arusha Agreements stated that everyone affected by the conflict 
would be compensated for their losses and would be entitled to property 
restitution (Republic of Burundi, 2000), which incentivized many refugees to 
return (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). There are no official data on the 
characteristics of those who returned versus those who decided to stay in 
Tanzania, but a study funded by the International Refugee Rights Initiative (Hovil 
& Kweka, 2008) showed that 1972 refugees who expected to reclaim their land 
upon return to Burundi showed a preference to return. Because the survey was 
                                                 
21 Communities without returnees were excluded from these analyses. 
171 
 
conducted in Burundi, we do not have information on those who did not return. If 
there is self-selection bias in the decision to return, significant findings with respect 
to return migration might be related to the specific characteristics of returnees who 
differ from community members in the return communities instead of a population 
increase.  
Because it is not possible to eliminate the possibility of endogeneity 
between return migration and the dependent variables, an IV approach using the 
two-stage least-squares (2SLS) technique was used as a robustness check. The IV 
approach is a quasi-experimental method in which the independent variable of 
interest is instrumented for by another variable that is relevant (correlated with the 
main independent variable) and exogenous (only related to the dependent variable 
via the dependent variable). In this study, the proportion of return migrants in a 
community was instrumented for by the distance of each community to the closest 
border (in km). As described in Section 8.3, most returnees resided in areas 
bordering Tanzania because individuals residing in communities that were closer 
to the border were more likely to cross international borders in times of conflict. 
Communities that generated more refugees were also more likely to receive 
returnees after the conflict ended. In contrast, people were more likely to become 
internally displaced during conflict in areas that were farther from the border. On 
average, communities were located 21 kilometres from the closest border, with a 
minimum of 3 kilometres and a maximum of 67 kilometres.  
A valid instrument should have two key characteristics. First, the 
instrument should be relevant, meaning that it is significantly and directly related 
to the dependent variable. Correlations between the proportions of first-generation 
and total returnees in the communities and the instrument are -0.35 (p < 0.001) and 
-0.26 (p = 0.01), respectively. Thus, the distance to the border is lower for 
communities that host more returnees. The correlation between the proportion of 
first-generation returnees and the dependent variable is higher than the correlation 
between the combined sample and the dependent variable. This finding suggests 
that second-generation returnees may have been less likely to settle in their origin 
communities or may have migrated further after their return. Nevertheless, the 
correlations show that the distance to the closest border is significantly related to 
return migration. Second, the instrument should be exogenous, meaning that it is 
not affected by the dependent variable. Validity is clearly demonstrated, as the 
distance from the border cannot be affected by return migration.  
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8.4.3 Control variables 
Community control variables included the community’s population size, the 
proportion of households that owned land, employment availability, the number of 
environmental shocks that the community had experienced in the past five years, 
the number of conflict experiences of the community during the past conflict 
period, the proportion of households in which at least one household member had 
IDP camp experiences, ethnic heterogeneity, and the presence of an NGO or 
humanitarian organization in the community. Finally, an infrastructure index 
included whether the community had electricity, lighting, drinking water, and 
facilities such as schools and health care facilities. This index was constructed using 
principal component analysis (PCA) (results are available upon request) and 
yielded a unique score for each community. Household control variables 
comprised the age, gender, marital status, and educational attainment of the 
household head; the household’s land ownership; living conditions; and household 
size. The living conditions variable was constructed using PCA and was composed 
of the type of water, toilet, and cooking fuel that the household used, as well as 
housing characteristics (results are available upon request). The analyses also 
controlled for whether one of the household members had ever been in a 
displacement camp. Descriptive statistics on the control variables are presented in 
Table 8.1. 
 
8.5 Results 
The results are presented in three phases. First, the relationships between return 
migration on the one hand and land disputes and security in the community on the 
other hand are studied. All of these analyses were conducted at the community 
level. Second, the effects of return migration on the households’ experiences of 
thefts are explored. Third, to study how the effects of return may have changed 
over time, the estimates for phases 1 and 2 are replicated using different cohorts of 
first-generation returnees: a) those who returned before 2000, b) those who 
returned between 2000 and 2005, and c) those who returned after 2005.  
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Table 8.1. Main variables: descriptive statistics 
Notes.1from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good), 2from 1 (no education) to 4 (bachelor or higher). 
 
8.5.1 Return migration, land disputes and security 
Table 8.2 shows the results of the community analyses. First, land disputes do not 
appear to be related to the proportions of first-generation and total returnees in the 
communities. Both the logit and IV tobit estimates are insignificant, indicating that 
land disputes were not more common in communities with relatively more 
returnees. The inclusion of a squared term of return migration does not reveal any 
significant findings regarding return migration and land disputes, which indicates 
that there is no non-linear relationship (results are available upon request). 
 M SD Min. Max. N 
   
 
Conflict indicators
Number of thefts experienced in the previous five years 0.23 0.87 0 12 1,401 
Problems of land disputes (1 = yes) 0.61 0.49 0 1 94 
Security level1 3.12 0.67 1 5 94 
      
Community characteristics      
First-generation returnees (prop.) 0.06 0.08 0 0.43 94 
Second-generation returnees (prop.) 0.03 0.06 0 0.33 94 
Total returnees (prop.) 0.09 0.12 0 0.60 94 
Population size (ln) 6.70 0.76 5.21 8.93 91 
Infrastructure (index) 0.00 1.39 -0.61 3.94 94 
Households that own land (prop.) 0.82 0.19 0.20 1.00 94 
No. of environmental shocks in the past five years 4.55 2.78 0 14 94 
No. of conflict experiences 12.48 23.64 0 180 94 
Households with IDP camp experiences (prop.) 5.31 4.41 0 19.35 94 
Ethnic heterogeneity (1 = yes) 0.85 0.36 0 1 94 
Hum. org./NGO presence (1 = yes) 0.26 0.44 0 1 94 
   
Instrument at community level   
Distance from the closest border (in km) 28.07 18.39 2.62 66.60 94 
      
Household (head) characteristics 
Age  39.17 14.47 18 98 1,401 
Gender (1 = male) 0.43 0.49 0 1 1,410 
Marital status (1 = married) 0.77 0.42 0 1 1,410 
Educational attainment2 1.71 0.84 1 4 1,408 
Living conditions (index) 0.00 1.94 -1.23 12.51 1,409 
Land ownership (1 = yes) 0.82 0.38 0 1 1,410 
Displacement camp experiences (1 = yes) 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,407 
Return migrant (1 = yes)  0.19 0.39 0 1 1,410 
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Land disputes were, however, significantly more common in communities 
with higher population sizes and in communities with more land-owning 
households. These findings provide support for the neo-Malthusian hypothesis 
regarding the linkages between population pressure and disputes. Land disputes 
were also more common in communities in which an NGO or a humanitarian 
organization was present. This situation is likely to be a matter of reverse causality 
in the sense that NGOs or humanitarian organizations are more likely to work in 
more problematic areas. Because the type of activities of NGOs in the communities 
were not analysed in this paper, it is not possible to derive conclusions from these 
findings. Security seemed better in communities in which an NGO or 
humanitarian organization was present. Whether the work of NGOs or 
humanitarian organizations leads to better security or whether such organizations 
are more likely to work in areas with better security does not become clear from 
these findings and should be explored by future research. 
Based on the OLS estimates, return migration seems to be associated with 
security in the communities, although the relationship does not run in the expected 
direction. Security was, on average, better in communities with higher proportions 
of first-generation and total returnees. However, when controlling for other 
community variables, the relationship between the total proportion of returnees 
and security in the communities became insignificant. Based on the IV estimations, 
which control for potential endogeneity in the relationship between return 
migration and security, the effects became insignificant for both the first-
generation and total returnees. The instrument seems to work well for the 
proportion of first-generation returnees but less well for the proportion of total 
returnees in the community. F statistics for the significance of the instrument in the 
first-stage regressions are 17.62 for the proportion of first-generation returnees and 
6.23 for the proportion of total returnees in the community. The general rule is that 
F-statistics under 10 signify weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The 
Durbin (1954) and Wu-Hausman (Wu, 1974; Hausman, 1978) tests showed 
insignificant results for all estimates (results are available upon request), indicating 
that there are no significant differences between the OLS and IV estimations. 
Overall, the analyses do not provide convincing evidence that return migration has 
led to less security in communities. Instead, security seems to be strongly, 
positively associated with the availability of employment in the communities.  
 
176 
 
8.5.2 Return migration and households’ theft experiences 
Table 8.3 shows the estimates for the number of thefts or destruction of crops, 
livestock and agricultural tools that households experienced in the previous five 
years. The results show that the proportion of returnees in the community is not 
significantly related to the dependent variable. In both the OLS and 2SLS estimates, 
the proportions of first-generation returnees in the community are insignificant. 
The proportion of total returnees shows a significant but weak, negative effect on 
the number of thefts, but the effect disappears when controlling for endogeneity. F 
statistics show that the distance to the border is a strong instrument for both the 
proportions of first-generation and total returnees in these analyses, with F-
statistics of 29.31 and 12.81, respectively. The Durbin (Durbin, 1954) and Wu-
Hausman (Hausman, 1978; Wu, 1974) tests again show insignificant results for all 
estimates (results are available upon request), indicating that there are no 
significant differences between the OLS and IV estimations. The inclusion of a 
squared term did not reveal any signs of a non-linear relationship between return 
migration and the dependent variable (results are available upon request). 
Overall, the analyses in Table 8.3 do not yield any evidence that return 
migration is related to households’ experiences of thefts or destruction in the 
previous five years. The infrastructure in the communities seems to be significantly 
related to the dependent variable. In communities with more infrastructure 
available, households experienced fewer thefts and less destruction of agriculture-
related items. As described, the infrastructure index included whether the 
community had electricity, lighting, drinking water, and facilities such as schools 
and health care facilities. The presence of employment and ethnic homogeneity in 
the community also showed significant relationships with the dependent variable, 
but the results were weak.  
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Table 8.3. Return and households’ thefts of crops, livestock and agricultural tools  
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
community level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Household control variables were 
included in all analyses.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 (OLS) (OLS) (2sls) (OLS) (OLS) (2sls) 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
Est. 
(SE) 
   
       
First-gen. returnees -0.05 -0.05 0.01    
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    
Total returnees    -0.04+ -0.05+ 0.01 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Population size (ln) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Infrastructure -0.04*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land ownership 0.19+ 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.16 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Employment avail. 0.13* 0.10+ 0.08 0.13* 0.10+ 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of env. shocks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of conflicts -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDPs in the comm. -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic homog. (1 = yes) 0.08* 0.01 0.02 0.09* 0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
NGO presence (1 = yes) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Intercept -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 
 (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) 
       
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
No. of hhs/comm. 1,346/94 1,346/94 1,346/94 1,346/94 1,346/94 1,346/94 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Distance to the border   -0.04***   -0.04*** 
Partial R2 first stage   0.24   0.14 
F-test   29.31***   12.81*** 
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8.5.3 Return cohorts and time spent abroad 
In the previous analyses, former refugees who had returned to Burundi were 
treated as a homogenous group in the analyses. However, as Section 3 has 
described, returnees arrived in Burundi at different times and spent different 
periods abroad. It can be expected that the effects of return migration on the 
communities differ depending on when returnees returned. In addition, studies 
have shown that the longer a refugee has spent in exile, the more difficult his or 
her reintegration will be (Rogge, 1994). The analyses of Tables 8.2 and 8.3 were 
therefore replicated by using different cohorts of first-generation returnees (those 
who returned before 2000, those who returned between 2000 and 2005, and those 
who returned between 2005 and 2011) and by controlling for the effect of their time 
spent abroad.  
 The results are presented in Table 8.4. In this table, each coefficient was 
derived from a different estimation. The effects of the period of return and the time 
spent abroad on the households’ experiences of thefts or destruction of crops, 
livestock or agricultural tools community land disputes are insignificant. 
Communities that received returnees after 2005, however, reported significantly 
lower security, although this effect was weak. This finding may be an indication 
that return migration generated short-term problems that faded over time. More 
recent returns may have led to lower security in areas of return, whereas the effects 
of less recent returns on security are no longer visible. Another possible 
explanation of the negative effect of returnees after 2005 is that returnees who 
returned after 2005 have particular characteristics that differ from the 
characteristics of returnees who returned before 2005. As described in Section 3, 
1972 caseload returnees were initially reluctant to return after the war and began to 
return primarily after 2007, when UNHCR and the Burundi and Tanzania 
governments began to promote return for this group. The 1972 returnees spent 
longer periods abroad and may have experienced more problems upon return. 
Property restitution was a particular problem for this group (Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2012). Nevertheless, 1972 caseload refugees constituted only a small 
share of the total returnees to Burundi, as many of them opted for citizenship in 
Tanzania. The extent to which the characteristics of the post-2005 return cohort 
explains the negative effect of return on security remains to be explored.  
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Table 8.4. First-generation returnees: cohorts and time spent abroad 
Notes. Each coefficient was derived from a different estimation. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the community level, in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 1).  
  
8.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter tested the neo-Malthusian hypothesis of population growth, natural 
resource scarcity and conflict in the context of large-scale return migration in a 
conflict-affected setting. Burundi, the country considered in this case study, 
witnessed the return of nearly 600,000 refugees between 2002 and 2014. In a 
context of poverty, population pressure and land scarcity, most returnees moved 
to their origin communities, some having spent more than 30 years abroad. 
Because of the size of the return movement, the short time period in which it 
occurred and the concentration of returns in certain areas, it has been feared that 
the return of former refugees would destabilize Burundi’s transition to peace. 
Return has created both structural scarcity of agricultural land, as returnees have 
 (1) (2) (2) 
 
Thefts/destruction 
of crops, livestock 
or agricultural tools 
Land disputes Security 
 
 
OLS 
 
Logit 
 
OLS 
 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
 
Est. 
(SE) 
  
    
Returnees received    
   Before 2000 (1 = yes) -0.05 0.77 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.77) (0.13) 
   Between 2000 and 2005 (1 = yes) 0.10 -0.82 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.90) (0.17) 
   Between 2005 and 2011 (1 = yes) 0.05 -1.06 -0.33+ 
 (0.07) (0.67) (0.17) 
Median time spent abroad (ln) 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.26) (0.05) 
Mean time spent abroad (ln) 0.00 0.14 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.30) (0.06) 
Household controls Yes - - 
Community controls Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects Yes No No 
No. of observations 1,136 77 77 
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less access to land than other households, and demand-induced scarcity of 
agricultural land, as pressure on land has increased as a result of return migration 
(Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012). This chapter examined 
whether return migration to Burundi has indeed led to more insecurity. Applying 
the neo-Malthusian hypothesis to the Burundi context, the expectation was that 
communities with higher proportions of returnees would experience more land 
disputes and lower security and that households residing in communities with 
higher proportions of returnees would experience more thefts and destruction of 
crops, livestock and agricultural tools.  
Descriptive statistics showed that a substantial share of the Burundi 
population interviewed in 2011 had been affected by international forced 
migration: approximately 8.5 per cent of individuals in the sample were first- or 
second-generation returnees. Most international returnees were residing in 
Burundi’s border provinces in the North and the South. In some cases, return had 
led to significant population increases, with some communities consisting of more 
than 40 to 60 per cent returnees. Most communities consisted of approximately 3 
per cent returnees. Fifteen communities in the sample (16 per cent) had not 
received any returnees. These descriptive statistics suggest that return was highly 
concentrated in certain areas but that the majority of areas had received small 
amounts of returnees.  
The findings revealed that communities with higher proportions of 
returnees were not more likely to experience land disputes and did not have lower 
security levels than communities with lower proportions of returnees. Similarly, 
households residing in communities with higher proportions of return migrants 
did not report significantly more thefts or destruction of crops, livestock and 
agricultural tools. These findings contrast with those of previous studies finding 
that return had led to disputes and insecurity as a result of differences in access to 
land between returnees and non-returnees and the resulting increased poverty 
(see, e.g., Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012). Previous studies 
were often conducted in a single location or in a few locations that were chosen 
specifically for their experiences with return migration. Although these studies 
provided valuable insights into the effects of return in Burundi’s high-return areas, 
the current study indicates that the effects of return are negligible at a national 
level. Although return migration after the conflict led to significant population 
increases in some communities, most communities received only a few returnees, 
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and these returnees seem to be absorbed in the communities without decreasing 
security. However, even in the high-return communities that witnessed substantial 
population increases due to return, this study did not find any indications of 
higher insecurity. The analyses therefore revealed no support for the neo-
Malthusian hypothesis in relation to large-scale return migration in Burundi. A 
potential explanation for these different findings is that qualitative studies 
measured the perceptions of respondents with respect to returnees and the 
changes that they felt had occurred in the community since return, whereas the 
present study used more objective indicators of security. It is possible that the 
experiences of potential violence, or feelings of threats, that people experienced 
differ from actual events.  
This study did find some indications that return migration created security 
problems in the short term. The findings showed that communities that received 
returnees after 2005 reported slightly lower levels of security. This result indicates 
that return migration may have affected security in communities of high return but 
that this effect diminished over time. The data for this research were collected in 
2011, approximately five years after the official end of conflict and after most 
returnees had returned (UNHCR, 2014c). Most returnees returned in the early 
2000s. It has been argued that refugee reintegration can take as many as 10 or 15 
years, especially when former refugees spent long periods abroad (Rogge, 1994). It 
is therefore possible that the effects of return on the communities had already 
dissolved by the time of data collection. The analyses that addressed the time 
dimension provided preliminary evidence because the analyses focused on first-
generation returnees and because a rather crude measurement of return was used 
as a result of data limitations. Nevertheless, the preliminary results suggest that the 
period of return is an important variable to consider when studying the effects of 
return migration on receiving communities and households, thus indicating an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
Another possible explanation for the insignificant findings is that 
population increases resulting from return migration are different from natural 
population growth. Former refugees who return to their origin communities are 
often received by networks of (extended) family members and kin. Although some 
returnees in Burundi spent long periods abroad and some were even born abroad, 
it is likely that their networks or their parents’ networks still existed when they 
returned. Research has shown that despite problems of property restitution and 
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initial adaptation, most former refugees have been positively received, especially 
when returnees shared strong ties with their community members (Rogge, 1994). 
In Eritrea, for example, experiences of conflict had created a shared identity, in 
addition to already existing ties of kinship and ethnicity, which facilitated the 
reintegration of returnees (Bascom, 2005). Although return may have created 
problems of land access and higher poverty in Burundi, the social networks on 
which returnees could rely upon return may have facilitated their reintegration 
and served as a ‘buffer’ to the instigation of violence. 
The instrumental variable approach that was used in this study yielded 
good test results for the proportion of first-generation returnees in the community, 
but the results were weaker for the combined sample that included both first- and 
second-generation returnees. This finding indicates that second-generation 
returnees may have been less likely to have settled in the communities of origin of 
their parents or may have moved on after ‘return’. As described in Section 8.3, 
second-generation returnees have experienced more problems in regaining their 
family land (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012), which may have incentivized them to 
move to areas with, for example, more employment opportunities. Whether this 
explanation indeed applies cannot be determined based on these data and should 
thus be explored in future research.  
This study found no significant relationships between return migration 
and insecurity in Burundi. However, other more structural factors, such as the 
availability of infrastructure and employment, were found significantly affect 
security in the communities. Communities with more employment opportunities 
were found to have significantly higher security levels. Similarly, in communities 
with more infrastructure, including electricity, clean drinking water, and facilities 
such as schools and health care facilities, households reported significantly fewer 
thefts or destruction of crops, livestock or agricultural tools. These findings 
contradict the general perception in Burundi that return migration poses a threat to 
long-term peace, and the results support the arguments of researchers such as Van 
Leeuwen (2010), who argued that current land problems in Burundi are not a 
direct cause of return migration but rather the result of structural problems of 
population density and poverty. Although return may have exacerbated these 
problems in the short term, the long-term implications of return migration for 
sustainable peace in Burundi seem negligible.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
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9.1 Introduction 
This dissertation explored the development effects of remittances and return 
migration in Burundi. By doing so, the dissertation aimed to contribute to the 
broad literature on the linkages between migration and development by focusing 
on a conflict-affected context. Conflict-affected contexts have received little 
attention in the migration and development debate, mainly because of a lack of 
large-scale, reliable data. The data that were collected for the IS Academy Migration 
and Development: A World in Motion project provided a unique opportunity to 
explore how remittances and return migration had affected households and 
communities that were recovering from violent conflict in a context of continuing 
insecurity and uncertainty. This dissertation opted for a multidimensional 
perspective on development, focusing on both the economic and social effects of 
remittances and return migration on development. This multidimensional focus is 
especially relevant in a conflict-affected context, in which not only economic 
development is hindered but social ties may be damaged as well (Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000).  
This dissertation had three main aims: 1) to provide insights into the lives 
of households and communities that were recovering from civil conflict and the 
role that migration played in their lives, 2) to apply tenets of theoretical approaches 
that have often been used to study labour migration to a specific conflict-affected 
setting, and 3) to study how migration affects both economic and social aspects of a 
conflict-affected society. The central research question that this dissertation aimed 
to address was: What are the economic and social effects of remittances and return 
migration on households and communities in a conflict-affected setting? This question 
was divided into the following sub-questions that are addressed in the four 
empirical papers that formed the body of this dissertation (see Section 1.4, 
Structure of this dissertation, for more details). The first two sub-questions focused 
on remittances, whereas sub-questions 3 and 4 addressed the effects of return 
migration.  
 
1. What are the economic effects of international monetary remittances on 
remittance-receiving households? 
2. How do international monetary remittances affect the social capital of 
remittance-receiving households? 
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3. What is the economic impact of return migration on households and 
communities in a conflict-affected context?  
4. What is the impact of return migration on security in return 
communities? 
 
Burundi was the country case study of this dissertation. After decades of 
insecurity and recurrent episodes of violent conflict since its independence in 1962, 
Burundi entered a transition period towards peace and development in 2000. 
Migration played an important role during this transition period. Remittances, the 
money and goods sent by Burundians living abroad, increased significantly in 
recent years and are now seen as potential contributors to the country’s economic 
reconstruction (Fransen & Andersson, 2011). At the same time, approximately 
600,000 formally registered former refugees returned to the country over a period 
of a decade (UNHCR, 2014c). This large return flow has raised concerns because of 
already existing problems of poverty and land scarcity. Burundi is one of the most 
densely populated countries in the world, and it suffers from a shortage of 
agricultural land, especially in rural areas. Because of the short time period in 
which the returns took place, the concentrations of returnees in certain areas and 
the already existing problems of agricultural land scarcity, it is feared that return 
migration will re-instigate social tensions by exacerbating the poverty in rural 
areas (Hovil, 2009).  
Burundi provided an interesting case for researching the linkages between 
migration and development in a conflict-affected setting. Many conflict-affected 
countries experience large return migrations during periods of relative stability 
and receive vast amounts of remittances that are considered beneficial to 
reconstruction and economic development. The findings from this study are 
therefore, to a certain extent, generalizable to other low-income, conflict-affected 
countries. At the same time, Burundi is a unique case because it is one of the 
poorest countries in the world and it struggles with increasing population density 
and scarcity of agricultural land. Burundi is also one of the least urbanized 
countries in the world—more than 90 per cent of its population relies on 
agriculture. The country offers very limited economic opportunities, and it 
struggles with low institutional capacity. To what extent have remittances and 
return migration affected Burundian households and communities that are 
recovering from decades of civil conflict in a context that is characterized by 
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poverty, large inequalities, and, yet again, growing insecurity in the run-up to the 
2015 elections? 
This study provided one of the first quantitative studies on the effects of 
remittances on development in a conflict-affected context. The empirical chapters 
in this dissertation relied on nationally representative household and community 
data that were collected for the Migration and Development: A World in Motion 
project. The data were collected in 2011, approximately five years after the official 
end of conflict in Burundi. The household questionnaire gathered information on 
all household members, including basic characteristics such as age, gender and 
education level, and their migration histories by interviewing a main respondent. 
Household characteristics that were collected included the households’ experiences 
with violence and their current well-being. Questions on migration history were 
therefore combined with various other household characteristics regarding 
economic and social well-being. These data are unique in the sense that they offer 
detailed insights into the livelihoods of households after conflict and the role that 
migration plays in these livelihoods.  
This chapter discusses the main findings of this dissertation regarding the 
economic and social effects of remittances and return migration in Burundi in 
Section 9.2. Then, the implications of the findings and suggestions for future 
research are presented in Section 9.3, and the conclusion is presented in Section 9.4. 
 
9.2 Main findings 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 addressed the development potential of remittances in 
Burundi, investigating the effects of remittances on receiving households’ wealth 
(Chapter 4) and the social capital investments of remittance-receiving households 
in urban areas (Chapter 5). Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 focused on return migration 
and studied the socio-economic sustainability of return migration in Burundi 
(Chapter 7) and the effects of return migration on security in receiving 
communities in rural areas (Chapter 8). The remainder of this section is divided 
into two parts: Section 9.2.1 describes the research findings on remittances, and 
Section 9.2.2 introduces the findings on return migration.  
 
9.2.1 Remittances 
Chapter 5 studied the importance and effects of remittances for households in 
Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, based on survey data collected from 810 
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households. This chapter took an explorative approach guided by the three 
hypotheses derived from NELM (relative deprivation, insurance, and investment) 
and applied these to the conflict-affected context of Burundi. The chapter 
addressed questions regarding the main beneficiaries of remittances in Burundi’s 
capital, the extent to which these beneficiaries relied on remittances, and the ways 
they allocated this resource from abroad. By doing so, this study explored the 
extent to which remittances have the potential to contribute to development in 
Burundi. 
 Chapter 5 revealed two main findings regarding the three NELM 
hypotheses. First, receiving remittances was more frequent among wealthier and 
higher-educated households, which is most likely the result of the (historical and 
current) selection to migration into the wider diaspora (Europe, North America). 
This finding rejects the relative deprivation hypothesis, which anticipates that the 
most deprived households are more likely to migrate and therefore to receive 
remittances. The expectation that remittances would provide important insurance 
for households affected by conflict appears to be unjustified in the Burundi context. 
Second, remittances were found to be mostly allocated to non-productive assets. 
Remittance-receiving households, for example, reported better living conditions 
and greater food security than similar but non-remittance-receiving households. 
Productive assets, including asset ownership and education, were not affected by 
remittances. These findings thus provided more support for the insurance than the 
investment hypothesis of NELM and verified the findings of the qualitative studies 
that argued that remittances are mostly used to sustain households during or 
immediately after crises (Ahmed, 2000; Van Hear, 2002). 
These findings differ from those in other developing country contexts, but 
only to a certain extent. The finding that remittances do not reach the poorest of the 
poor is a common finding in other developing country contexts as well (see, e.g., 
Adams Jr, 1998; Mazzucato et al., 2008). Because members of relatively better-off 
households tend to select themselves into migration, these wealthier households 
are generally more likely to receive remittances. The finding that remittances are 
mostly spent on living conditions and food security appears to be a specific result 
of the conflict-affected context of Burundi. Previous studies have shown that 
remittances are often spent on daily needs (see, e.g., Kabki et al., 2004; Mazzucato, 
2009), and others have shown that remittances are often sent for or spent on 
schooling and assets such as housing and agricultural land, thereby boosting 
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development in remittance-receiving countries that did not experience conflict 
(Mazzucato et al., 2008; Ratha et al., 2011). The remittance literature has therefore 
shown that remittances are often spent on both productive and non-productive 
assets. It is likely that the unstable nature of the conflict-affected context in Burundi 
lowered households’ opportunities and incentives to invest their remittances in 
items other than living conditions and food security.  
Chapter 6 studied the effects of remittances on the social capital of 
remittance-receiving households based on the same urban survey data that were 
used in Chapter 5. Social capital is considered a prerequisite for reconstruction and 
development, but it has been largely overlooked in the literature on the effects of 
remittances on development in migrant-sending areas. Previous studies have 
argued that, especially in unstable settings in which investment opportunities are 
limited, households may allocate (part of) their remittances to their social capital 
(Van Hear, 2002, 2004), but the empirical evidence is limited. Burundi provided an 
interesting setting for studying the link between remittances and social capital 
because of its unique social dynamics, characterized by ‘weak bridges, strong 
bonds’ (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005, p. 6).  
 Chapter 6 extended the NELM investment assumption beyond the most 
commonly studied investments that concern economic or human capital by 
studying the effects of remittances on the social capital of remittance-receiving 
households. A distinction was made between bonding and bridging social capital 
investments (Putnam, 2000, 2002), which allowed for exploring the extent to which 
remittance-receiving households invested in social capital to benefit their in-
groups as opposed to social capital investments that crossed social divides. The 
bonding versus bridging social capital distinction was based on networks of family 
members and friends. These networks have an important insurance function for 
households in Burundi, but they were reportedly weakened during the war (Uvin, 
2009; Vervisch, Vlassenroot, et al., 2013).  
Chapter 6 showed that the assumption that remittances are invested in 
social networks for insurance purposes could only be partly confirmed for the 
Burundi context. The use of a multifaceted social capital measure demonstrated 
that the relationship between remittances and social capital is complex and 
dependent on the measure of social capital considered. First, the analyses showed 
that remittances incentivized households to invest in structural social capital by 
donating time but not money. Remittance-receiving households participated more 
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in organizations, which may be explained by the income-smoothing effect of 
remittances, which generate leisure time (see, e.g., Adams Jr, 2011), or by the fact 
that wealthier households are more likely to participate in networks because they 
have more to offer to other members (Fafchamps, 2006). Remittance-receiving 
households may also be affected by norms and values regarding civic engagement 
through contacts with the diaspora that incentivize them to be civically engaged 
(see, e.g., Caarls et al., 2013). 
 Second, remittance-receiving households invested more in their bonding 
social capital than did non-remittance-receiving households but only when the 
network comprised family members. Remittance-receiving households spent more 
on financially supporting family members in rural areas. However, remittances 
appeared to reduce gifts to larger networks of family and friends in the sense that 
remittance-receiving households spent less on these networks than did similar but 
non-remittance-receiving households. This may be because of a crowding-out 
effect of remittances, introduced by Caarls et al. (2013), which states that receiving 
remittances may reduce incentives to invest in social capital because the 
remittances create financial independence.  
 
9.2.2 Return migration 
Chapter 7 contributed to the emerging literature on refugee return and 
development by exploring the concept of sustainable return, a concept that has 
been used extensively in policy circles and in the academic debate to refer to 
situations in which refugee returns increase poverty and negatively influence long-
term peace in former refugees’ home countries (Black & Gent, 2006). This chapter 
applied the sustainability framework to the context of Burundi. Using nationally 
representative household and community data, the chapter explored the wider 
view on sustainability, following Black and Gent (2006) by incorporating both 
household comparisons and an analysis of the relationship between returns and 
the socio-economic conditions of all households in communities of returnees. 
Socio-economic sustainability was measured using a multidimensional approach 
that encompassed both objective and subjective indicators. In doing so, the aim of 
this paper was to provide detailed insights into the relationships between return 
migration and the socio-economic conditions of both households and communities 
in rural Burundi.  
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Descriptive statistics in Chapter 7 showed that returnees represented a 
substantial share of the population in rural Burundi: nearly 8.5 per cent of the 
individuals were either first- or second-generation returnees. Because the data 
were nationally representative, this means that with an estimated population of 10 
million people in 2011, the returnee population in Burundi comprised 
approximately 850,000 people. The returns were very concentrated, with the 
highest proportions of return migrants found in communities in the southern 
provinces of Rutana, Makamba, and Ruyigi, which border Tanzania. Here, some 
communities had experienced large increases in their populations because of 
returns and at the time consisted of 30 or 40 per cent returnees.  
The analyses in Chapter 7 highlighted different challenges for return 
versus non-return households at different levels of analysis and across the different 
socio-economic indicators. The household-level analyses revealed that land 
ownership among first- and particularly second-generation return households was 
low and that most such households experienced food insecurity on a weekly basis 
and reported low subjective wealth. Most return households also reported declines 
in their wealth over the previous years. Relative to non-return households, both 
first- and second-generation return households were less likely to own land. The 
community-level analyses showed that in communities with higher proportions of 
second-generation returnees, all households had lower living conditions and 
reported both lower subjective wealth and more negative changes in wealth in 
previous years. Thus, from both objective and subjective perspectives, households 
in communities with more second-generation returnees were worse off than were 
households in other communities.  
Because of the size of the return movement, the short time period in which 
it took place and the concentrations of returnees in certain areas, it has been feared 
that the return of former refugees will destabilize Burundi’s transition to peace. 
Returns have created both structural scarcity of agricultural land, because 
returnees have less access to land than do other households, and demand-induced 
scarcity of agricultural land, because pressure on land has increased as a result of 
return migration (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012).  
Chapter 8 studied whether return migration to Burundi has led to more 
insecurity. The idea that large-scale return migration would lead to competition 
over resources and, ultimately, violence is similar to neo-Malthusian views that a 
rapid population increase will lead to scarcity of renewable natural resources, such 
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as agricultural land and natural water sources, which in turn may instigate 
violence (Homer-Dixon, 2010). This chapter tested the neo-Malthusian hypothesis 
of population growth, natural resource scarcity and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 2010) 
in the context of large-scale return migration in Burundi. The expectation was that 
communities with higher proportions of returnees would experience more land 
disputes, more thefts, and lower security.  
The findings revealed that communities with higher proportions of 
returnees were not more likely to experience land disputes and did not have lower 
security levels than did communities with lower proportions of returnees. 
Similarly, households in communities with higher proportions of return migrants 
did not report significantly more thefts or destruction of crops, livestock or 
agricultural tools. These findings contrast with those of previous studies that 
found that returns had led to disputes and insecurity as a result of differences in 
access to land between returnees and non-returnees and the resulting increased 
poverty (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Rema Ministries, 2012). Previous studies 
were often conducted in a single location or in a few locations that were chosen 
specifically for their experiences with return migration. Although these studies 
provided valuable insights into the effects of returns in Burundi’s high-return 
areas, the current study indicates that the effects of returns are negligible at the 
national level.  
This study did find some indications that return migration created security 
problems in the short term. The findings showed that communities that received 
returnees after 2005 reported slightly lower levels of security. This result indicates 
that return migration may have affected security in communities of high return but 
that this effect diminished over time. The data for this research were collected in 
2011, approximately five years after the official end of conflict and after most 
returnees had returned (UNHCR, 2014c); most returned in the early 2000s. It has 
been argued that refugee reintegration can take as long as 10 or 15 years, especially 
when former refugees spent long periods abroad (Rogge, 1994). It is therefore 
possible that the effects of return on the communities had already resolved by the 
time of data collection.  
This study found no significant relationships between return migration 
and insecurity in Burundi. However, other, more structural factors, such as the 
availability of infrastructure and employment, were found to have a significant 
effect on security in the affected communities. Communities with more 
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employment opportunities were found to have significantly higher security levels. 
Similarly, in communities with more infrastructure, including electricity, clean 
drinking water, and facilities such as schools and health care facilities, households 
reported significantly fewer thefts or destruction of crops, livestock or agricultural 
tools. These findings contradict the general perception in Burundi that return 
migration poses a threat to long-term peace, and the results support the arguments 
of researchers such as Van Leeuwen (2010), who argued that current land 
problems in Burundi are not a direct cause of return migration but rather the result 
of structural problems of population density and poverty. Although return may 
have exacerbated these problems in the short term, the long-term implications of 
return migration for sustainable peace in Burundi appear to be negligible.  
 
9.3 Implications and directions for future research 
The introduction and theoretical chapters of this dissertation have shown that both 
remittances and return migration are considered potential contributors to 
development in conflict-affected states. This chapter reflects on the common 
assumptions regarding remittances and return migration in the academic literature 
and relates them to the research findings in this dissertation. 
  
9.3.1 Are remittances essential for development in conflict-affected states? 
As described in the introduction of this dissertation, remittances are seen as 
important contributors to economic development and, consequently, sustainable 
peace in conflict-affected countries; they are seen as lifelines for poorer households 
that were affected by conflict. Despite the limited evidence available, remittances 
are believed to provide a safety net for poorer households, insure them against 
shocks, and reduce poverty in the context of failing states that are unable to 
provide members of society with basic needs. 
The research in this dissertation has shown that remittances sent to 
Burundi are a small but growing financial resource. Compared with other 
countries in the region, such as neighbouring Rwanda, remittances have not yet, 
however, developed into a stable financial flow that has the potential to contribute 
to economic and social reconstruction. The findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest 
that the economic development potential of remittances in Burundi is currently 
limited. Remittances only reach a few, mostly relatively well-off households in the 
capital, and they are a scarce resource among the rural, more deprived 
194 
 
populations. The limited access of the rural population to remittances appears to 
be largely attributable to a lack of financial infrastructure in rural areas in Burundi. 
In addition, mobility, especially international mobility, is low in rural areas, where 
poverty levels are high. Remittances therefore do not reach the most 
disadvantaged households. Thus, one of the greatest limitations for remittances to 
contribute to development in Burundi is the limited access of those who need them 
the most.  
However, research has shown that when remittances are transmitted into 
local economies through investments, increased production or increased 
consumption, they may have a welfare-enhancing effect for other households 
(Taylor, 1999). Remittances were mostly invested in food security and living 
conditions in Burundi, but these investments may yield positive effects on, for 
example, local production and employment, which may boost development in the 
long term. These transmissions or spill-over effects of remittances may enhance 
community wealth, the availability and quality of schooling, and community 
public services. Although remittances mostly reach relatively wealthy households, 
eventually the positive effects may trickle down to poorer households as well. 
These potential trickle-down effects of remittances in conflict-affected contexts 
should be explored in future research. 
In addition, remittances did have important positive effects for remittance-
receiving households. First, they provided an important source of capital for those 
households that did receive them. The contribution of remittances to the household 
budgets of receiving households in Bujumbura totalled an average of 61 per cent of 
household expenditures. Second, of all remittance-receiving households, poorer 
households appeared to benefit the most. Relatively poor remittance-receiving 
households enjoyed better food security and living conditions because of the 
remittances. Although remittances were not invested as much in productive assets, 
their impact on the livelihoods of receiving households was significant and may 
have long-term beneficial effects for these households. The significant positive 
impacts on food security, living conditions, and subjective wealth may have 
positive, long-term effects on the productivity, health and education of remittance-
receiving households. These long-term effects warrant the attention of future 
research.  
In the policy arena in Burundi, the linkages between remittances and 
development are being increasingly recognized. Dialogues between diaspora 
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organizations and the National Bank of Burundi (BRB) are ongoing, and a diaspora 
directorate has been created in the Ministry of External Affairs (Fransen & Siegel, 
2010). These developments have put the issue of remittances on the policy agenda, 
which may lead to the design and implementation of policies that stimulate 
remittance inflows and enhance the effectiveness of remittances for development.  
 
9.3.2 Do remittances help to restore social relations in remittance-receiving areas? 
Researchers have argued that in unstable settings in which investment 
opportunities are limited, households may also allocate (part of) their remittances 
to their social capital rather than to more tangible investments such as education or 
business (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). In the absence of formal insurance mechanisms, 
such as those provided by the state, households often rely on informal networks 
and social relations for support. If remittances are invested in social capital in 
remittance-receiving areas, this may have important effects on social ties in these 
areas, reinforcing networks and restoring social ties (Van Hear, 2002, 2004). 
However, if remittance-receiving households withdraw from their social relations 
and invest their remittances exclusively in in-group social capital, as Caarls et al. 
(2013) suggested, remittances may intensify social divides rather than contributing 
to social development.  
The impact of remittances on social development in Burundi appeared to 
be highly complex. Remittance-receiving households spent more time on but did 
not make higher monetary contributions to their bridging social capital. 
Remittance-receiving households spent more money on their bonding social 
capital but only when the network comprised family members. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the financial investments of remittances mainly strengthened 
the bonding social capital of remittance-receiving households and of family 
networks in particular. However, despite the fact that remittance-receiving 
households in Burundi made fewer monetary contributions to their bridging social 
capital, their enhanced participation in organizations may have positive, long-term 
effects. Participation in formal organizations such as associations is particularly 
important for conflict prevention because it makes societies more resilient to 
political polarization (Varshney, 2001). Since the end of the conflict in Burundi, the 
number of civil society organisations and community associations has increased, 
and civil society has become more active in areas such as women’s and youth 
issues, development and reconciliation, human rights, and religion (Brachet & 
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Wolpe, 2005; Vervisch, Titeca, et al., 2013). The finding that remittance-receiving 
households participated more in organizations may positively reinforce this trend 
of growing civic engagement in Burundi. These potential effects of remittances on 
civic engagement provide an interesting avenue for future research.  
More research is needed on the linkages between remittances and social 
capital in remittance-receiving areas. The use of a multifaceted social capital 
measure demonstrated that the relationship between remittances and social capital 
is complex and dependent on the measure of social capital considered. The 
linkages between remittances and both bonding and bridging social capital, for 
example, deserve more attention by future research to determine the extent to 
which remittances affect relations that cross social divides versus relations between 
in-groups only. Further research should also address the effects of remittances on 
organization memberships. Insights into the types of organizations that the 
remittance-receiving households engage in, the types of involvement (financial 
versus donating time), and the intensity of households’ organizational 
involvement will shed more detailed light on the effects of remittances on 
organizational involvement.  
Further research should also focus on the exact mechanisms that underlie 
the relationship between remittances and social capital. These could not be 
disentangled with the present data and therefore warrant further research 
attention. For example, whether remittances increase social capital investments by 
relaxing households’ liquidity constraints or by increasing the incomes of 
remittance-receiving households remains to be examined. In addition, it was not 
possible to distinguish between monetary remittances and the transfer of norms 
and values (social remittances) from the diaspora as driving forces of social capital 
investments. The mechanisms underlying the relationship between remittances 
and social capital investments therefore also warrant further research attention. 
Finally, because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is difficult to 
draw causal inferences from the findings regarding remittances. PSM is an 
empirical approach that is commonly used in the absence of longitudinal or 
experimental data to create a counterfactual situation. However, there may be 
unobservable variables that simultaneously affect the assignment of a household 
into the treatment group and the dependent variable, potentially creating a hidden 
bias that may drive the results. Future research is therefore needed to study the 
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long-term effects of remittances on social capital formation and, consequently, 
social development in conflict-affected settings.  
 
9.3.3 Does return migration lead to development in conflict-affected states? 
The prevailing view in the literature on return migration and development is that 
return migration may play a positive role in the development of migrant-sending 
countries because returning migrants may bring with them skills, assets (including 
money), and social capital that they acquired abroad. However, when return flows 
are large, returnees have few resources and the contexts to which they return offer 
few opportunities, the results may be less positive; this is often the case for conflict-
affected contexts. Often, former refugees return from neighbouring countries 
where they had few employment opportunities and consequently few possibilities 
to obtain skills that could be brought back upon their returns. After they return, 
former refugees may find limited opportunities to re-establish their livelihoods.  
The repatriation exercise of Burundian refugees after the war was one of 
the largest ever undertaken in the region. Many support programs were put in 
place for returnees, including distributing Non Food Item (NFI) kits, food rations, 
educational items, and, after 2007, cash grants (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). 
UNHCR also set up a shelter program that distributed house building materials for 
over 100,000 households between 2002 and 2010 and participated in the Rural 
Integrated Villages (VRI) project, together with other international organizations, 
NGOs and the Burundi government, which was established for landless returnees 
and other vulnerable populations (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2014). The logistics of 
coordinating the return process and supporting such a large group is an immense 
achievement. 
Nevertheless, many returnees live in poor socio-economic conditions and 
are worse off than households that did not experience forced international 
migration. Moreover, whole communities were affected by returns in some cases. 
The issue of property restitution, which in this case mainly concerns agricultural 
land, came forward as a central driver of the differences between returnees and 
non-returnees. Return migrant households were found to be significantly less 
likely to own land. The Arusha Agreements stated that everyone affected by the 
conflict would be entitled to property restitution and would be compensated for 
their losses (Republic of Burundi, 2000). These objectives incentivized many 
refugees, including those from the 1972 cohort, to return. The objectives were, 
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however, not met, leading to significant differences between returnees and non-
returnees. The unequal distribution of land raised concerns because of the 
importance of land for livelihoods in rural Burundi and the emotional ties felt by 
many people to their ancestral land (Rema Ministries, 2012). The findings of this 
thesis highlight the importance of property restitution after conflict and the 
responsibility of local governments in providing restitution and compensation for 
the losses that people suffered.  
Return migration may be an individual or household decision, but the 
process of reintegration is one that also affects those households that have not 
returned. The findings in Chapter 7 validate the use of a wider approach to 
studying the sustainability of returning, using both household- and community-
level comparisons. The finding that the effects of returning on households and 
communities differed suggests that sustainability is best measured at the 
household and community levels simultaneously, using a multidimensional 
approach that incorporates both objective and subjective indicators. This will lead 
to a detailed understanding of the relationship between returns and the socio-
economic conditions of households and communities. The broad perspective on 
the sustainability of returns showed that return migration affects not only the 
returnees and return households but their entire communities as well. This finding 
highlights the need for support programs that benefit not only the returnees or the 
returning households but their community members well.  
This dissertation also made a distinction between the first- and second-
generation returnees, the latter of whom are the children of former refugees who 
were born in exile. This distinction is especially relevant in the Burundi context 
because, owing to their time spent in exile, many former refugees had children 
who returned with them to Burundi. The finding that second-generation return 
households are particularly worse off indicates that returnees are not a 
homogeneous group and that reintegration assistance should be adapted to fit the 
needs of different types of returnees. More research is needed on the return 
experiences of second-generation returnees and particularly the issue of property 
restitution in this regard. Second-generation returnees are an understudied group 
in the larger migration literature (exceptions are: Christou, 2006; King & Christou, 
2010; Wessendorf, 2007). The research in this dissertation has, however, indicated 
that there are differences in the return experiences of first- and second-generation 
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returnees that should be taken into account when studying the sustainability of 
returns in conflict-affected contexts.  
 
9.3.4 Is large-scale refugee return a threat to sustainable peace? 
The research findings in this dissertation suggested that return migration does not 
pose a direct threat to security in Burundi. Although return migration after the 
conflict led to significant population increases in some communities, most 
communities received only a few returnees, and these returnees appeared to have 
been absorbed into the communities without increasing insecurity. However, even 
in the high-return communities that witnessed substantial population increases 
from returns, this study found no indications of higher insecurity. 
Another possible explanation for the insignificant findings is that 
population increases resulting from return migration are different from those 
resulting from natural population growth. Former refugees who return to their 
origin communities are often received by networks of (extended) family members 
and kin. Although some returnees in Burundi spent long periods abroad and some 
were even born abroad, it is likely that their networks or their parents’ networks 
still existed when they returned. Research has shown that despite problems of 
property restitution and initial adaptation, most former refugees have been 
positively received, especially when they shared strong ties with their community 
members (Rogge, 1994). In Eritrea, for example, experiences of conflict had created 
a shared identity, in addition to already existing ties of kinship and ethnicity, 
which facilitated the reintegration of returnees (Bascom, 2005). Although returns 
may have created problems of land access and higher poverty in Burundi, the 
social networks on which returnees could rely may have facilitated their 
reintegration and served as buffers against the instigation of violence.  
In addition, the findings that return migration may have lowered security 
in areas of return in the short term suggests that the period of return is an 
important variable to consider when studying the effects of return migration on 
receiving communities and households. It is possible that return has significant 
effects on security in the short term that diminish over time. 
 The research in this dissertation focused on former refugees only. As 
described in Chapter 4, this was a consequence of the project focus, which 
addressed mostly international migration. However, former IDPs were also a 
significant population in Burundi, and it is likely that the return of IDPs has had 
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important effects on development as well. Refugees and IDPs differed in their 
experiences during migration. Whereas the refugee camps in Tanzania where most 
refugees resided received vast amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance, 
residents of IDP camps in Burundi were more deprived of assistance and 
frequently lacked access to basic services such as health care and education. The 
literature has shown that experiences during migration have an effect on the extent 
to which return migration can affect development. An interesting avenue for future 
research would therefore to be to compare the return migration of former refugees 
and former IDPs to study how these different migrations impact development in 
conflict-affected states. 
 Finally, future research should address secondary migrations after return, 
studying the extent to which former refugees migrate further after having arrived 
in their countries of origin. Although the research in this dissertation could not 
give conclusive evidence, it found some indications that second generations in 
particular may have migrated to other regions in Burundi after having returned to 
their origin communities. It is likely that a significant share of the second-
generation returnees migrated to areas with more employment or education 
opportunities because of the problems they experienced regarding property 
restitution, employment and social reintegration (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012). 
Whether or not this is indeed the case, and the potential effects of these secondary 
migration flows on development, provide an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
Migration is an important part of the daily lives of individuals and households in 
Burundi. Remittances that are sent by migrants abroad are a common financial 
resource for households in urban areas, and the return of former refugees has 
affected nearly all rural communities, albeit in different intensities. The 
multidimensional focus on development that this dissertation adopted, focusing on 
both the economic and the social effects of remittances and return migration, 
showed that migration affects not only the economic aspects of societies but also 
social ties between society members. However, the development implications of 
remittances and return migration on the economic and social lives of households 
and communities showed different results.  
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This dissertation has shown that in a conflict-affected country such as 
Burundi, which is one of the poorest countries the world, migration does not have 
the anticipated development-boosting effect that comes forward from the policy 
and academic literature on migration and development. The economic 
development impact of remittances, for example, was limited because remittances 
did not reach the citizens who needed it the most. This finding highlights that 
remittances cannot replace official state and international aid initiatives on 
development and poverty alleviation programmes, as is sometimes suggested by 
‘co-development’ initiatives in which migrants are seen as a way to channel 
development aid more directly to the ‘grass roots’ (see, e.g., Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 
2002, for a discussion on co-development). The finding that remittances were not 
as invested in education, financial access and assets may be the result of the 
unstable nature of the conflict-affected context in Burundi. It is likely that the high 
levels of uncertainty that characterize conflict-affected contexts lower households’ 
opportunities and incentives to invest their remittances in more productive, long-
term items. Similarly, return migration led to structural inequalities between return 
and non-return households and was found to negatively affect the living 
conditions of non-return households as well.  
When interpreting these results it is important to keep in mind that the 
political situation was tense at the time the survey data were collected in 2011. 
There were frequent incidents of political violence resulting from the 2010 elections 
and there was fear among the population that these violent incidents would result 
in large-scale conflict again. It is likely that this context played a role in the 
outcomes of this study. Households were continuously faced with uncertainty and 
insecurity, which most likely affected their behavior and opinions.  
The findings of this research highlight the necessity of a basic level of 
development before migration can positively affect development. In the absence of 
investment opportunities for remittances or opportunities for returnees or 
returning households to establish their livelihoods, the development effects of 
remittances and return migration will be limited or, in the case of return migration, 
even negative. These findings highlight the need for policies that simultaneously 
address humanitarian needs and economic and social development. Important 
steps have already been taken in this direction. The activities of UNHCR, for 
example, shifted from pure humanitarian aid towards more long-term 
development practices in the 1990s (Crisp, 2001). In the early 2000s, UNHCR also 
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shifted its focus from individual assistance to a so-called community-based 
approach (CBA) to humanitarian aid (UNHCR, 2008a). The CBA implies local 
cooperation for humanitarian support and a more 'bottom-up' working method. In 
practice, this means that operations are undertaken in cooperation with local 
governments and decisions are made while working with the community. This 
community involves not only the displaced or the people of concern but also the 
community’s non-displaced. These initiatives can, however, only have their 
desired effects if issues such as property restitution and providing legal status to 
returnees are addressed.  
Nevertheless, the impact of migration on development was in some cases 
promising. First, the long-term effects of remittances are likely to be positive. 
Remittance flows to Burundi are growing, and their positive effects are likely to 
trickle down to non-remittance-receiving context households. Second, despite 
expectations, and despite the finding that returns led to structural inequalities and 
lower living conditions in areas of high return, return migration did not pose a 
direct security threat to sustainable peace in the country. These findings suggest 
that migration may play a positive role in contributing to development after 
conflict if the other criteria of a basic level of development and property restitution 
are met. 
Burundi provided an interesting country case for studying the linkages 
between remittances, return migration and development in a conflict-affected state, 
but more research is needed on the effects of migration on development, especially 
social development, in conflict-affected states. A call for more research suggests 
that more and better data need to be collected in conflict-affected settings. 
Although important strides are being made in the area of monitoring and 
evaluation, better data need to be collected on remittances and on the repatriation 
and, especially, the reintegration of former refugees in conflict-affected settings. 
Collecting better data will enhance the visibility of the areas in which returnees 
need support and therefore guide policymaking and enhance the effectiveness of 
returnee support programs. As emerged from this dissertation, data collection 
should preferably take place using a multidimensional framework that 
incorporates both the economic and the social aspects of societies.  
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Figure A.1a. Number of organization memberships per household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1b. Expenditures on religious organisations (USD)  
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Figure A.1c. Expenditures on gifts to family and friends (USD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1d. Urban-rural remittance sending (1 = yes) 
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Figure A.1e. Value of urban-rural remittances (USD) 
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Map A.1. Geographic location of Burundi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United Nations Cartographic Section, 2011 
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Map A.2. Returnees per province: March 2002-June 2011 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2011 
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Valorization addendum 
As described in this dissertation, migration has been increasingly considered as a 
contributor to development in conflict-affected states. Many conflict-affected 
countries experience large return migrations during periods of relative stability 
and receive vast amounts of remittances that are considered beneficial to 
reconstruction and economic development. The development effects of return 
migration and remittances, however, remain underexplored. Most research on 
migration and development has taken place in countries that were not affected by 
conflict, yielding limiting knowledge on the importance of migration in conflict-
affected states. This dissertation studied the impact of migration on development 
in a conflict-affected state, Burundi. Focus was on remittances and return 
migration as potential contributors to development. These migration-related 
phenomena have surfaced from the migration and development literature as being 
among the most important that may contribute to development in migrant-sending 
countries. The central research question of this dissertation was: What are the 
economic and social effects of remittances and return migration on households and 
communities in a conflict- affected context?  
This research was part of a larger research project called Migration and 
Development: A World in Motion. This was a five-year research project, funded by 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that investigated the effects of migration on 
four migrant-sending countries (Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Morocco) 
and one migrant-receiving country (the Netherlands). The aim of the project was to 
stimulate new approaches to development cooperation using the available 
knowledge on sustainable development and poverty reduction and to gather new 
evidence on migration and development that would lead to effective policies. 
Specifically, the Migration and Development: A World in Motion project aimed to 
strengthen the scientific foundation for policy making in the area of migration and 
development, to strengthen the policy relevance of research and to increase the 
knowledge about migration and development among the Dutch society, policy 
makers in other sectors, as well as policy makers in developing countries. 
 
Innovation 
This dissertation contributed to the migration and development debate in three 
ways. First, this dissertation studied the lives of households and communities that 
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are recovering from civil conflict and the role that migration plays in their lives. As 
described in the dissertation, data from conflict-affected contexts are scarce, and 
there is little knowledge on migration as a livelihood or the coping strategies of 
households in these contexts. Second, this dissertation applied specific tenets of 
theoretical approaches that have often been used to study labour migration to a 
conflict-affected setting to study how the effects of migration on development may 
differ in a conflict-affected setting. Third, this dissertation studied how migration 
affects both economic and social aspects of a conflict-affected society. This 
multidimensional focus is especially relevant in a conflict-affected context, in 
which not only economic structures have to be rebuilt, but social relations are often 
damaged as well. 
This research showed that in a conflict-affected country such as Burundi, 
migration does not have the anticipated development- boosting effect that comes 
forward from the policy and academic literature on migration and development. 
This is most likely due to the conflict-affected context. Conflict-affected states differ 
significantly from other developing country contexts that were not affected by 
conflict, because a) the causes and characteristics of migration flows are 
significantly different in conflict-affected contexts, and b) civil conflict has both 
direct and indirect effects on society and creates a situation of insecurity and 
instability that often persists long after the conflict has ended. These findings 
highlight the necessity of a basic level of development before migration can 
positively affect development. In the absence of investment opportunities for 
remittances or opportunities for returnees or returning households to establish 
their livelihoods, the development effects of remittances and return migration will 
be limited or, in the case of return migration, even negative. The multidimensional 
focus on development that this dissertation adopted, focusing on both the 
economic and the social effects of remittances and return migration, showed that 
migration affects not only the economic aspects of societies but also social ties 
between society members.  
 
Policy implications 
The research findings in this dissertation highlight the need for policies and 
programs that simultaneously address humanitarian needs and economic and 
social development in conflict-affected settings. Without a basic level of economic 
development, the contribution that remittances and return migration can make to 
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development is most likely minimal. Local governments should therefore work in 
close collaboration with international organizations to deliver both humanitarian 
aid and implement programs and policies that stimulate development. For 
migrant-receiving countries, such as the Netherlands, it is important to invest in 
development aid. The finding that remittances are not received by those who 
‘need’ it the most, for example, highlights that remittances cannot replace official 
state and international aid initiatives on development and poverty alleviation 
programmes, as is sometimes suggested by ‘co-development’ initiatives in which 
migrants are seen as a way to channel development aid. 
 The findings on remittances also showed that the potential of the diaspora 
is not yet fully recognized. A draft diaspora engagement policy has been designed 
in Burundi in 2011, but has not been implemented to date. Putting the issue of 
remittances on the policy agenda can lead to the design and implementation of 
policies that stimulate remittance inflows and enhance the effectiveness of 
remittances for development. The most important condition for remittances to 
increase and have substantial impacts on development in the country is, however, 
a stable political situation. Political stability will lead to more security, which will 
probably positively affect the economy and enhance the business climate in 
Burundi. A better financial climate will also enhance the possibilities for receivers 
to invest remittances in businesses and other productive assets, which will have a 
positive impact on the economy. The tensions that are rising in Burundi in the run-
up to the 2015 elections are therefore the largest threat to remittance inflows and 
their potential impacts on development. 
The findings on return migration highlighted the importance of property 
restitution after conflict and the responsibility of local governments in providing 
restitution and compensation for the losses that people suffered. The issue of 
property restitution, which in this case mainly concerns agricultural land, came 
forward as a central driver of the differences between returnees and non-returnees. 
The unequal distribution of land raised concerns because of the importance of land 
for livelihoods in rural Burundi and should therefore be addressed. This research 
also showed that returnees are not a homogeneous group, which highlights the 
need that reintegration assistance is adapted to fit the needs of different types of 
returnees. Second-generation returnees, for example, were found to be less well off 
than first-generation return households. Land ownership among second-
generation return households was found to be low and most such households 
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experienced food insecurity on a weekly basis and reported low subjective wealth. 
Different types of returnees are therefore in need of different types of support. 
In addition, return migration was found to affect not only the returning 
households but other community members in communities of return as well. This 
finding highlights the need for support programs that benefit not only the 
returnees or the returning households but their community members well. The 
community-based approach (CBA) to humanitarian aid that UNHCR adopted in 
the early 2000s is a good example of such a program. The CBA implies local 
cooperation for humanitarian support and a more 'bottom-up' working method. In 
practice, this means that operations are undertaken in cooperation with local 
governments and decisions are made while working with the community. This 
community involves not only the displaced or the people of concern but also the 
community’s non-displaced. The restoration of social ties is an important part of 
the peace-building process and should therefore be incorporated into policies and 
programs that are implemented in conflict-affected settings such as Burundi.  
 
Knowledge sharing 
Throughout the research, we worked in close collaboration with key actors in the 
area of migration and development, including international organizations (e.g. 
UNHCR, UNDP, IOM), local and international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), local research institutes, and government representatives in both the 
Netherlands and Burundi. Before our data collection started, we went on scoping 
visits to Burundi. During these visits we would   have meetings with international 
organizations and local and international NGOs that were working on the area of 
migration and/or development in Burundi. We interviewed them about the current 
situation in the country and involved them in our research design. Maintaining 
close links with these organizations ensured that our research findings would be 
relevant for them. The Burundi government was also informed about our research 
and we conducted several interviews with government officials to learn about the 
current situation in Burundi. The data collection took place in close collaboration 
with a local research institute (Development Through Expert Consultancy – 
DevEC) and a local university, Université Sagesse d’Afrique.  
Throughout the research have also maintained close ties with members of 
the Burundi diaspora and the different organizations that they were involved in in 
the Netherlands. These actors and diaspora members provided input into the 
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research design and the implementation of the research to ensure that the focus of 
the project and the results that were obtained would be of interest for them. For 
example, before data collection we held consultation meetings with Burundi 
diaspora organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where we introduced our 
research design and the questionnaire that we would use for data collection. 
During these meetings we would receive feedback from the diaspora members, 
which ensured that the questions that we asked during the fieldwork were relevant 
and culturally appropriate. After data collection, we shared our preliminary 
findings with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Burundi diaspora 
organizations to disseminate the results quickly and to receive feedback on our 
findings.  
The research results of this dissertation have been disseminated, and will 
continue to be disseminated in the future, through different means. First, the 
research results have been published, and will be published, in academic papers 
and policy briefs. The empirical chapters that form the body of this dissertation 
have all been either published or sent to academic journals for publication. In 
addition, two policy briefs have been published in the Maastricht Graduate School 
of Governance Migration and Development policy brief series. These policy briefs 
provided insights into the remittance market in Burundi and the diaspora 
engagement policy that is currently being developed. Second, we have shared our 
research results through workshops and conferences that were attended by 
academics, policy makers, diaspora members, and representatives of international 
organizations. In the years to come, we will continue to share our research results 
through these types of events. Third, the data that were collected for the Migration 
and Development: A World in Motion project will become publicly available online in 
the near future. The publication of our survey data will offer other scholars and 
practitioners the opportunity to work with the data and to gain further insights 
into the linkages between migration and development. 
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